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Abstract 
This thesis examines the roles of financial turmoil, which are often captured by extreme capital flow 
waves and financial crises. Building upon emerging literature, I empirically investigate the policy 
dimensions adopted by financial regulators in response to volatile capital flows and financial crises, 
and main drivers of volatile capital flows. In the first essay, I find the evidence that policymakers 
implement the financial policy reforms following a financial crisis, which confirms the crisis-begets-
reform argument. However, such financial policy reform following financial crises generally does not 
include the strengthening of prudential regulation. In the second essay, I find that macroprudential 
policies are likely to be tightened after having a period of sudden decrease in capital inflows and 
controls on capital inflows are likely to be increased following a period of sudden increase in capital 
inflows. The third essay states that the global uncertainty is the main driver of extreme capital flows 
waves. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Since the early 1970s, the world economy is extraordinary in terms of the volatility in commodity 
prices, exchange rates, real estate and stocks, and the frequency and severity of financial crises 
(Kindleberger and Aliber,2011). Rooting from the two oil shocks in 1973 and 1979, the world economy 
went into a deep recession in the 1970s and many Latin American countries faced a liquidity crunch 
since they borrowed against future oil revenue with the debt valued in US dollars. In the wake of 
Mexico's default in 1982, other Latin American countries defaulted on their debts. As a result, the 
world economy experienced again a debt crisis in the early 1980s and saw 0.8 per cent decline in the 
output (Claessens and Kose, 2013), and the 1980s is known as the 'lost decade' of development. At the 
same time, international capital flows have experienced an unprecedented increase in both their 
volume and volatility in the 1980s. Following a period of large capital flows, a number of emerging 
economies in Latin America and Asia experienced a sharp reversal of capital flows in the 1990s, which 
leaded to the Mexican crisis of 1994-1995 and the East Asian crises in the mid- to late 1990s. 
 Not only emerging economies but also developed economies experienced financial crises in 
recent decades as well, from the UK and Nordic countries in the late 1980s to Japan in the 1990s. The 
recent global financial crisis of 2007–2008 originated from the US subprime mortgage problems has 
had a widespread impact on the financial and capital markets of countries around the world. This crisis 
is the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s (Eigner and Umlauft, 2015; Temin, 
2010), and it saw a 2 percent decline in world per capita GDP in 2009 (Claessens and Kose, 2013). 
Subsequently, European debt crisis took place in the European Union from the end of 2009 to 2012, 
and it had significant adverse effects on international trade and global economy. Some areas in the 
world economy are still suffering from the lingering effects of the latest crises. Per capita GDP of some 
advanced economies are still below than it was before the 2008-2009 (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2014). 
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Therefore, some claim that financial crises have become more frequent over time since 
financial integration is the major transmission of shocks between economies. According to Bordo et 
al. (2001), the frequency of crises during the period 1945-1971 was only 38, whereas after 1971, there 
were between three and four times more financial crises than there were in the first period, and the 
sudden stop problem has become more severe. Laeven and Valencia (2013) also report that the world 
experienced 147 banking crises, 217 currency crises, and 67 sovereign debt crises over the period 1970 
to 2011. It is visible that the interconnectedness of the global economy gives rise to the several 
chronologies of incidence and frequency of financial crises. Although steady capital flows are 
beneficial and help increase investment, volatile capital flows can give rise to systemic economic and 
financial risks. Some of the financial distress and crises are initiated by large capital flows, which 
constitute the main source of financial instability (Rodrik, 1998; Aizenman, 2004; Shimpalee and 
Breuer, 2006). Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2011) also document that volatile capital flows are the 
important triggers of local crises. 
Therefore, it can be said that financial crises can have domestic or external origins, stem from 
problems of the private or public sectors, come in different shapes and sizes, and rapidly spread across 
borders. Immediate and comprehensive policy responses are required to address loss and damage 
associated with the adverse effects of financial crises and further financial reforms are needed to 
protect the whole financial sector from future risks and mitigate the financial crises. Understanding the 
drivers and consequences of macroeconomic volatility and the policy response have become 
increasingly popular among policy makers, economists and researchers, and they have been the central 
topics in the empirical and theoretical literature. A number of empirical studies examines which factors 
drive the volatility of capital flows. For instance, Forbes and Warnock (2012) identify four types of 
episodes of extreme capital flow movements (surges, stops, flight, and retrenchment) by using the 
quarterly gross capital flows data from the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial 
Statistics (IFS) and investigate the factors that are associated with these episodes of extreme capital 
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flows. They find the prominent correlation between capital flow waves and global and contagion 
factors, but insignificant correlation with domestic factors. Similarly, Calderón and Kubota (2013) and 
Comelli (2015) also explain the justification for the significant role of global factors in driving extreme 
capital flows.  
At the same time, another group of studies investigate the costs of volatile capital flows, such 
as financial distress and crises, and output loss. For example, Rodrik (1998) and Aizenman (2004) 
argue that large capital flows associated with capital account liberalization constitute the main source 
of financial instability, and Edwards (2004) concludes that they can lead to lower economic growth. 
In addition, some studies (Bekaert et al., 2005; Kose et al., 2009b) examine how capital flows affect 
economic growth and conclude that the effects of capital flows on economic growth depend on the 
form of capital flow. Several studies examine how episodes of volatile capital flows affects real output 
(Calvo, 1998; Calvo & Reinhart, 2000; Cavallo et al., 2015). Literature on the episodes of extreme 
capital flows denote sudden stops (sudden declines in capital inflow) and flights (sudden increases in 
capital outflow) as the types of financial crises. 
On the other hand, various works devoted to the identification of financial crises (such as 
currency, backing, and debt crises) and early warning systems (EWSs) by using some macroeconomic 
indicators. Among them, some works, e.g., (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2011; Eichengreen et al., 1995; 
Pescatori & Sy, 2007) define financial crises based on a certain threshold, whereas others, e.g., (Caprio 
& Klingebiel, 2002; Laeven & Valencia, 2008) identify financial crises based on the authors’ judgment 
or chronological events. While the weak macroeconomic conditions have been denoted as key 
contributors to financial crises (see, e.g., Cuaresma & Slacik, 2009; Catão & Milesi-Ferretti, 2014), 
policy makers and financial regulators seek the appropriate policy response and adopt the financial 
reform with the aim to repair the cracks exposed by the crisis and prevent potential crises in the future. 
A large body of empirical studies examines whether financial policy reform follows a crisis (or 'crisis 
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begets reform' hypothesis) and confirms that financial crises can hasten financial reform (see, e.g., 
Bruno, 1993; Lora & Olivera, 2004; Abiad & Mody, 2005; Waelti, 2015). 
For example, Abiad and Mody (2005) create six dimensions of financial policy reform using 
six measures of financial sector repressiveness, considering 35 economies during the 1973-1996 period 
and investigate whether financial reforms follow a financial crisis. They conclude that specific types 
of crises trigger financial reforms and that different types of crises produce different effects. Following 
their works, many studies also confirm the 'crisis begets reform' hypothesis. Although financial policy 
reform generally includes both liberalization of the financial system and the strengthening of prudential 
regulation, the previous studies on the crisis-begets-reform hypothesis have failed to describe whether 
both financial liberalization and prudential regulation are included during the process of financial 
policy reform or not. In light of this gap in the literature, this thesis is broadly concerned with policy 
responses to different types of financial crises and drivers of volatile capital flows. In consists of three 
essays with particular reference to advanced and emerging economies in the current environment. 
In Chapter 2, I empirically investigate the crisis-begets-reform hypothesis argument in the 
context of financial liberalization and strengthening prudential regulations since financial policy 
reform includes both polices. In addition, I evaluate these policy issues related to the origins of 
financial crises and the policy dimensions of financial policy reform by using five types of financial 
crises data of Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) and the seven individual dimensions of financial policy 
reform of data of Abiad et al. (2008). Following the empirical framework of Abiad and Mody (2005), 
I employ the control function (CF) models, motivated by Heckman (1978) and Maddala (1983). The 
estimated results confirm that the crisis-begets-reform argument in the context of financial 
liberalization by showing that all types of financial crises promote financial liberalization. However, 
financial policy reform following financial crises does not generally include the strengthening of 
prudential regulation. 
10 
 
In Chapter 3, I attempt to discover what types of policy measures, such as macroprudential 
policies or capital controls, or both policies, are adopted by the policy makers in the face of volatile 
capital inflows. In order to test whether countries employ macroprudential policies or capital controls 
following shocks related to volatile capital inflows, following the work of Guidotti et al. (2004), I 
identify two types of capital inflow episodes (sudden stops and surges) by using annual net capital 
inflows and gross capital inflows 110 countries during the period from 2000 to 2013. I employ 
complementary log regression, propensity-score matching (PSM) and inverse-probability-weighted 
regression adjustment (IPWRA) or doubly robust estimations. The estimated results suggest that 
sudden slowdown in both net and gross capital inflows (stops) is likely to tighten macroprudential 
policies, particularly, such capital inflow episodes lead to tighten financial institutions-based policies 
rather than borrower-based policies. Moreover, sharp increase in net capital inflow (surges) is likely 
to increase controls on capital inflows. 
In Chapter 4, I empirically explore how global and contagion and domestic factors relate to 
extreme waves of capital flows, including foreign direct investment, portfolio investment, and other 
investment. In addition, I investigate potential differences in awareness of those factors between 
advanced and developing economies, since few studies have existed on this issue as well. In the first 
part of the essay, following the work of Forbes and Warnock (2012), I classify extreme capital flows 
into four types of episodes (stop, surge, flight, and retrenchment) by using quarterly data on capital 
inflows and outflows in 57 advanced and developing countries covering the period from 2000 to 2015. 
The data is obtained from the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics (IFS). I 
then analyze which factors among global, contagion, and domestic contribute the most to the 
fluctuations of capital flows. The estimated results state that global factors and contagion factors is are 
main driver of fluctuation in capital flows, especially intensified global uncertainty generally increases 
the likelihood of sudden contraction of most types of capital inflows and outflows, and it can decrease 
the likelihood of sudden expansion of all types of capital outflows. More importantly, global 
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uncertainty increases the likelihood of sudden contraction of portfolio investment in both advanced 
and developing economies, while it increases that of foreign direct investment in only advanced 
economies. 
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Chapter 2: Financial crisis and financial policy reform: Crisis 
origins and policy dimensions 
2.1  Introduction 
Since approximately the 1970s, economic liberalization has been recognized as an essential part of 
policy packages. Prior to the 1980s, many countries had exercised a high degree of government 
intervention in their financial systems, but more recently, and particularly since the 1990s, financial 
sectors have undergone deregulation or financial liberalization processes. Financial liberalization 
includes opening up trade to international markets, decreasing government ownership or control of 
financial sectors, and removing regulatory restrictions placed on financial operations. Many studies 
suggest that economic and financial liberalization promotes competition, investment, and economic 
growth (Goldsmith, 1969; McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973; De Haan & Sturm, 2000; Ang & McKibbin, 
2007; Kim & Kenny, 2007; Galindo et al., 2007; Hübler et al., 2008; Baltagi et al., 2009). However, 
financial liberalization can simultaneously foster instability of the financial system or lead to financial 
crises (Chang & Velasco, 2001; Demirgüç-Kunt & Detragiache, 1998; Kaminsky & Reinhart, 1999).1  
To complement or remove the threat of financial instability arising from financial liberalization, 
prudential financial regulation has also attracted significant attention, due in part to the banking 
regulations included in the Basel Accords. Certain studies, such as Fischer and Reisen (1992) and 
Mathieson and Rojas-Suarez (1994), argue that weak regulation and lax supervision of financial 
systems are highly associated with bank failure. In the past, financial regulations emphasized 
restrictions on financial operations (for example, credit and interest rate controls and entry barriers) to 
prevent excessive competition in financial sectors and to secure appropriate profits for financial firms. 
However, as financial liberalization has become more prevalent, the recent trend in financial regulation, 
                                                          
1 There are also studies on the effects of economic and financial liberalization on other macroeconomic conditions. For 
example, Bergh and Nilsson (2010) and de Haan and Sturm (2017) suggest that liberalization increases income 
inequality. 
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called prudential regulation, has placed more emphasis on financial and macroeconomic stability and 
on the reduction of significant damage caused by failures of registered financial intermediaries. 
 Financial policy reform is currently regarded as essential for an economy. Such reform 
generally includes both liberalization of the financial system and the strengthening of prudential 
regulation. Financial regulators often adopt such reforms with the aim to produce a more flexible 
economy to achieve the efficient allocation of financial resources and to prevent potential crises in the 
future. The broadly shared view is that financial policy reform follows a crisis (or that a crisis triggers 
financial reform) to repair the cracks exposed by the crisis; this view is called the crisis-begets-reform 
hypothesis. The term “financial crisis” indicates a situation in which certain financial assets, including 
a large part of their nominal value, are lost in a heightened sense of urgency. A large body of literature 
states that financial crises can hasten financial reform (see, e.g., Bruno, 1993; Lora & Olivera, 2004; 
Abiad & Mody, 2005; Waelti, 2015).  
The crucial assumption in past studies is that a financial crisis is treated as an exogenous shock. 
However, many empirical studies report that macroeconomic conditions affect the likelihood of 
financial crises (see, e.g., Cuaresma & Slacik, 2009; Bussiere & Fratzscher, 2006; Catão & Milesi-
Ferretti, 2014), which would create an endogeneity problem. A primary objective of this study is to re-
evaluate the crisis-begets-reform hypothesis, i.e., to investigate whether financial regulators respond 
to a financial crisis by enacting financial policy reforms and whether they react in a forceful or 
panicked manner. Unlike past works that assume financial crises are exogenous, we examine this 
policy issue by addressing possible endogeneity problems with the consideration of how 
macroeconomic environments determine both financial policy reform and financial crises. To do so, 
we apply the financial policy reform framework of Abiad and Mody (2005) with endogenous treatment 
effects models motivated by Heckman (1978) and Maddal (1983). In particular, we estimate the 
average treatment effect (ATE) of a financial crisis on the financial policy reform process.  
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In general, the origins of financial crises can be classified into several types (e.g., banking, 
currency, and sovereign debt crises, and sudden stop episodes) and there are significant differences 
among them (see, e.g., Laeven & Valencia, 2008, 2013; Reinhart & Rogoff, 2011). Thus, the origin of 
a financial crisis is an important factor in the relationship between a financial crisis and financial policy 
reform. Financial regulators may respond differently to financial crises depending on their origins. In 
addition, determining the policy dimensions adopted by financial regulators in response to financial 
crises is crucial. Financial policy reform has two main components: financial liberalization and 
prudential regulation. Financial liberalization itself encompasses various policy dimensions, including 
capital account controls and banking sector controls. Depending on the observed origin of a financial 
crisis, financial regulators may adopt different financial policy measures or dimensions.  
This study attempts to evaluate these policy issues related to the origins of financial crises and 
the policy dimensions of financial policy reform. An examination of these issues could provide 
important policy assessments and guidance regarding the responses of financial regulators to different 
types of financial crises in a globalized economy. To the best of our knowledge, no extensive empirical 
study has examined how the origin of a financial crisis relates to financial policy reform and its various 
dimensions. The insights regarding financial liberalization and prudential regulatory policies 
implemented in response to different types of financial crises should be explored carefully to 
thoroughly understand the implications of the crisis-begets-reform hypothesis. One exception may 
include the work of Waelti (2015), who examines whether crisis origins matter when studying the 
relationship between financial crises and financial reform but does not account for the presence of 
endogeneity. Thus, our study attempts to fill this gap in the literature by empirically analyzing the role 
of financial crisis origins in regulators’ choice of financial policy dimensions when implementing 
financial policy reform. This objective describes an important contribution of this paper to the literature. 
To measure the promotion of financial policy reform, we use the aggregate index of financial 
liberalization, the six individual dimensions of financial liberalization (i.e., capital account restrictions, 
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credit controls, interest rate controls, entry barriers, state ownership in the banking sector, and 
securities market policy), and the measure of prudential regulation constructed by Abiad et al. (2008). 
To capture financial crises, we use the five types of financial crises described by Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2011): currency, banking, domestic debt, external debt, and inflation crises. We use annual data from 
61 countries covering the period from 1975 to 2005. For the robustness checks, we use the three- and 
five-year non-overlapping interval data of Abiad et al. (2008) and the five-year non-overlapping 
interval data of Gwartney et al. (2016). Our empirical model controls for several macroeconomic 
variables, including the credit gap, output gap, and presence of an IMF program, because these 
variables are expected to be associated with the promotion of financial policy reform or the occurrence 
of financial crises.  
The results in this paper indicate that financial crisis episodes generally operate as catalysts for 
financial policy reform. More importantly, our results support the crisis-begets-reform argument in the 
context of financial liberalization. Specifically, we find that financial policy reform mainly involves 
the promotion of financial liberalization rather than the fortification of prudential regulation, i.e., 
financial crises tend to promote ‘incomplete’ financial policy reform. Walter (2003) suggests that 
financial policy reform often fails to include prudential regulation, which he calls implementation 
failure, because financial liberalization is easier to implement than prudential regulation due to 
imperfect technical knowledge, the difficulty of implementing prudential supervision, and the 
existence of rent-seeking groups that block reforms. Several studies suggest that financial liberalization 
and prudential regulation are equally important, noting that financial liberalization without prudential 
regulation leads to a dangerous combination of financial policies that could give rise to financial 
distress (Mishkin, 2001; Rosenbluth & Schaap, 2003). Thus, prudential regulation should be viewed 
as a necessary precursor of financial liberalization. Our results are generally robust even when we use 
the three- and five-year non-overlapping interval data of Abiad et al. (2008) and the five-year non-
overlapping interval data of Gwartney et al. (2016) instead of annual data. In addition, our analysis 
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reveals that financial regulators’ choice of policy dimensions in response to financial crises varies 
depending on crisis origin.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a selective review of 
the literature on financial crises, financial policy reform, and the relationship between financial crises 
and financial policy reform. Section 3 explains the methodology, empirical specification, and data used 
in this study. Section 4 presents the empirical results and their economic implications, as well as a 
sensitivity analysis. The final section concludes the paper with a policy discussion. 
 
2.2  Literature review 
This section summarizes a selective review of the literature on financial crises, financial policy reform 
and the relationship between financial crises and financial policy reform. The objective of this review 
is to highlight certain findings that may help us to better understand the relationship between financial 
crises and financial policy reform. 
 
2.2.1  Financial crises 
Various works devoted to the identification of financial crises and early warning systems (EWSs) 
endeavor to provide possible policy solutions to mitigate or prevent future crises. Some works define 
financial crises based on a certain threshold (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2011; Eichengreen et al., 1995; 
Pescatori & Sy, 2007), whereas others identify financial crises based on the authors’ judgment or 
chronological events (Caprio & Klingebiel, 2002; Laeven & Valencia, 2008, 2013). Recent studies on 
international financial flows identify episodes of sudden stop and flight as a sign of the deterioration 
of economic conditions (Calvo et al., 2004; Rothenberg & Warnock, 2011; Cowan et al., 2008; Waelti, 
2015). In general, financial crises are classified into several types, namely, currency, banking, domestic 
debt, external debt, inflation, and capital market crises.  
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Currency crises are generally identified based on large real or nominal exchange rate 
depreciation (Frankel & Rose, 1996; Reinhart & Rogoff, 2011) or intensified exchange market 
pressure (EMP), which is often indicated by changes in the nominal exchange rate and foreign reserves 
(Eichengreen et al., 1995; Kaminsky et al., 1998). Eichengreen et al. (1995) identify political instability, 
public budget and current account deficits, monetary growth, and prices as the key determinants of 
exchange rate devaluation, whereas Frankel and Rose (1996) state that currency crises tend to occur 
when decreases in foreign direct investment coincide with low levels of foreign reserves and high 
levels of domestic credit growth. Currency crises often exert negative effects on the labor market, 
particularly with respect to poor individuals, and cause output, foreign borrowing, and real domestic 
credit to remain below their previous trends for many years (Baldacci et al., 2002; Hong & Tornell, 
2005). Regarding developing countries, the original sin argument describes the inability of these 
countries to borrow from external economies in their own respective currencies (see Eichengreen & 
Hausmann, 2005, for a comprehensive review). Firms that borrow foreign currency from abroad 
experience profit reductions due to significant currency depreciation, which in turn leads to decreased 
investment and output (Aghion et al., 2004). 
Banking crises are primarily identified based on intuitive judgment or chronological events due 
to the difficulty of empirical identification; consequently, there is no consensus on a precise definition. 
For example, Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) define a banking crisis as a situation of financial distress 
wherein a banking system has a negative net worth. Laeven and Valencia (2008) identify systemic 
banking crises based on several criteria, including significant signs of financial distress in the banking 
system and significant banking policy intervention measures. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) identify 
banking crises based on financial distress and systemic problems without distinguishing between 
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them.2 Chaudron and de Haan (2014) compare these three databases on banking crises and report that 
differences in the methods used to identify and date banking crises may lead to different conclusions.  
Many empirical works explore the determinants of banking crises. Although the impact of 
certain macroeconomic conditions is less clear, most studies show that banking crises are likely to be 
associated with low levels of economic growth, foreign reserves on the central bank’s balance sheet, 
and liquidity in the banking system, as well as high levels of inflation, public debt, private credit, and 
credit growth (Demirgüç-Kunt & Detragiache, 1998; Hardy & Pazarbasioglu, 1998; Gourinchas & 
Obstfeld, 2012; Davis & Karim, 2008). Other studies analyze the effects of banking crises on the 
macroeconomy. For example, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Eichengreen and Rose (1998) show 
that bank distress tends to cause significant declines in output growth and private credit growth and 
Hutchison and McDill (1999) report that during periods following bank distress, economies are 
characterized by sharp declines in asset prices and low economic growth. Caprio and Klingebiel (2002) 
show that significant financial costs prevail after banking crises, and Laeven and Valencia (2008) study 
data for 129 countries from 1970 to 2009 and estimate that the average cumulative cost for the first 
four years after a systemic banking crisis is approximately 23 percent of the GDP. 
The existing literature on debt crises uses several approaches to define them. Most works 
identify debt crises based on the concept of a critical value, i.e., whether a particular indicator exceeds 
some arbitrary level (Detragiache & Spilimbergo, 2001; Pescatori & Sy, 2007), whereas others apply 
accounting judgment, i.e., whether there are defaults on or restructurings of debt obligations or 
payment suspensions (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2011). Debt crises are often classified as one of two types: 
external and domestic. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) suggest that although defaults on domestic debt 
are less frequent and are given less attention than defaults on foreign debt, compared with crises based 
                                                          
2 Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) consider two events to constitute banking crises. The first event, type I (systemic), is 
characterized by bank runs that lead to the closure, merging or takeover by the public sector of one or more financial 
institutions. The second event, type II (financial distress), corresponds to a situation without bank runs where the closure, 
merging, takeover, or large-scale government assistance of an important financial institution marks the start of a string of 
similar outcomes for other financial institutions (see also Chaudron & de Haan, 2014). 
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on external default, domestic debt crises typically occur in situations of greater duress. Many empirical 
studies have examined the determinants and effects of debt crises. Among them, Manasse et al. (2003), 
Ciarlone and Trebeschi (2005), and Catão and Milesi-Ferretti (2014) reveal that debt crises are likely 
to occur when countries face high levels of external debt, public debt, and current account deficits and 
low levels of economic growth and trade openness. Manasse et al. (2003) also find that political 
uncertainty may be a source of debt crises. Regarding the costs of debt crises, Levy-Yeyati and Panizza 
(2011) and Furceri and Zdzienicka (2012) posit that debt crises can cause declines in output. Moreover, 
Furceri and Zdzienicka (2012) report that debt crises are costlier than currency and banking crises 
because debt crises can cause substantial long-term losses in output levels. 
Like other types of financial crises, inflation crises and stock market crashes are identified 
using the threshold concept. Reinhart and Rogoff (2011), among others, define an inflation crisis as 
one that occurs when the annual inflation rate exceeds some threshold level and define a stock market 
crisis as a decline in the return on a given index of stocks below some threshold level. Several empirical 
studies examine the link between these financial crises and macroeconomic conditions. For example, 
Han and Mulligan (2002) discuss hyperinflation and public spending and Claessens and Kose (2013) 
show that inflation crises negatively affect the macroeconomy and note that inflation stabilization takes 
a long time because of the need to restore public confidence in the national currency. 
 
2.2.2  Financial policy reform 
Policy reform is a process of policy changes and includes financial liberalization and prudential 
regulation. Several studies, such as Bruno and Easterly (1998) and Drazen and Easterly (2001), identify 
policy reforms either indirectly, by observing changes in macroeconomic variables, or directly, by 
observing changes in the policy regime, e.g., capital account openness and the exchange rate regime 
(Waelti, 2015). Many countries have recently adopted a series of financial policy reforms designed to 
stimulate efficiency in the economy; consequently, financial policy reform has received a great deal 
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of academic attention. Numerous studies have attempted to construct direct measures of financial 
policy reform and of certain individual policy dimensions (Williamson & Mahar, 1998; Bandiera et 
al., 2000; Edison & Warnock, 2003; Laeven, 2003; Clemens & Williamson, 2004; Abiad & Mody, 
2005; Abiad et al., 2008; Kaminsky & Schmukler, 2008; Campos & Horváth, 2012; Gwartney et al., 
2016). The recent development of comprehensive panel datasets on financial policy reform, including 
systematic information across countries over time, enables us to empirically analyze the links between 
financial policy reform and macroeconomic conditions, including financial crises (Bumann et al., 
2013; Agnello et al, 2015a, 2015b; Waelti, 2015).  
For example, Williamson and Mahar (1998) construct six graded indexes of financial reforms 
(credit controls, interest rate controls, entry barriers, regulations, privatization, and international capital 
flows) for 34 economies over the period 1973-1996. Laeven (2003) also identifies six reform measures 
(interest rate controls, entry barriers, reserve requirements, credit controls, privatization, and prudential 
regulation) in a study of 13 countries over the period 1988-1998. In addition, Edison and Warnock 
(2003) measure capital controls for 29 emerging markets during 1989-2000 using monthly stock 
market capitalization. Kaminsky and Schmukler (2008) construct three indexes of financial reform, 
namely, domestic banking industry liberalization, capital account liberalization, and domestic stock 
market liberalization, for 28 countries between 1973 and 2005. Moreover, Gwartney et al. (2016) 
develop five broad areas of economic freedom (size of the government; the legal system and property 
rights; soundness of the monetary system; freedom to trade internationally; and regulation) using forty-
two distinct variables. Several studies, including Pitlik and Wirth (2003), and de Haan and Sturm (2000, 
2017), use the data of Gwartney et al. (2016) relating to economic freedom in the financial sector as 
an alternative measure of financial policy reform. 
Abiad and Mody (2005) create six dimensions of financial policy reform using six measures of 
financial sector repressiveness (credit controls, interest rate controls, entry barriers, operational 
regulations, privatization, and capital controls), considering 35 economies during the 1973-1996 
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period. Abiad et al. (2008) extend the approach developed by Abiad and Mody (2005) by adding 
indexes of securities market policy and prudential regulation policy. Their dataset is highly 
comprehensive and internationally comparable and has rather significant advantages over other 
datasets. First, their dataset has greater country and time coverage than other datasets, encompassing 
91 countries and spanning the period from 1973 to 2005. In addition, their reform indicators cover 
seven specific financial policy reform measures (credit controls, interest rate controls, entry barriers, 
privatization, international capital flows, securities market policy, and banking supervision) plus an 
aggregate index.3 Using their dataset, with its individual dimensions of financial policy reform, we can 
examine whether the relevant reforms are implemented specifically to address individual financial 
crises. Only one dimension among the seven indexes, prudential regulation, is coded as a prudential 
reform toward more government intervention; the other six dimensions are coded as reforms toward 
financial liberalization.  
 
2.2.3  Financial crises and financial policy reform 
Financial crises can damage macroeconomic conditions and sometimes result in severe and long-
lasting recessions, leading to calls for reforms in financial sectors to avoid or remedy such crises. It is 
widely accepted that financial restructuring policies and institutional reforms are needed after a 
financial crisis. Thus, a solid relationship between financial crises and financial policy reform is 
expected. In other words, a crisis is an instigator of reform, reflecting the crisis-begets-reform 
hypothesis (see Drazen, 2011, for a more detailed discussion).  
A large body of literature discusses the relationships between crises and policy reform. 
Historically, many countries have experienced crises and then the regulatory responses to these crises, 
supporting the view that crises accelerate reforms (Lora & Olivera, 2004). Rodrik (1996) notes that a 
nation falls into a crisis when its policy fails and thus government reforms are necessary because the 
                                                          
3 For a more complete description of the construction of the dataset, see Abiad et al. (2008).  
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previous policy has proven unsuccessful. Bruno (1993) suggests that an economic crisis is essential 
for a major reform, which rarely occurs without one, and Bates and Krueger (1993) contend that 
reforms are not needed under good economic conditions and are undertaken more often when 
economic conditions deteriorate or when new governments assume political power. Asatryan et al. 
(2017) argue that although a crisis is a potent catalyst for reform, the existence of powerful bureaucrats 
limits the ability to implement reforms following a crisis. Masciandaro and Romelli (2017) state that 
financial crises are associated with reforms that increase the involvement of central banks in the 
supervision of entire financial sectors, and Hallerberg and Scartascini (2017) emphasize the role of 
banking crises in the timing of tax reforms. Olson (1982) and Drazen and Grilli (1993) emphasize that 
a crisis must be sufficiently severe to trigger major reform, and Harberger (1993) states that in addition 
to the depth of a crisis, its duration is a crucial factor in the relation between reform and crisis.  
In general, reforms lead to uncertain outcomes, which could encourage preserving the status 
quo and thus increase the difficulty of implementing reforms (Fernandez & Rodrik, 1991; Przeworski, 
1991; Laban & Sturzenegger, 1994a, 1994b). One possible explanation of the crisis-begets-reform 
argument is that a successful economy creates powerful vested interest groups, which may involve 
bureaucratic red tape, and such groups do not like reforms; hence, severe economic deterioration is 
needed to weaken the influence of these special interest groups (Nelson, 1990).4 Moreover, Tornell 
(1998) and Drazen (2000) argue that an economic crisis reduces cooperation among different interest 
groups, which may increase the likelihood of reform. 
Recently, several empirical studies have explored the relationships among various types of 
crises and the dimensions of financial policy reform using comprehensive datasets of financial crises 
and financial policy reforms, as discussed in the previous subsections. Abiad and Mody (2005) show 
                                                          
4 Williamson (1994) confirms this explanation by citing specific cases. For example, New Zealand undertook more 
reforms than Australia because the situation in Australia was less severe. In addition, in 1987, the Brazilian finance 
minister suggested that his fiscal package was not supported by the president because the crisis was not considered 
serious. 
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that specific types of crises trigger financial reforms and that different types of crises produce different 
effects. Waelti (2015) states that the origin of a crisis is a relevant factor in the nexus between financial 
crisis and financial reform. Pitlik and Wirth (2003) demonstrate that financial crises promote financial 
policy reform through financial liberalization. Simmons and Elkins (2004) note that a currency crisis 
has a significant positive effect on capital account openness. Moreover, Agnello et al. (2015a, 2015b) 
state that crisis episodes, such as debt, banking, and currency crises, lead to structural reform, including 
financial reform. Nevertheless, empirical studies that examine how different types of crises relate to 
prudential regulation or to different dimensions of financial liberalization are relatively scarce.5  
In addition, several studies report that the ideology of the ruling government, structural features, 
and financial assistance play critical roles in accelerating financial policy reform. Indeed, a number of 
studies indicate that right-wing governments are more reform-oriented than left-wing governments 
(Alesina & Roubini, 1992; Cukierman & Tommasi, 1998; Bortolotti et al., 2004; Bortolotti & Pinotti, 
2008; Roberts & Saeed, 2012). Supporting this view, Williamson (1994) shows that right-wing 
governments introduce most policy reforms. Additionally, structural features, such as the degree of 
trade and financial openness, can influence the likelihood of financial reforms (Rajan & Zingales, 
2003). Likewise, financial assistance, including assistance received from IMF programs, dilutes the 
effects of financial crises, thereby facilitating the implementation of reforms, as noted by Drazen 
(2000), Svensson (2000), and Fernández-Arias and Montiel (2001). 
 
2.3  Empirical approach 
2.3.1  Methodology  
                                                          
5 Regarding the different dimensions of financial policy reform, Horvath and Vasko (2016) examine the role of banking 
crises on financial stability transparency (mainly that of central banks) and find that banking crises have a negative effect 
on financial stability transparency in a sample restricted to countries in which central banks are obliged to safeguard 
financial stability. The authors note that banking crises do not affect financial stability transparency globally but that 
central banks are more reluctant to increase transparency when they are charged legally to safeguard financial stability. 
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Several alternative procedures can be used to address endogeneity problems in regression models. 
Some studies utilize instrumental variables (IVs), whereas others adopt the control function (CF) 
approach. Both approaches produce generally comparable estimates (Robinson, 1989; Vella & 
Verbeek, 1999). Although IV approaches may seem more attractive, it is often difficult to find an 
appropriate instrument, i.e., one that is both highly correlated with the treatment conditions and 
independent of the error term of the outcome regression.6 In addition, when an endogenous treatment 
variable is binary, the process of creating an instrument and a binary dependent variable leads to 
complications in the regression analysis (see Aldrich & Nelson, 1984).  
To mitigate the difficulty of applying the IV approach, one possible way is to apply CF models, 
motivated by Heckman (1974, 1978) and Maddal (1983). In CF models, the variables included in the 
selection equation should be based on economic grounds (Vella & Verbeek, 1999). In this study, we 
apply one of the CF models, an endogenous treatment effects model, because our endogenous 
treatment variable is binary. This model is also called an endogenous binary variable (dummy variable) 
model, which is a linear potential outcome model that allows for a specific correlation structure 
between the unobservables that affect the treatment and the unobservables that affect potential 
outcomes (Heckman, 1978). Maddala (1983) derives full-information maximum likelihood (FIML) 
and two-step estimation procedures and describes the model as a constrained endogenous-switching 
model.7 The advantage of an endogenous treatment effects model is that it corrects for selection bias 
while estimating treatment effectiveness. 
                                                          
6 For the IV method, exclusion restrictions are generally difficult to find because they must be exogenous (they do not 
affect the outcome) and relevant (they affect treatment selection). If the exclusion restrictions affect the outcome, the 
problem of excessive mean-squared errors arises (Bartels, 1991). If the exclusion restrictions weakly affect selection, the 
inconsistency problem arises, even in large samples (Bound et al., 1995). See Basinger and Ensley (2010) for a detailed 
explanation of these issues. 
7 Endogenous treatment effects models can be estimated using a two-step approach or the FIML method. A key feature is 
that the error terms in the two equations (i.e., the primary regression and selection equations) are distributed bivariate 
normal. When the assumption of the error terms is satisfied, the FIML method has efficiency advantages (Maddala, 
1985). Although the FIML relies heavily on the normality assumption, this study applies the FIML method. 
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The purpose of estimating endogenous treatment effects models is to determine an ATE. The 
model is expressed in two equations: a primary regression equation and a selection equation. In our 
analysis, the financial policy reform and financial crisis models correspond to primary regression and 
selection equations, respectively. The financial policy reform model, which is of our interest, can be 
described by 
Yit = αXit + γFCit + εit,        (1)   
where Yit is the measure of the speed of financial policy reform; Xit is a set of control variables; FCit
 
is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if country i experiences a financial crisis in period t and 
a value of zero otherwise and is assumed to stem from an unobservable latent variable FCit
∗ ; and εit is 
a random component. In the financial crisis model, the latent variable FCit
∗  is linearly dependent on a 
set of control variables Zit and a random component μit: 
FCit
∗ = aZit + μit,         (2) 
where FCit = 1  if FCit
∗ > 0 , and FCit = 0  otherwise. In this selection equation, Zit  refers to the 
covariates used to model the treatment assignment, and the error terms εit and μit are assumed to be 
bivariate normal, such that their means are zero, their correlation is ρ, and their variances are σ2 and 
one, respectively, i.e., the covariance matrix is [
σ2 ρσ
ρσ 1
]. This study applies the FIML estimation 
wherein the primary regression and selection equations are estimated simultaneously (Maddala, 1983). 
The proper endogeneity test is a likelihood ratio or Wald test of the two equations’ independence, with 
the null hypothesis being that the treatment variable is exogenous, i.e., ρ = 0. If ρ is close to zero, the 
treatment variable is exogenous, and the results are biased. In this situation, an endogenous treatment 
effects model may be inappropriate (Basinger & Ensley, 2010). 
Let Yit
0 denote the outcome or measure of the speed of financial policy reform undertaken by 
country i if the country does not experience a financial crisis, and let Yit
1 denote the outcome or measure 
of the speed of financial policy reform undertaken by country i if the country experiences a financial 
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crisis, where Yit = FCit × Yit
1 + (1 − FCit) × Yit
0 . Then, the ATE, which is the average difference 
between the treated potential outcomes and the control potential outcomes, is described by ATE =
E(Yit
1 − Yit
0). 
 
2.3.2  Empirical specification  
This subsection describes the financial policy reform model and the financial crisis model to explain 
how a financial crisis is associated with financial policy reform in the framework of our endogenous 
treatment effects model. Our primary regression equation for financial policy reform, which aims to 
assess how a financial crisis determines the evolution of financial policy reform, follows the empirical 
framework of Abiad and Mody (2005), who assume that domestic learning, regional learning, different 
types of shocks, social features, and political factors are related to the promotion of financial policy 
reform.  
As discussed in Abiad and Mody (2005), domestic learning reflects the status quo bias, which 
implies a dynamic relationship between the level of financial sector reform and subsequent policy 
changes (initial reforms increase the likelihood of further reforms). Shehzad and De Haan (2009) state 
that after a country has implemented one reform, the introduction of additional reforms becomes easier. 
Domestic learning is a nonlinear effect of the existing process of financial liberalization on further 
reforms and is represented as the function of the existing level of financial policy reform, DLi,t =
FINRi,t(1 − FINRi,t). FINRi,t is the measure of financial policy reform for country i in year t, and 
1−FINRi,t captures the gap between the full (desired) and current levels of financial policy reform, 
where the full level is assumed to be one. In our model, we normalize the measure of financial policy 
reform to range from zero to one so that the full level of financial policy reform implies FINR = 1.8 It 
is expected that the coefficient of DLi,t is positive. 
                                                          
8 Abiad and Mody (2005) model domestic learning by α(FL∗ − FL), where α is a measure of status quo bias, FL∗ = 1 is 
the desired level of financial liberalization, and FL is the current level of financial liberalization. A lower α means a 
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Regional learning reflects regional diffusion and is represented as the function of the regional 
gap in financial policy reform levels between the country and its regional leader, denoted as RLi,t =
REGFINRi,t − FINRi,t, where REGFINRi,t is the financial policy reform level of the regional leader.
9 
The idea of regional learning (or diffusion) is that countries within a region will attempt to “catch up” 
with the highest (or regional leader’s) level of financial policy reform within the region.10 Observing 
the regional leader’s financial policy can reduce uncertainty regarding the costs and benefits of reform, 
and financial policy reform will be necessary to attract external capital flows under regional 
competition (Abiad & Mody, 2005). Meseguer (2006) also suggests that the presence of a regional 
learning process leads to expectations among policy makers of similar changes in their own regions. 
In this study, all countries are divided into seven regions in accordance with the World Bank region 
classification (Table 1). In each region, the country with the highest level of financial policy reform is 
the regional leader. 
Our dependent variable in the financial policy reform model (primary regression equation) is 
the annual change in the measure of financial policy reform (∆FINRi,t) rather than its level, which is 
consistent with the approach taken in previous empirical studies on how financial policy changes over 
time rather than what it is at a given time. Because financial policy reform is the process of changing 
and updating existing financial policies, the financial reform literature focuses on how things change 
                                                          
greater status quo bias. Then, they assume that the resistance to reform is described by α = θFL, where the status quo 
bias is the highest when the financial sector is highly regulated or repressed and the bias decreases as liberalization 
increases, i.e., θ > 0. Accordingly, the domestic learning variable can be rewritten as θFL(FL∗ − FL) = θFL(1 − FL). 
9 Elhorst et al. (2013) argue that the regional leader matrix in the empirical framework of Abiad and Mody (2005) has 
several problems: (1) it assumes that a country’s financial reform is motivated only by the regional leader’s financial 
liberalization, and it does not consider the influence of countries located outside the region, e.g., important trading 
partners; (2) it does not test for whether the financial liberalization index has a spatial unit root or whether the process is 
spatially cointegrated; (3) it does not consider that the financial liberalization level of the regional leader hardly changes 
over time; and (4) it does not consider time-period effects. Elhorst et al. (2013) employ spatial econometric analysis to 
mitigate these problems. One motivation for our study is to re-evaluate the relationship between financial crises and 
financial policy reform (and its policy dimensions) considering possible endogenous issues. Thus, although the spatial 
econometric approach is a possible analytical method, we apply the CF approach introduced by Heckman (1974, 1978) 
and Maddal (1983) to address possible endogeneity issues. 
10 The previous literature discusses international policy diffusion in the context of policy formulation (see, e.g., Buera et 
al., 2011; Volden et al., 2008; Simmons & Elkins, 2004; Callander & Harstad, 2015). In the present study, this argument 
can be closely related to regional learning or diffusion in our model specification.  
31 
 
over time or on the speed of financial policy reform (∆FINR). In this study, we consider two major 
aspects of financial policy reform, financial liberalization and prudential regulation, and then evaluate 
six dimensions of financial liberalization (capital account restrictions, credit controls, interest rate 
controls, entry barriers, state ownership in the banking sector, and securities market policy) based on 
the data of Abiad et al. (2008). Following the empirical works of Abaid and Mody (2005) and Waelti 
(2015), our financial policy reform equation is as follows: 
∆FINRi,t = α0 + α1DLi,t−1 + α2RLi,t−1 + α3CRISISi,t−1 + ∑ βkXk,i,tk + δi + λt + εit, 
where DLi,t−1 and RLi,t−1 are domestic learning and regional learning (or diffusion), respectively, in 
country i at time t − 1; CRISISi,t−1 is a dummy for the financial crisis; Xk,i,t are other control variables 
expected to affect the speed of financial policy reform; δi and λt are the terms for fixed effects and 
year-specific effects, respectively; and εit is the error term. To account for the origins of financial 
crises or crisis types, this study considers five types of financial crises (currency, banking, external 
debt, domestic debt, and inflation crises) for the crisis variable (CRISIS). Based in part on the argument 
that a reform process may take some time to implement, we use one-lagged values for domestic and 
regional learning variables and the financial crisis variable in an effort to minimize the potential 
problem of reserve causality (see Drazen, 2009). 
Other control variables include the output gap, trade openness and the existence of an IMF 
program (IMF). The output gap is measured as the cyclical component of the log of real GDP. The 
cyclical component, which is equivalent to the difference between the log of real GDP and its trend 
component, is derived by the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter. Certain studies, such as Agnello et al., 
(2015b) show that financial reform is affected by a country’s macroeconomic conditions, including 
recession. Trade openness is measured by the ratio of the sum of exports and imports of goods and 
services to GDP. Several studies, such as Rajan and Zingales (2003), document the link between trade 
integration and financial policy liberalization. Controlling for trade openness thus allows us to capture 
the relation between international economic integration and financial policy reform. In addition, it is 
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widely acknowledged that the presence of an IMF program can facilitate financial policy reforms. 
Financial assistance during periods of crisis, which is typically provided through IMF programs, 
dilutes the macroeconomic effects of financial crises, although this outcome is debatable. The receipt 
of IMF assistance requires compliance with program conditions, and the IMF is involved in the reform 
process, which increases the crisis-affected country’s efforts to promote reform (Drazen, 2000; 
Svensson, 2000; Fernández-Arias & Montiel, 2001).  
The model also incorporates two political factors, the age of the government and the political 
orientation of the executive power, following the works of Abiad and Mody (2005) and Waelti (2015). 
For the age of the government, we include a dummy variable to indicate the first year of a new 
government or the incumbent ( FIRST ). As noted by Krueger (1993), reforms are likely to be 
implemented when a new government comes into power. In addition, the political orientation of the 
executive power is represented by the ideology of the ruling party (left, right, or center), which is likely 
to affect the process of national policy formation (De Haan & Sturm, 1994). Thus, the model includes 
two dummies for left- and right-wing ruling parties (LEFT and RIGHT). Finally, country and year 
dummies are included to control for country- and year-specific fixed effects. 
Regarding the selection equation in this study, we employ a probit model to estimate the 
financial crisis model: 
CRISISit
∗ = γ0 + ∑ γmZm,i,tm + μit, 
where CRISISit
∗  is the latent variable, with CRISISit = 1 if CRISISit
∗ > 0 and CRISISit = 0 otherwise; 
Zm,i,t is a set of the covariates that are expected to affect the treatment assignment; and μit is the error 
term. We estimate each of the five types of financial crisis models (currency, banking, external debt, 
domestic debt, and inflation crises). The choice of the explanatory variables is motivated by past 
literature on financial crises. The model includes several covariates, which are three common 
macroeconomic variables (credit gap, output gap, and trade openness), as well as other macroeconomic 
variables that depend on the type of financial crisis. 
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Concerning common covariates, the financial crisis model includes the credit gap and output 
gap to capture the credit health and overall macroeconomic conditions of a country, respectively. A 
number of previous studies emphasize the role of credit and explain that financial crises tend to be 
preceded by rapid expansions of credit (McKinnon & Pill 1997; Kaminsky & Reinhart 1999; 
Schularick & Taylor, 2012). Many studies discuss the relationship between output and financial crises, 
and several of them state that higher economic growth is likely to reduce vulnerability to a financial 
crisis (Cuaresma & Slacik, 2009; Davis & Karim, 2008). The credit and output gaps are defined as the 
cyclical components of the ratio of credit to GDP and the log of real GDP, respectively, which are 
derived using the HP filter. In addition, to capture the degree of a country's commercial links to the 
rest of the world, the model includes trade openness, which is measured by the ratio of the sum of 
exports and imports to GDP, as a common explanatory variable. Trade integration is expected to be 
closely related to a country’s vulnerability to financial crises. A number of studies suggest that trade 
openness can reduce the probability of a financial crisis (Ciarlone & Trebeschi, 2005; Cavallo & 
Frankel, 2008). 
Our financial crisis models also include different variables depending on the type of financial 
crisis. First, we incorporate the inflation rate into the financial crisis models (except for the inflation 
crisis model) to capture the stability of the macroeconomy and the monetary system. High inflation 
can be harmful to a country's economy due to its distortional effects. Many studies, including 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2005) and Evrensel (2008), state that inflation is a determinant of 
financial crises. Because several developing countries in our sample experience large fluctuations in 
inflation rates, we use the transformation of the inflation rate, i.e., π/(1 + π), where π is the inflation 
rate based on the consumer price index. Second, we include the ratio of foreign reserves to external 
debt in the currency and external debt crisis models. Central banks typically use their foreign reserves 
to control foreign exchange rates or prevent abrupt currency depreciation by intervening in foreign 
exchange markets. An economy with a high level of foreign reserves can thus shield itself against 
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external shocks, such as currency turmoil and associated external debt surges (Obstfeld et al., 2010; 
Catão & Milesi-Ferretti, 2014). Third, this study includes the ratio of the current account balance to 
GDP in the currency and domestic debt crisis models. The current account balance reflects the external 
balance, or the balance between domestic savings and investment in an economy. A current account 
deficit tends to increase the risk of currency and sovereign debt crises (Cuaresma & Slacík, 2009; 
Edwards, 1984; Beirne & Fratzscher, 2013). 
 Fourth, we include the ratio of private sector credit to GDP in the banking crisis model to 
capture the banking system development of a country. Creane et al. (2004) state that private credit 
captures the extent of a country’s banking system development. Certain studies suggest that a high 
level of banking system development decreases the probability of a banking crisis (Demirgüç-Kunt & 
Detragiache, 2005; Davis & Karim, 2008). Fifth, this study controls for an economy’s burden of 
internal indebtedness by including the ratio of public debt to GDP in the banking, domestic debt, and 
inflation crisis models. A high level of public debt, which often leads to rising interest rates, increases 
the probability of default or a sovereign debt crisis (Aizenman et al., 2013; Beirne & Fratzscher, 2013). 
Sixth, we incorporate the ratio of foreign liabilities to GDP in the external debt crisis model to account 
for external indebtedness. Countries with a high level of external debt are more vulnerable to external 
debt crises than those with non-debt liabilities (Catão & Milesi-Ferretti, 2014).11 Finally, we include 
money supply growth in the inflation crisis model because traditional monetary theory suggests that 
growth of the money supply is the cause of inflation.  
 
2.3.3  Data 
The empirical analysis is based on panel data for 61 advanced and developing countries during the 
sample period of 1975 to 2005 (Table 1). The data on financial policy reform and its seven multi-
                                                          
11 We use the ratio of gross foreign liabilities to GDP as a measure of external debt. Shin (2012) and Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2010) suggest that gross debt exposure is more relevant than net debt exposure, but Henderson and Rogoff (1982) claim 
that net foreign assets measures the macroeconomic instability of an economy. 
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dimensional indexes are obtained from Abiad et al. (2008). Seven dimensions of financial policy 
reform are included: (1) capital account restrictions, (2) credit controls, (3) interest rate controls, (4) 
entry barriers, (5) state ownership in the banking sector, (6) securities market policy, and (7) prudential 
regulations and supervision of the banking industry (see Table 2 for a brief explanation). The first six 
dimensions measure financial liberalization, whereas the last dimension indicates the degree of bank 
regulation. Abiad et al. (2008) assign each of the first six dimensions a value between zero and three 
(zero for full repression, one for partial repression, two for partial liberalization, and three for full 
liberalization). These researchers also give the last dimension a value between zero and three (zero for 
no regulation, one for less regulation, two for regulation, and three for high regulation). This study 
constructs an aggregate index of financial liberalization by summing the measures of the first six 
dimensions to capture the overall degree of financial liberalization in a country. In addition, we use 
the index of the seventh dimension, prudential regulation and supervision of the banking industry, as 
our index of prudential regulation to capture the overall prudential bank regulatory framework. In our 
empirical analysis, we normalize all indexes to range from zero to one. 
In addition, the data on financial crises are obtained from Reinhart and Rogoff (2011). These 
financial crisis data include a dummy variable that takes the value of one during years with a financial 
crisis and zero otherwise. This variable includes the five major types of financial crises: (1) currency 
crisis, (2) banking crisis, (3) domestic debt crisis, (4) external debt crisis, and (5) inflation crisis. 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) define a currency crisis as occurring if the annual depreciation of the 
domestic currency vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar (or the relevant anchor currency, which historically has 
been the UK pound, the French franc, or the German mark and is currently the euro) is 15 percent or 
higher. A banking crisis is said to exist if there are bank runs that lead to the closure, merger or takeover 
of one or more financial institutions by the public sector or if there are signs of financial distress in the 
banking system. A domestic debt crisis is coded in the event of a sovereign default to private creditors, 
debt rescheduling, the freezing of bank deposits and/or forcible conversions of such deposits from 
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dollars to local currency. An external debt crisis occurs when a country fails to meet a principal or 
interest payment due date and the rescheduled debt is less favorable than the original obligation. An 
inflation crisis is generally identified when the annual inflation rate is 20 percent or higher, although 
for certain countries, an inflation crisis is deemed to occur only when inflation exceeds 40 percent. 
Table 2 presents a brief description of the definitions and sources of other control variables used in our 
empirical analysis. Table 3 shows a summary of the statistics for the variables used in this study.  
 
2.4  Empirical results 
This section presents the estimated results and discusses their implications for the relationship between 
financial crises and financial policy reform (financial liberalization and prudential regulation). In 
addition, we discuss the reaction of each of the seven dimensions of financial policy reform to different 
types of financial crises. The full sample includes 1,748 observations, including 400 currency crises, 
336 banking crises, 82 domestic debt crises, 282 external debt crises, and 341 inflation crises. Tables 
4 to 8 present the estimated results of the aggregate index of financial liberalization for currency, 
banking, domestic debt, external debt, and inflation crises. Tables 9 to 13 show the estimated results 
for prudential regulation. In each table, panel A shows the estimates of the financial policy reform 
equation, and panel B shows the probit estimates of the financial crisis equation. The first column 
presents the results of the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation, and the other columns show the 
estimations of the endogenous treatment effects models.12 The second and third columns display the 
results of the models without and with the regional learning variable, respectively. Elhorst et al. (2013) 
note several problems related to spatial spillover or regional learning under the framework of Abiad 
and Mody (2005).13 The fourth column presents the estimated results of the models with the variables 
                                                          
12 The financial policy reform (primary regression) equations are also estimated by the OLS method with country- (fixed) 
and year-specific effects. 
13 As suggested by Elhorst et al. (2013), the empirical approach of Abiad and Mody (2005) has several problems. Thus, 
we estimate the models with and without the regional learning variable for the robustness checks. 
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that were statistically significant in the general model (column 3). Finally, columns 5 and 6 show the 
estimated results of our general model for the groups of developing (non-OECD) and developed 
(OECD) countries, respectively.14 The division of the full sample into these two groups allows us to 
assess the extent to which their results are similar. For the aggregate index of financial liberalization, 
the endogeneity tests, or Wald tests, confirm that endogenous treatment effects models can be 
appropriate for all types of financial crises (Tables 4-8). For prudential regulation, the endogeneity 
tests suggest that endogenous treatment effects models are appropriate for currency and inflation crises 
(Tables 9 and 13). However, the tests fail to reach the conventional level of statistical significance (at 
the 10% level) for banking, domestic debt, and external debt crises, which means that controlling for 
endogeneity is not supported in these cases, and the OLS estimate may be valid (Table 10-12).15 
 
2.4.1  Financial liberalization 
The estimation results for the aggregate index of financial liberalization show that the coefficients of 
the crisis dummies are significantly positive for all types of financial crises, indicating that financial 
liberalization generally accelerates when an economy faces a financial crisis. This result is more 
evident in the group of non-OECD or developing countries. As mentioned in Agnello et al. (2015b), 
institutional frameworks in developing countries are underdeveloped, such that financial crises are 
likely to reveal their weak institutional capacity and force them to promote further financial 
liberalization. Our result is consistent with the crisis-begets-reform argument in the crisis-reform 
literature. For example, Abiad and Mody (2005) observe that balance-of-payment crises spur financial 
reform. Pitlik and Wirth (2003) agree that severe inflation crises promote financial liberalization, and 
Bruno and Easterly (1996) state that inflation crises promote policy reform. In a recent study, Waelti 
(2015) states that a financial crisis, which is defined as a sudden stop in financial flows, begets financial 
                                                          
14 The estimated results for domestic and external debt crises in OECD countries are not presented because only a small 
number of domestic and external debt crisis episodes occurred in these countries throughout our sample period. 
15 See Basinger and Ensley (2010). 
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reform. Agnello et al. (2015a, 2015b) show that financial crises, including external debt and banking 
crises, are essential triggers of financial reform. Moreover, Asatryan et al. (2017) reveal that economic 
and financial crises induce administrative reform. The positive effect of banking crises in our 
estimation contrasts with the results of Abiad and Mody (2005), who show a negative link between 
banking crises and financial reform.16 
 Regarding the other control variables, the results suggest, first, that domestic and regional 
learning are positively linked with financial liberalization, which is consistent with the findings in 
Abiad and Mody (2005), Pitlik (2007), and Waelti (2015). The positive link between domestic learning 
and financial liberalization confirms that the promotion of financial liberalization decreases the status 
quo bias, with an inverse U-shaped relationship between the level and speed of financial liberalization. 
Financial regulators often have incentives to accelerate further financial liberalization once the process 
of financial liberalization is initiated. The positive coefficients of regional learning indicate that 
countries’ financial regulators are likely to be motivated by the regional leader’s financial policy. 
Observation of the impacts of financial liberalization in the regional leader reduces uncertainty about 
the consequences of reform in their own countries. Regional competition for external capital flows 
provides another crucial motivation for financial policy reform, particularly financial liberalization, to 
attract foreign investors. 
 Second, the results reveal that the coefficients of IMF programs are significantly positive, 
particularly in the group of non-OECD countries, regardless of the type of financial crisis. IMF 
programs tend to encourage or require accelerated financial policy reform. IMF conditions force 
countries to implement economic and financial policy reforms toward liberalization even during 
periods of economic repression. In addition, financial assistance, including IMF programs, dilutes the 
adverse effects of economic repression, thereby facilitating the implementation of reforms (see Drazen, 
                                                          
16 Regarding the effect of growth crises on financial reform, several empirical studies, including Pitlik and Wirth (2003) 
and Lora and Olivera (2004), show that crises of output growth promote financial liberalization. 
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2000; Svensson, 2000; Fernández-Arias & Montiel, 2001). Third, regarding political factors, the 
coefficients of both left- and right-wing governments are significantly positive for currency, domestic 
debt, and external debt crises. The relatively large coefficients of right-wing governments compared 
with those on left-wing governments imply that right-wing governments are more likely to pursue 
financial liberalization, which is consistent with the argument in the field of political economy (see 
Williamson, 1994; Bortolotti et al., 2004; Bortolotti & Pinotti, 2008; Roberts & Saeed, 2012; Elinder 
& Jordahl, 2013). Finally, our analysis fails to show clear evidence of links between financial 
liberalization and output gaps, trade openness, or government age. 
 
2.4.2  Prudential regulation 
Prudential regulation in this study refers to the index of prudential regulation and supervision of the 
banking sector constructed by Abiad et al. (2008). This index reflects several prudential regulatory 
frameworks of the banking sector, including the adoption of risk-based capital adequacy ratios 
pursuant to the Basel Capital Accord, the independence of the banking supervisory agency from the 
executive power, and the effectiveness of on- and off-site bank examinations. 17  The tests of 
endogeneity support endogenous treatment effects models for currency and inflation crises. For 
banking, domestic and external debt crises, the tests fail to show the validity of controlling for 
endogeneity, indicating that the OLS estimation might be valid. Our results show that most financial 
crises do not appear to contribute to the strengthening of prudential regulatory frameworks, although 
banking and inflation crises promote prudential regulation. The finding of a relationship between 
banking crises and prudential regulation supports the argument of Masciandaro and Romelli (2017), 
                                                          
17 Certain studies that examine the roles of bank regulation and banking crises at the individual bank level find 
heterogeneous relationships. For example, Klomp and De Haan (2012) show that the effect of bank regulation and 
supervision on banking risk is not uniform, and Klomp (2010) reveals that the determinants of banking crises are not 
uniform. Because our data are at the aggregate level, our analysis cannot capture the relationships among banking crises, 
financial policy reform, and bank characteristics at the individual bank level, which is one of the drawbacks of our 
analysis. 
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who maintain that banking crises trigger supervisory architecture reform by increasing the involvement 
of central banks in supervision. In addition, the positive relationship between inflation crises and 
prudential regulation supports the claim of Jácome and Vázquez (2008) that many countries have 
entered a phase of more prudential macroeconomic frameworks, including increased central bank 
independence, with the aim of reducing or controlling inflation.18 When we divide the full sample into 
OECD and non-OECD groups, the results show that inflation crises trigger the strengthening of 
prudential regulation in both OECD and non-OECD countries.  
With respect to the other control variables, the analysis reveals significantly positive 
coefficients of regional learning. Similar to the case of financial liberalization, a country’s financial 
regulators are likely to be motivated by the regional leader’s prudential regulation. However, the 
coefficients of domestic learning are generally insignificant, which suggests that in contrast to the case 
of financial liberalization, the promotion of prudential regulation does not show any clear status quo 
bias. Moreover, the presence of an IMF program does not play any role in the strengthening of 
prudential supervisory frameworks. The analysis also shows that left- and/or right-wing governments 
help to promote prudential regulation, except in cases of external debt crisis. 
 
2.4.3  Financial liberalization and prudential regulation 
The previous subsections indicate that all financial crises promote financial liberalization but only 
banking and inflation crises promote prudential regulation. This finding suggests that in general, 
financial crises promote financial liberalization without the significant strengthening of prudential 
regulation. This finding has several important implications for financial policy reform. First, financial 
liberalization is considered an important driving force for economic recovery and potential long-term 
growth (De Haan & Sturm, 2000; Ang & McKibbin, 2007). However, financial liberalization without 
                                                          
18 Cukierman et al. (1992) report a negative relationship between the legal independence of the central bank and inflation. 
In practice, many countries with high inflation reformed their central bank laws during the 1990s with the objective of 
attaining and preserving price stability (Jácome & Vázquez, 2008). 
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effective prudential regulation might give rise to financial fragility or distress and could intensify the 
risk of subsequent financial crises (Rossi, 1999; Mishkin, 2001; Rosenbluth & Schaap, 2003; Walter, 
2003). Financial liberalization alone is insufficient to address the risks and deficiencies arising from 
financial crises; effective prudential regulation frameworks should also be a part of the policy reform 
paradigm. Recently, many prudential tools have been proposed in the reforms of financial policies and 
institutions, especially after the global financial crisis and the subsequent establishment of the new 
Basel regulatory framework (known as Basel III), which is one of the most significant responses to the 
crisis (Claessens & Kodres, 2014). 
 Second, given the argument that financial liberalization should be accompanied by prudential 
regulation, our results imply that financial crises promote ‘incomplete’ financial policy reforms, i.e., a 
financial crisis tends to promote financial liberalization, rather than inducing a panic reaction or a 
reversal of liberalization, but does not motivate the strengthening of prudential regulation. Financial 
regulators take advantage of financial crises to promote financial liberalization but often fail to include 
or simultaneously implement prudential regulation during the process of financial policy reform, which 
may be characterized as implementation failure (Walter, 2003). Walter (2003) notes that prudential 
financial supervision is more difficult to implement than liberalization due to imperfect technological 
knowledge, rent-seeking behaviors, and weak institutional capacity for supervisory procedures and 
implementation. In addition, financial regulators tend to consider the short-term benefits and costs of 
financial liberalization and prudential regulation. In particular, these regulators perceive a trade-off for 
financial regulation, which is designed to reduce the risk of financial crises but could be detrimental 
to economic growth. Thus, at least in the short term, financial liberalization might be easier to 
implement than the strengthening of prudential regulation. These arguments signify that financial 
regulators should carefully evaluate the trade-off between the short- and long-term benefits and costs 
of financial liberalization and prudential regulation and should choose a combination of the two policy 
dimensions when implementing financial policy reform. 
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2.4.4  Individual dimensions of financial liberalization 
The previous subsections explain how financial liberalization (the aggregate index of financial 
liberalization) and prudential regulation relate to financial crises. In particular, we found evidence that 
clearly supports the crisis-begets-reform hypothesis by confirming that financial liberalization is more 
intense following financial crises. This subsection evaluates the impact of financial crises on six 
individual components of financial liberalization. Tables 14-18 show the estimated results for currency, 
banking, domestic and external debt, and inflation crises. A key finding is that crisis origin is a relevant 
factor in the crisis-reform relationship in the contexts of different dimensions of financial liberalization. 
In other words, different types of financial crises may encourage or force financial authorities to react 
with different policy measures.  
First, currency crises promote financial liberalization in the form of interest rate deregulation. 
Second, banking crises encourage financial regulators to liberalize financial systems by relaxing credit 
and interest rate controls and entry barriers.19 Third, domestic debt crises promote privatization of 
state-owned banks and securities market deregulation. Fourth, external debt crises stimulate financial 
liberalization through reduced interest rate controls and the promotion of privatization and securities 
market deregulation. Fifth, inflation crises trigger financial liberalization in the form of relaxed interest 
rate controls and the promotion of securities market development.20 
In most countries, the banking sector is more heavily regulated than non-banking sectors. 
Examples of financial regulations that have been implemented in many countries include interest rate 
                                                          
19 Horvath and Vasko (2016) find an insignificant effect of banking crises on financial stability transparency at the global 
level but a significantly negative effect on financial stability transparency for the group of countries that are charged 
legally to safeguard financial stability. Our study examines the entire picture of financial policy reform, including 
financial liberalization and prudential regulation, rather than focusing on the transparency of central banks by using the 
data of Abiad et al. (2008). 
20 The results of the policy dimensions can be reinterpreted as follows: (1) credit controls are reduced as a result of 
banking crises; (2) interest rate liberalization is more intense following currency, banking, external debt, and inflation 
crises; (3) regulation of entry barriers decreases following banking crises; (4) privatization is promoted by domestic and 
external debt crises; and (5) securities market liberalization and development are stimulated by domestic and external 
debt, and inflation crises. 
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and credit controls, which are closely related to each other. For example, state-owned banks often 
provide direct credit to specific sectors through various subsidy schemes, including interest rate 
subsidies. Another policy measure is the restriction of new entry into the financial sector. Although 
these regulations help to stabilize the banking system by preventing competition among banks and, 
particularly in developing countries, by protecting an infant industry being promoted by the 
government, these regulations also generate economic costs. Buttari (1995) suggests that regulations 
reduce deposit rates and potential savings, which could lead to poor quality lending and high default 
rates due to lax screening of potential borrowers. Beck et al. (2006) state that restrictive entry barriers 
to financial markets increase bank fragility and reduce the efficiency of the banking system, and Sturm 
and Williams (2004) argue that foreign banks are more efficient than domestic banks and that diversity 
in bank types is crucial for improved efficiency. Our results show that the deregulation of credit and 
interest rate controls and a lessening of entry barriers into the banking sector are triggered by financial 
crises, especially banking crises.  
Our analysis also indicates that securities market development and privatization are motivated 
by domestic and external debt crises. After these types of financial crises, governments tend to meet 
their financing needs by issuing debt securities in domestic and international markets. Tagkalakis 
(2013) shows that financial crisis episodes increase the stock of government debt. Because financial 
crises might cause governments to become more risk averse and long-term debt issuance is less risky 
due to the reduced likelihood of a rollover crisis (Broner et al., 2013), governments are likely to 
facilitate long-term debt securities transactions by liberalizing securities markets. Bassanini and 
Reviglio (2011) state that after financial crises, economies often experience a loss of wealth or 
investment and that these economies need securities market development to induce a surge in long-
term investment and thereby mitigate the adverse impacts of the crisis and increase the growth rate. In 
addition, governments tend to improve their fiscal balances through privatization, particularly after 
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financial crises. For example, Wiese (2014) maintains that a debt crisis is one of the main triggers of 
healthcare financing privatization.  
 
2.4.5  Sensitivity analysis 
The previous subsection uses the annual data of Abiad et al. (2008) to measure the speed and policy 
dimensions of financial policy reform. This subsection conducts robustness checks using three 
alternative measures of financial policy reform during the same sample period, 1975-2005. We 
construct the three- and five-year non-overlapping interval (averaged) data of Abiad et al. (2008) to 
measure financial liberalization and prudential regulation. In addition, following de Haan and Sturm 
(2017), we measure financial liberalization using the sum of four sub-indices from the five-year non-
overlapping interval data for economic freedom (Gwartney et al., 2016) in the financial sector: (1) 
freedom to own foreign currency bank accounts (3D); (2) black market exchange rates (4C); (3) 
controls on the movement of capital and people (4D); and (4) credit market regulations (5A).21 When 
calculating the financial crisis dummy, we use the value of one if a country experiences a crisis within 
a three- or five-year interval and zero otherwise. 
Tables 19-21 present the results for the effects of financial crises on financial liberalization 
based on the three- and five-year interval data of Abiad et al. (2008) and the five-year interval data of 
Gwartney et al. (2016).22 Tables 22-23 show the results for the effects of financial crises on prudential 
regulation based on the three- and five-year interval data of Abiad et al. (2008). Each table shows the 
results of the OLS and endogenous treatment effects estimations. For financial liberalization, the 
estimated results are consistent with our previous findings based on the annual data of Abiad et al. 
                                                          
21 The economic freedom database of Gwartney et al. (2016) is used only to estimate models for financial liberalization 
due to limitations of the data related to prudential regulation. As in the previous subsections, we normalize all indexes to 
range from zero to one.  
22 The correlations between domestic and regional learning variables are relatively high for the data of Gwartney et al. 
(2016) but relatively low for the data of Abiad et al. (2008). Thus, we include both domestic and regional learning 
variables in the models for the data of Abiad et al. (2008) but exclude the regional learning variable from the models for 
the data of Gwartney et al. (2016). 
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(2008). Financial liberalization is promoted when an economy faces any type of financial crisis. On 
the other hand, the analysis presents that only banking crises promote prudential regulation, but other 
types of financial crises do not relate to prudential regulation. The previous results based on the annual 
data of Abiad et al. (2008) show the positive link of banking and inflation crises with prudential 
regulation and the insignificant link of currency, domestic and external debt crises with prudential 
regulation. For all financial crises except for inflation crises, the results are consistent with our previous 
findings based on the annual data of Abiad et al. (2008). Prudential regulation is generally insensitive 
to the incidence of any type of financial crisis.23 
 
2.5  Conclusion 
In this paper, we examined the policy reactions of financial regulators to financial crises over the period 
from 1975 to 2005 with consideration of endogeneity problems. The study presents several main 
conclusions. First, our analysis confirms the crisis-begets-reform argument in the context of financial 
liberalization. This is particularly true for the group of non-OECD (or developing) countries, which is 
consistent with the finding of Agnello et al. (2015b). Second, although financial liberalization should 
be accompanied by prudential regulation, financial policy reform following financial crises generally 
does not include the strengthening of prudential regulation, i.e., financial crises tend to promote 
‘incomplete’ financial policy reform. As suggested in the works of Mishkin (2001), Rosenbluth and 
Schaap (2003), and Walter (2003), financial liberalization without sound prudential regulation fails to 
reduce vulnerability to subsequent financial crises. Third, financial regulators’ choice of policy 
dimensions in response to financial crises varies depending on the crisis origin. When a country faces 
                                                          
23 We also evaluate how each policy dimension is affected by financial crises using the four components of the economic 
freedom index (Gwartney et al., 2016), namely, (1) freedom to own foreign currency bank accounts; (2) black market 
exchange rates; (3) controls on the movement of capital and people; and (4) credit market regulation. The components of 
the economic freedom index are not consistent with those of Abiad et al. (2008), which makes the comparison of the two 
data sources generally difficult. Tables 24 and 25 show the results of endogenous treatment effects models. The Wald 
tests support the validity of endogenous treatment effects models for controls of the movement of capital and people (4D) 
and credit market regulation (5A). The results indicate that financial crises promote financial liberalization for controls of 
the movement of capital and people (4D) and credit market regulation (5A). 
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a specific type of financial crisis, financial regulators should evaluate the short- and long-term benefits 
and costs of each policy dimension of financial policy reform (both financial liberalization and 
prudential regulation) and should choose the optimal combination of policy dimensions to maintain 
financial stability and to mitigate the adverse effects of possible financial disturbances. 
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Table 2.2 Definition and sources of variables 
Variable Definition and construction Source 
Capital account restrictions Restrictions on international financial convertibility, and the 
use of multiple exchange rates 
Abiad et al. (2008) 
Credit controls Directed credit toward favored sectors, ceilings on credit 
toward other sectors, and excessively high reserve 
requirements 
Abiad et al. (2008) 
Interest rate controls Government's direct control over interest rates or the existence 
of floors, ceiling, or interest rate bands 
Abiad et al. (2008) 
Entry barriers Licensing requirements, limits to the participation of foreign 
banks, and restrictions relating to bank specialization or the 
establishment of universal banks 
Abiad et al. (2008) 
State ownership Privatization in the financial sector  Abiad et al. (2008) 
Security market The introduction of medium and long-term government bonds 
and auctioning of government securities, the establishment of 
debt and equity markets, and the openness of those securities 
markets to foreign investors 
Abiad et al. (2008) 
Aggregate index of financial 
liberalization 
Sum of the measures of the six dimensions of financial 
liberalization, normalized from 0 to 1 
Abiad et al. (2008) 
Prudential regulation Operational restrictions (e.g., on staffing, branching and 
advertising) 
Abiad et al. (2008) 
CRISIS Financial crisis dummies based on the identification of crisis 
episodes (currency, banking, domestic debt, external debt, and 
inflation crises) 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) 
Output gap Difference between the log of actual real GDP and its trend 
component 
Penn World Table 9 
Trade openness Ratio of export plus import to GDP World Development Indicators 
IMF The presence of IMF program Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) 
FIRST Dummy variables based on the chief executive has been the 
first year in office 
World Banks’ Database of Political 
Institutions (DPI2012) 
LEFT Dummy variables for left-wing ruling parties World Banks’ Database of Political 
Institutions (DPI2012) 
RIGHT Dummy variables for right-wing ruling parties World Banks’ Database of Political 
Institutions (DPI2012) 
Credit gap Difference between the ratio of credit to GDP and its trend 
component 
World Development Indicators 
Inflation Consumer prices (annual %) World Development Indicators 
Foreign exchange reserve to 
external debt 
Ratio of foreign reserves minus gold to total foreign liabilities Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) 
Current account balance to 
GDP 
Ratio of current account balance to GDP World Development Indicators 
Private sector credit to GDP Ratio of private sector credit to GDP  World Development Indicators 
Public debt to GDP Ratio of public debt to GDP Abbas et al. (2010) 
External debt to GDP Ratio of total (gross) foreign liabilities to GDP Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) 
Money supply growth Annual money growth World Development Indicators 
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Table 2.3 Descriptive of statistics  
Variable No of  
observation 
Mean Std 
deviation 
Minimum 
value 
Maximum 
value 
Change of aggregate financial liberalization 1,748 0.019 0.057 -0.333 0.444 
Change of prudential regulation 1,748 0.022 0.091 -0.333 0.667 
Change of capital account restrictions 1,748 0.017 0.137 -1.000 1.000 
Change of credit controls 1,748 0.019 0.115 -0.750 0.750 
Change of interest rate controls 1,748 0.025 0.158 -1.000 1.000 
Change of entry barriers 1,748 0.022 0.100 -0.667 0.667 
Change of state ownership 1,748 0.011 0.099 -1.000 1.000 
Change of securities market 1,748 0.019 0.082 -0.333 0.667 
Currency crisis 1,748 0.229 0.420 0.000 1.000 
Banking crisis 1,748 0.192 0.394 0.000 1.000 
Domestic debt crisis 1,748 0.047 0.212 0.000 1.000 
External debt crisis 1,748 0.161 0.368 0.000 1.000 
Inflation crisis 1,748 0.195 0.396 0.000 1.000 
Domestic learning      
  Aggregate financial liberalization 1,748 0.150 0.083 0.000 0.250 
  Prudential regulation 1,748 0.089 0.109 0.000 0.222 
  Capital account restrictions 1,748 0.101 0.111 0.000 0.222 
  Credit controls 1,748 0.109 0.109 0.000 0.222 
  Interest rate controls 1,748 0.041 0.087 0.000 0.222 
  Entry barriers 1,748 0.086 0.108 0.000 0.222 
  State ownership 1,748 0.097 0.110 0.000 0.222 
  Securities market 1,748 0.113 0.111 0.000 0.222 
Regional learning      
  Aggregate financial liberalization 1,748 0.261 0.261 0.000 0.903 
  Prudential regulation 1,748 0.250 0.250 0.000 1.000 
  Capital account restrictions 1,748 0.317 0.317 0.000 1.000 
  Credit controls 1,748 0.333 0.333 0.000 1.000 
Interest rate controls 1,748 0.289 0.289 0.000 1.000 
Entry barriers 1,748 0.346 0.346 0.000 1.000 
State ownership 1,748 0.481 0.481 0.000 1.000 
Securities market 1,748 0.298 0.298 0.000 1.000 
Output gap 1,748 0.000 0.048 -0.536 0.290 
Trade openness 1,748 63.007 47.294 6.320 422.331 
IMF 1,748 0.136 0.342 0.000 1.000 
FIRST 1,748 0.208 0.406 0.000 1.000 
LEFT 1,748 0.312 0.463 0.000 1.000 
RIGHT 1,748 0.332 0.471 0.000 1.000 
Credit gap 1,748 -0.027 7.086 -48.618 68.493 
Inflation  1,722 0.122 0.156 -0.083 0.992 
Foreign exchange reserve to external debt 1,748 0.142 0.184 0.000 2.447 
Current account balance to GDP 1,516 -1.675 5.780 -42.894 32.543 
Private sector credit to GDP 1,715 50.418 38.588 0.0595 221.289 
Public debt to GDP 1,702 0.584 0.648 0.020 20.929 
External debt to GDP 1,748 0.893 0.969 0.039 10.846 
Money supply growth 1,421 0.169 0.188 -1.391 0.992 
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Table 2.4 Currency crisis and financial liberalization 
  liberalization  Model Model Model Non-
OEDC 
OECD 
Panel A: Dependent Variable: Financial 
liberalization 
OLS OLS      
Domestic learning 0.084*** 0.005 0.100*** 0.085*** 0.085*** 0.110*** 0.154*** 
 (0.022) (0.029) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.033) (0.033) 
Regional learning 0.113*** 0.129***  0.108*** 0.108*** 0.142*** 0.094*** 
 (0.012) (0.014)  (0.012) (0.012) (0.018) (0.017) 
Output gap -0.019 0.019 -0.014 -0.006  0.001 -0.072 
 (0.026) (0.043) (0.026) (0.025)  (0.030) (0.063) 
Trade openness 0.000 -0.000* 0.000 0.000  -0.000 -0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
IMF 0.019*** 0.008 0.022*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.021*** 0.012 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.011) 
FIRST 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.002  0.004 0.000 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.005) (0.004) 
LEFT 0.010** 0.016* 0.010* 0.010** 0.010** 0.005 0.008 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) 
RIGHT 0.013*** 0.016** 0.007 0.012** 0.012** 0.005 0.011 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) 
Currency crisis 0.001 0.012* 0.037*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.026*** -0.016 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011) 
        
Panel B: Dependent Variable: Currency crisis                
Credit gap   0.015** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.025*** 0.009 
   (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.012) 
Output gap   -2.072*** -2.007*** -2.002*** -1.778*** -4.842** 
   (0.633) (0.644) (0.638) (0.682) (2.372) 
Trade openness   -0.001 -0.001  -0.002 -0.006 
   (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.004) 
Inflation   4.033*** 3.996*** 4.084*** 4.191*** 0.777 
   (0.300) (0.304) (0.294) (0.367) (0.865) 
Foreign exchange reserve to external debt   -0.916*** -0.869*** -0.945*** -1.175*** -0.543 
   (0.331) (0.332) (0.327) (0.395) (0.926) 
Current account balance to GDP   0.003 0.001  0.021** -0.102*** 
   (0.008) (0.008)  (0.008) (0.024) 
        
Wald test   18.25*** 8.61*** 9.70*** 7.24*** 2.01 
Observation  1451  1451 1451 1451 1451 943 508 
    *Significant at 10%   
 
 
   
  **Significant at  5%        
***Significant at  1%        
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Table 2.5 Banking crisis and financial liberalization 
  OLS Model Model Model Non-OEDC OECD 
Panel A: Dependent Variable: Financial liberalization       
Domestic learning 0.108*** 0.102*** 0.098*** 0.098*** 0.117*** 0.137*** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.032) (0.041) 
Regional learning 0.112*** 
 
0.106*** 0.106*** 0.130*** 0.127*** 
 (0.012) 
 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.022) 
Output gap -0.017 -0.003 0.011 
 
0.001 0.039 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
 
(0.028) (0.082) 
Trade openness 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 
-0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
IMF 0.016*** 0.018*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.014) 
FIRST 0.005 0.004 0.004 
 
0.005 0.008 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
 
(0.005) (0.005) 
LEFT 0.008 0.011** 0.008 
 
0.008 0.004 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
 
(0.007) (0.014) 
RIGHT 0.008 0.006 0.007 
 
0.009 0.002 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
 
(0.006) (0.013) 
Banking crisis -0.007* 0.066*** 0.063*** 0.064*** 0.064*** -0.019 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.014) 
       
Panel B: Dependent Variable: Banking crisis             
Credit gap 
 
0.006 0.006 
 
0.000 0.039*** 
 
 
(0.005) (0.005) 
 
(0.006) (0.012) 
Output gap 
 
-1.643*** -1.687*** -1.612*** -1.567** -6.345** 
 
 
(0.590) (0.589) (0.561) (0.630) (2.638) 
Trade openness 
 
-0.001 -0.001 
 
-0.002* -0.013*** 
 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
 
(0.001) (0.004) 
Inflation 
 
0.817*** 0.675*** 0.768*** 0.613*** -0.353 
 
 
(0.214) (0.215) (0.211) (0.234) (0.998) 
Private sector credit to GDP 
 
0.002* 0.002* 0.002** 0.006*** -0.003 
 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Public debt to GDP 
 
0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.008** 
 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) 
 
 
     
Wald test  112.48*** 105.44*** 115.93*** 51.14*** 2.15 
Observation 1353 1353 1353 1353 998 355 
    *Significant at 10%  
 
 
   
  **Significant at  5%       
***Significant at  1%       
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Table 2.6 Domestic debt crisis and financial liberalization 
  OLS Model Model Model Non-OEDC 
Panel A: Dependent Variable: Financial liberalization      
Domestic learning 0.089*** 0.103*** 0.089*** 0.089*** 0.119*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.033) 
Regional learning 0.116***  0.113*** 0.115*** 0.145*** 
 (0.012)  (0.012) (0.012) (0.017) 
Output gap -0.014 -0.028 -0.010  -0.005 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)  (0.029) 
Trade openness 0.000 -0.000 -0.000  -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
IMF 0.016*** 0.019*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.018*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
FIRST 0.003 0.003 0.003  0.005 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.005) 
LEFT 0.012** 0.012** 0.012** 0.011** 0.009 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) 
RIGHT 0.014*** 0.009* 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.009 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Domestic debt crisis -0.010 0.043*** 0.028* 0.019 0.038** 
 (0.009) (0.013) (0.016) (0.018) (0.016) 
      
Panel B: Dependent Variable: Domestic debt crisis           
Credit gap  -0.016** -0.016** -0.013* -0.020** 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
Output gap  -1.332 -1.292  -1.250 
  (0.961) (0.976)  (0.927) 
Trade openness  -0.001 -0.001  -0.002 
  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) 
Inflation  1.526*** 1.511*** 1.832*** 1.065*** 
  (0.295) (0.298) (0.260) (0.307) 
Public debt to GDP  0.001 0.001  0.001* 
  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) 
Current account balance to GDP  -0.003 -0.004  0.005 
  (0.011) (0.012)  (0.011) 
Wald test  14.16*** 6.92*** 3.07* 11.94*** 
Observation 1415 1415 1415 1415 919 
    *Significant at 10%      
  **Significant at  5%   
   
***Significant at  1%      
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Table 2.7 External debt crisis and financial liberalization 
  OLS Model Model Model Non-OEDC 
Panel A: Dependent Variable: Financial liberalization      
Domestic learning 0.078*** 0.104*** 0.081*** 0.081*** 0.107*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.031) 
Regional learning 0.098***  0.093*** 0.094*** 0.127*** 
 (0.011)  (0.010) (0.010) (0.016) 
Output gap -0.012 -0.011 -0.002  -0.009 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.023)  (0.028) 
Trade openness 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
IMF 0.018*** 0.020*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.019*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
FIRST 0.001 0.002 0.001  0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.005) 
LEFT 0.009* 0.010** 0.009** 0.009** 0.006 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) 
RIGHT 0.010** 0.008* 0.010** 0.010** 0.007 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) 
External debt crisis 0.004 0.043*** 0.029*** 0.026*** 0.026** 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) 
      
Panel B: Dependent Variable: External debt crisis           
Credit gap  -0.008 -0.008  -0.011* 
  (0.006) (0.006)  (0.007) 
Output gap  -0.892 -0.844  -0.511 
  (0.612) (0.622)  (0.659) 
Trade openness  -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.013*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Inflation  3.155*** 3.167*** 3.230*** 2.103*** 
  (0.262) (0.264) (0.263) (0.278) 
Foreign exchange reserve to external debt  -1.084*** -1.038*** -1.030*** -1.130*** 
  (0.342) (0.345) (0.346) (0.367) 
External debt to GDP  0.285*** 0.288*** 0.292*** 0.793*** 
  (0.057) (0.058) (0.058) (0.117) 
      
Wald test  7.76*** 8.75*** 8.02*** 4.33** 
Observation 1718 1718 1718 1718 1048 
    *Significant at 10%   
   
  **Significant at  5%      
***Significant at  1%      
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Table 2.8 Inflation crisis and financial liberalization 
  OLS Model Model Model Non-OEDC OECD 
Panel A: Dependent Variable: Financial liberalization       
Domestic learning 0.093*** 0.100*** 0.092*** 0.092*** 0.099*** 0.146*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.030) (0.039) 
Regional learning 0.107***  0.106*** 0.107*** 0.128*** 0.124*** 
 (0.012)  (0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.021) 
Output gap -0.008 -0.010 0.002  -0.007 0.084 
 (0.025) (0.026) (0.025)  (0.028) (0.079) 
Trade openness 0.000 0.000 0.000  -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
IMF 0.015*** 0.018*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.018*** 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.013) 
FIRST 0.003 0.003 0.003  0.004 0.008 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.005) (0.005) 
LEFT 0.008 0.013** 0.009  0.008 0.005 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)  (0.007) (0.014) 
RIGHT 0.010** 0.010** 0.011** 0.006 0.011* 0.003 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.014) 
Inflation crisis 0.007 0.039*** 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.029*** -0.002 
 (0.005) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.023) 
       
Panel B: Dependent Variable: Inflation crisis             
Credit gap  -0.013** -0.013** -0.013** -0.012* -0.012 
  (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.014) 
Output gap  -2.500*** -2.495*** -2.479*** -2.540*** -2.646 
  (0.657) (0.661) (0.655) (0.678) (3.030) 
Trade openness  -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.008*** -0.002 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) 
Public debt to GDP  0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** -0.010* 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) 
Money supply growth  2.065*** 2.084*** 2.089*** 1.921*** 0.365 
  (0.208) (0.209) (0.209) (0.228) (0.789) 
       
Wald test  8.22*** 6.69** 6.43** 6.23** 0.32 
Observation 1385 1385 1385 1385 1015 370 
    *Significant at 10%   
    
  **Significant at  5%       
***Significant at  1%       
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Table 2.9 Currency crisis and prudential regulation 
  OLS Model Model Model Non-OEDC OECD 
Panel A: Dependent Variable: Prudential regulation       
Domestic learning 0.005 -0.005 -0.000  -0.236*** 0.060 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.028)  (0.053) (0.044) 
Regional learning 0.129***  0.130*** 0.130*** 0.078*** 0.249*** 
 (0.014)  (0.013) (0.013) (0.019) (0.027) 
Output gap 0.019 0.018 0.009  -0.001 -0.197 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.042)  (0.041) (0.158) 
Trade openness -0.000* -0.000 -0.000* -0.000* -0.000* -0.002** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
IMF 0.008 0.009 0.007  0.011 -0.032 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)  (0.007) (0.027) 
FIRST 0.004 0.003 0.005  0.006 0.001 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)  (0.007) (0.010) 
LEFT 0.016* 0.013 0.016* 0.016* 0.016 -0.013 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.017) 
RIGHT 0.016** 0.014* 0.017** 0.017** 0.018** -0.011 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.018) 
Currency crisis 0.012* 0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 0.022 
 (0.007) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.033) 
 
      
Panel B: Dependent Variable: Currency crisis              
Credit gap 
 
0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.028*** 0.006 
 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.012) 
Output gap 
 
-1.733*** -1.739*** -1.705*** -1.413** -4.215* 
 
 
(0.652) (0.651) (0.649) (0.685) (2.325) 
Trade openness 
 
-0.002 -0.002  -0.002 -0.006 
 
 
(0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.004) 
Inflation 
 
3.953*** 3.958*** 4.067*** 4.149*** 0.884 
 
 
(0.309) (0.309) (0.298) (0.371) (0.861) 
Foreign exchange reserve to external debt 
 
-0.931*** -0.947*** -1.044*** -1.297*** -0.468 
 
 
(0.342) (0.343) (0.336) (0.406) (0.930) 
Current account balance to GDP 
 
0.001 0.001  0.021** -0.099*** 
 
 
(0.008) (0.008)  (0.009) (0.024) 
 
     
Wald test 
 
1.52 3.12* 3.18* 1.82 0.04 
Observation  1451 1451 1451 1451 943 508 
    *Significant at 10%  
 
 
   
  **Significant at  5%       
***Significant at  1%       
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Table 2.10 Banking crisis and prudential regulation 
  OLS Model Model Model Non-OEDC OECD 
Panel A: Dependent Variable: Prudential regulation       
Domestic learning -0.033 -0.060* -0.034 
 
-0.296*** 0.034 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) 
 
(0.052) (0.061) 
Regional learning 0.116*** 
 
0.116*** 0.117*** 0.063*** 0.199*** 
 (0.014) 
 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.019) (0.031) 
Output gap 0.013 0.020 0.012 
 
-0.001 -0.225 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.040) 
 
(0.038) (0.205) 
Trade openness -0.000* -0.000 -0.000* -0.000* -0.000* -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
IMF 0.007 0.009 0.007 
 
0.010 -0.011 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
 
(0.007) (0.034) 
FIRST 0.004 0.002 0.004 
 
0.006 -0.000 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
 
(0.007) (0.013) 
LEFT 0.015 0.014 0.015* 0.014* 0.014 -0.024 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.034) 
RIGHT 0.016* 0.015* 0.016** 0.016** 0.013 -0.020 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.033) 
Banking crisis 0.014** 0.018 0.010 0.011 0.006 0.030 
 (0.006) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.052) 
 
      
Panel B: Dependent Variable: Banking crisis             
Credit gap 
 
0.013** 0.013** 0.013** 0.002 0.040*** 
 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.012) 
Output gap 
 
-0.870 -0.871 
 
-0.598 -5.196** 
 
 
(0.650) (0.649) 
 
(0.672) (2.638) 
Trade openness 
 
-0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002** -0.013*** 
 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) 
Inflation 
 
0.835*** 0.842*** 0.863*** 0.842*** -0.299 
 
 
(0.237) (0.238) (0.237) (0.248) (1.027) 
Private sector credit to GDP 
 
0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 0.007*** -0.004 
 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Public debt to GDP 
 
0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.008** 
 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
 
      
Wald test 
 
0.02 0.12 0.07 0.10 0.26 
Observation 1353 1353 1353 1353 998 355 
    *Significant at 10%  
 
 
   
  **Significant at  5%       
***Significant at  1%       
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Table 2.11 Domestic debt crisis and prudential regulation 
  OLS Model Model Model Non-OEDC 
Panel A: Dependent Variable: Prudential regulation      
Domestic learning 0.006 -0.003 0.005  -0.238*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.029)  (0.054) 
Regional learning 0.137***  0.137*** 0.138*** 0.083*** 
 (0.014)  (0.014) (0.014) (0.020) 
Output gap 0.004 0.008 0.002  -0.008 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.041)  (0.041) 
Trade openness -0.000* -0.000 -0.000** -0.000** -0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
IMF 0.008 0.011 0.008  0.013* 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)  (0.007) 
FIRST 0.006 0.004 0.006  0.008 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)  (0.007) 
LEFT 0.016* 0.012 0.016* 0.015* 0.017* 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
RIGHT 0.016* 0.013 0.016** 0.016** 0.016* 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
Domestic debt crisis -0.007 -0.017 -0.026 -0.026 -0.020 
 (0.015) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) 
 
     
Panel B: Dependent Variable: Domestic debt crisis           
Credit gap 
 
-0.013* -0.013* -0.012 -0.015* 
 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
Output gap 
 
-0.763 -0.772  -0.673 
 
 
(0.968) (0.969)  (0.935) 
Trade openness 
 
-0.001 -0.001  -0.002 
 
 
(0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) 
Inflation 
 
1.541*** 1.551*** 1.807*** 1.147*** 
 
 
(0.290) (0.290) (0.257) (0.307) 
Public debt to GDP 
 
0.001 0.001  0.001 
 
 
(0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) 
Current account balance to GDP 
 
-0.010 -0.010  -0.002 
 
 
(0.011) (0.011)  (0.011) 
 
    
Wald test 
 
1.31 1.51 1.56 0.58 
Observation 1415 1415 1415 1415 919 
    *Significant at 10%      
  **Significant at  5%   
   
***Significant at  1%      
 
 
 
 
 
  
 68 
Table 2.12 External debt crisis and prudential regulation 
  OLS Model Model Model Non-OEDC 
Panel A: Dependent Variable: Prudential regulation      
Domestic learning -0.007 -0.014 -0.012  -0.248*** 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.027)  (0.049) 
Regional learning 0.121***  0.121*** 0.120*** 0.071*** 
 (0.012)  (0.012) (0.012) (0.018) 
Output gap 0.011 0.005 0.005  -0.012 
 (0.039) (0.040) (0.038)  (0.037) 
Trade openness -0.000 -0.000 -0.000  -0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
IMF 0.009 0.010 0.009  0.010 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)  (0.006) 
FIRST 0.003 0.002 0.003  0.005 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)  (0.006) 
LEFT 0.007 0.007 0.007  0.011 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)  (0.009) 
RIGHT 0.009 0.008 0.008  0.015* 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)  (0.008) 
External debt crisis -0.002 -0.009 -0.014 -0.011 -0.007 
 (0.008) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) 
 
     
Panel B: Dependent Variable: External debt crisis           
Credit gap 
 
-0.005 -0.005  -0.010 
 
 
(0.006) (0.006)  (0.007) 
Output gap 
 
-0.637 -0.642  -0.230 
 
 
(0.630) (0.630)  (0.657) 
Trade openness 
 
-0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.013*** 
 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Inflation 
 
3.143*** 3.148*** 3.186*** 2.060*** 
 
 
(0.266) (0.266) (0.265) (0.280) 
Foreign exchange reserve to external debt 
 
-1.031*** -1.048*** -1.036*** -1.157*** 
 
 
(0.350) (0.351) (0.350) (0.375) 
External debt to GDP 
 
0.285*** 0.279*** 0.283*** 0.804*** 
 
 
(0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.118) 
 
     
Wald test 
 
0.60 1.43 1.05 1.23 
Observation 1718 1718 1718 1718 1048 
    *Significant at 10%   
   
  **Significant at  5%      
***Significant at  1%      
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Table 2.13 Inflation crisis and prudential regulation 
  OLS Model Model Model Non-OEDC OECD 
Panel A: Dependent Variable: Prudential regulation       
Domestic learning -0.019 -0.028 -0.008  -0.265*** 0.045 
 (0.032) (0.029) (0.029)  (0.048) (0.056) 
Regional learning 0.118***  0.106*** 0.105*** 0.052*** 0.198*** 
 (0.013)  (0.012) (0.012) (0.017) (0.030) 
Output gap -0.004 0.055 0.052  0.033 -0.192 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.040)  (0.037) (0.196) 
Trade openness -0.000* 0.000 -0.000  -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.001) 
IMF 0.008 0.008 0.007  0.009 -0.021 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)  (0.006) (0.031) 
FIRST 0.004 0.002 0.003  0.006 -0.004 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)  (0.006) (0.013) 
LEFT 0.013 0.013 0.013  0.014* -0.034 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)  (0.008) (0.033) 
RIGHT 0.015* 0.015* 0.015** 0.007 0.015** -0.029 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.033) 
Inflation crisis -0.006 0.118*** 0.115*** 0.114*** 0.099*** 0.171*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.033) 
 
      
Panel B: Dependent Variable: Inflation crisis             
Credit gap 
 
0.000 0.000  -0.001 -0.012 
 
 
(0.004) (0.004)  (0.005) (0.012) 
Output gap 
 
-1.911*** -1.943*** -1.642*** -1.915*** -2.261 
 
 
(0.547) (0.544) (0.495) (0.567) (2.526) 
Trade openness 
 
-0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.006*** 0.001 
 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) 
Public debt to GDP 
 
0.002* 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* -0.004 
 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) 
Money supply growth 
 
1.429*** 1.408*** 1.402*** 1.380*** 0.671 
 
 
(0.177) (0.178) (0.177) (0.194) (0.694) 
 
      
Wald test 
 
398.48*** 377.30*** 382.91*** 261.90*** 41.32*** 
Observation 1385 1385 1385 1385 1015 370 
    *Significant at 10%   
    
  **Significant at  5%       
***Significant at  1%       
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Table 2.14 Currency crisis and individual dimension of financial liberalization 
  Aggregate 
index of 
financial 
liberalization 
Capital 
account 
restrictions 
Credit 
controls 
Interest 
rate 
controls 
Entry 
barriers 
State 
ownership 
Security 
markets 
Panel A: Dependent Variable: Financial 
liberalization 
       
Domestic learning 0.085*** 0.013 0.059 0.252*** 0.077*** 0.043 0.012 
 (0.021) (0.039) (0.036) (0.055) (0.028) (0.036) (0.024) 
Regional learning 0.108*** 0.190*** 0.141*** 0.175*** 0.115*** 0.140*** 0.134*** 
 (0.012) (0.016) (0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) 
Output gap -0.006 0.012 0.004 0.068 0.037 -0.049 -0.069* 
 (0.025) (0.063) (0.053) (0.067) (0.045) (0.048) (0.040) 
Trade openness 0.000 -0.001* 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
IMF 0.019*** 0.027** 0.007 0.037*** 0.039*** 0.004 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) 
FIRST 0.002 0.010 0.006 -0.006 0.006 -0.008 0.004 
 (0.004) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) 
LEFT 0.010** 0.010 0.015 0.019 0.005 0.010 0.003 
 (0.005) (0.013) (0.011) (0.014) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) 
RIGHT 0.012** 0.003 0.020** 0.017 0.020** 0.023*** 0.006 
 (0.005) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) 
Currency crisis 0.023*** 0.015 0.029 0.093*** -0.011 -0.012 0.021 
 (0.008) (0.022) (0.019) (0.025) (0.013) (0.017) (0.025) 
        
Panel B: Dependent Variable:  
Currency crisis  
  
            
Credit gap 0.017*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.016*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.018*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Output gap -2.007*** -1.781*** -1.719*** -2.038*** -1.740*** -1.731*** -1.846*** 
 (0.644) (0.658) (0.648) (0.622) (0.654) (0.654) (0.659) 
Trade openness -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Inflation 3.996*** 3.953*** 4.014*** 3.883*** 3.959*** 3.963*** 3.965*** 
 (0.304) (0.309) (0.310) (0.293) (0.309) (0.309) (0.307) 
Foreign exchange reserve to external debt -0.869*** -0.900*** -0.917*** -0.727** -0.937*** -0.911*** -0.878*** 
 (0.332) (0.338) (0.341) (0.321) (0.341) (0.340) (0.337) 
Current account balance to GDP 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
 0.017*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.016*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.018*** 
Wald test 8.61*** 0.38 2.82* 16.57*** 0.80 0.00 0.59 
Observation 1451 1451 1451 1451 1451 1451 1451 
    *Significant at 10%   
 
 
   
  **Significant at  5%  
      
***Significant at  1%  
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Table 2.15 Banking crisis and individual dimension of financial liberalization 
  
Aggregate index 
of financial 
liberalization 
Capital 
account 
restrictions 
Credit 
controls 
Interest rate 
controls 
Entry 
barriers 
State 
ownership 
Security 
markets 
Panel A: Dependent Variable: 
Financial liberalization 
       
Domestic learning 0.098*** 0.019 0.027 0.198*** 0.090*** 0.004 0.027 
 (0.022) (0.041) (0.039) (0.057) (0.028) (0.036) (0.024) 
Regional learning 0.106*** 0.174*** 0.133*** 0.176*** 0.101*** 0.108*** 0.122*** 
 (0.012) (0.016) (0.013) (0.016) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) 
Output gap 0.011 0.047 0.021 0.054 0.057 -0.025 -0.073** 
 (0.026) (0.064) (0.054) (0.069) (0.045) (0.045) (0.037) 
Trade openness 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
IMF 0.015*** 0.018* 0.010 0.023** 0.037*** -0.003 0.006 
 (0.004) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) 
FIRST 0.004 0.020** 0.004 -0.001 0.004 -0.006 0.004 
 (0.004) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
LEFT 0.008 -0.001 0.021* 0.015 0.002 0.017* -0.008 
 (0.005) (0.014) (0.011) (0.015) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) 
RIGHT 0.007 -0.008 0.018* 0.018 0.011 0.020** -0.003 
 (0.005) (0.013) (0.010) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) 
Banking crisis 0.063*** -0.008 0.109*** 0.163*** 0.132*** -0.016 0.001 
 (0.007) (0.031) (0.020) (0.016) (0.008) (0.019) (0.025) 
 
 
      
Panel B: Dependent Variable: 
Banking crisis 
  
            
Credit gap 0.006 0.013** 0.011** 0.010** 0.008* 0.015*** 0.013** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) 
Output gap -1.687*** -0.873 -1.237** -1.321** 0.036 -0.823 -0.888 
 (0.589) (0.654) (0.617) (0.583) (0.539) (0.645) (0.673) 
Trade openness -0.001 -0.002* -0.002* -0.001 -0.001 -0.002* -0.001* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Inflation 0.675*** 0.832*** 0.671*** 0.689*** 0.365* 0.835*** 0.840*** 
 (0.215) (0.238) (0.231) (0.213) (0.199) (0.237) (0.246) 
Private sector credit to GDP 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 0.002 0.001 0.002* 0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Public debt to GDP 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
 
      
Wald test 105.44*** 0.00 30.32*** 141.16*** 327.84*** 0.96 0.00 
Observation 1353 1353 1353 1353 1353 1353 1353 
    *Significant at 10%   
 
 
   
  **Significant at  5%  
      
***Significant at  1%  
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Table 2.16 Domestic debt crisis and individual dimension of financial liberalization 
  
Aggregate index 
of financial 
liberalization 
Capital 
account 
restrictions 
Credit 
controls 
Interest 
rate 
controls 
Entry 
barriers 
State 
ownership 
Security 
markets 
Panel A: Dependent Variable: 
Financial liberalization 
       
Domestic learning 0.089*** 0.008 0.060* 0.298*** 0.080*** 0.025 0.028 
 (0.021) (0.040) (0.037) (0.054) (0.029) (0.035) (0.024) 
Regional learning 0.113*** 0.191*** 0.145*** 0.169*** 0.115*** 0.122*** 0.118*** 
 (0.012) (0.016) (0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) 
Output gap -0.010 0.018 -0.006 0.033 0.038 -0.006 -0.075** 
 (0.025) (0.061) (0.053) (0.064) (0.044) (0.045) (0.037) 
Trade openness -0.000 -0.000* 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
IMF 0.016*** 0.022** 0.007 0.028** 0.040*** -0.006 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) 
FIRST 0.003 0.011 0.008 -0.002 0.005 -0.005 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) 
LEFT 0.012** 0.011 0.018 0.022 0.008 0.013 0.001 
 (0.005) (0.013) (0.011) (0.014) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) 
RIGHT 0.014*** 0.002 0.021** 0.025** 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.008 
 (0.005) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) 
Domestic debt crisis 0.028* -0.045 0.054 0.064 -0.008 0.074*** 0.123*** 
 (0.016) (0.036) (0.035) (0.040) (0.025) (0.020) (0.012) 
 
 
      
Panel B: Dependent Variable: 
Domestic debt crisis 
  
            
Credit gap -0.016** -0.012 -0.013* -0.012 -0.012 -0.022*** -0.021*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
Output gap -1.292 -0.735 -0.838 -0.963 -0.744 -1.799* -0.959 
 (0.976) (0.969) (0.944) (0.977) (0.972) (0.951) (0.859) 
Trade openness -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Inflation 1.511*** 1.534*** 1.479*** 1.557*** 1.537*** 1.183*** 1.230*** 
 (0.298) (0.291) (0.295) (0.292) (0.291) (0.296) (0.247) 
Public debt to GDP 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Current account balance to GDP -0.004 -0.009 -0.005 -0.008 -0.010 -0.009 -0.005 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) 
        
Wald test 6.92*** 0.00 6.50** 2.70 0.02 32.56*** 174.10*** 
Observation 1415 1415 1415 1415 1415 1415 1415 
    *Significant at 10%  
      
  **Significant at  5%  
 
 
    
***Significant at  1%  
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Table 2.17 External debt crisis and individual dimension of financial liberalization 
  
Aggregate 
index of 
financial 
liberalization 
Capital 
account 
restrictions 
Credit 
controls 
Interest 
rate 
controls 
Entry 
barriers 
State 
ownership 
Security 
markets 
Panel A: Dependent Variable: Financial 
liberalization 
       
Domestic learning 0.081*** 0.020 0.044 0.199*** 0.081*** 0.045 0.026 
 (0.019) (0.035) (0.032) (0.049) (0.026) (0.031) (0.021) 
Regional learning 0.093*** 0.177*** 0.132*** 0.182*** 0.112*** 0.112*** 0.110*** 
 (0.010) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) 
Output gap -0.002 0.022 0.005 0.041 0.041 -0.025 -0.032 
 (0.023) (0.057) (0.048) (0.063) (0.041) (0.042) (0.034) 
Trade openness 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
IMF 0.018*** 0.025** 0.012 0.026** 0.037*** 0.002 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
FIRST 0.001 0.010 0.006 -0.005 0.003 -0.007 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
LEFT 0.009** 0.006 0.016 0.014 0.009 0.011 0.002 
 (0.005) (0.011) (0.010) (0.013) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) 
RIGHT 0.010** -0.002 0.018** 0.017 0.018** 0.020*** 0.005 
 (0.004) (0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) 
External debt crisis 0.029*** -0.023 0.025 0.067*** -0.005 0.030** 0.075*** 
 (0.009) (0.020) (0.021) (0.025) (0.014) (0.015) (0.011) 
 
 
      
Panel B: Dependent Variable: External 
debt crisis 
  
            
Credit gap -0.008 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.011** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
Output gap -0.844 -0.646 -0.717 -0.725 -0.640 -0.632 -1.103* 
 (0.622) (0.633) (0.624) (0.630) (0.632) (0.631) (0.573) 
Trade openness -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Inflation 3.167*** 3.152*** 3.182*** 3.166*** 3.149*** 3.151*** 2.897*** 
 (0.264) (0.267) (0.265) (0.263) (0.267) (0.267) (0.255) 
Foreign exchange reserve to external debt -1.038*** -1.022*** -1.013*** -0.998*** -1.026*** -1.025*** -0.740** 
 (0.345) (0.350) (0.348) (0.351) (0.351) (0.350) (0.309) 
External debt to GDP 0.288*** 0.286*** 0.287*** 0.283*** 0.286*** 0.285*** 0.276*** 
 (0.058) (0.060) (0.059) (0.059) (0.060) (0.060) (0.053) 
        
Wald test 9.52*** 0.08 4.07** 3.89** 0.04 0.03 53.59*** 
Observation 1718 1718 1718 1718 1718 1718 1718 
    *Significant at 10% 
 
 
 
    
  **Significant at  5%  
      
***Significant at  1%  
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Table 2.18 Inflation crisis and individual dimension of financial liberalization 
  
Aggregate index of 
financial 
liberalization 
Capital 
account 
restrictions 
Credit 
controls 
Interest rate 
controls 
Entry 
barriers 
State 
ownership 
Security 
markets 
Panel A: Dependent 
Variable: Financial 
liberalization 
       
Domestic learning 0.092*** 0.026 0.033 0.214*** 0.071** 0.021 0.026 
 (0.021) (0.039) (0.037) (0.056) (0.028) (0.034) (0.023) 
Regional learning 0.106*** 0.167*** 0.137*** 0.193*** 0.109*** 0.107*** 0.111*** 
 (0.012) (0.015) (0.013) (0.016) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) 
Output gap 0.002 0.063 0.002 0.024 0.028 -0.005 -0.035 
 (0.025) (0.063) (0.052) (0.070) (0.045) (0.045) (0.036) 
Trade openness 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
IMF 0.015*** 0.019* 0.010 0.024** 0.035*** -0.002 0.005 
 (0.004) (0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) 
FIRST 0.003 0.015 0.006 -0.002 0.003 -0.007 0.000 
 (0.004) (0.009) (0.008) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) 
LEFT 0.009 -0.000 0.019* 0.012 0.005 0.016* -0.005 
 (0.005) (0.014) (0.011) (0.015) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) 
RIGHT 0.011** -0.006 0.020* 0.025* 0.018** 0.021** 0.001 
 (0.005) (0.012) (0.010) (0.014) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) 
Inflation crisis 0.029*** 0.029 0.018 0.065* 0.011 0.031 0.072*** 
 (0.009) (0.024) (0.020) (0.034) (0.026) (0.019) (0.011) 
 
 
      
Panel B: Dependent 
Variable: Inflation crisis 
  
            
Credit gap -0.013** -0.010* -0.010* -0.011** -0.010* -0.013** -0.017*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
Output gap -2.495*** -2.304*** -2.271*** -2.380*** -2.212*** -2.344*** -2.360*** 
 (0.661) (0.661) (0.665) (0.661) (0.667) (0.662) (0.623) 
Trade openness -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Public debt to GDP 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Money supply growth 2.084*** 2.086*** 2.071*** 2.057*** 2.078*** 2.070*** 1.727*** 
 (0.209) (0.211) (0.212) (0.211) (0.213) (0.212) (0.207) 
 
 
      
Wald test 6.64** 1.35 0.13 2.81* 0.24 3.31* 54.60*** 
Observation 1385 1385 1385 1385 1385 1385 1385 
    *Significant at 10% 
 
 
 
    
  **Significant at  5%  
      
***Significant at  1%  
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Table 2.19 Financial crisis and financial liberalization 
  Three-year interval data of Abiad et al. (2008) 
  Currency crisis Banking crisis Domestic debt crisis External debt crisis Inflation crisis 
Panel A: Dependent Variable:  
Financial liberalization 
OLS ETE OLS ETE OLS ETE OLS ETE OLS ETE 
Domestic learning -0.026 -0.039 -0.038 -0.045 -0.037 -0.038 -0.018 -0.008 -0.005 -0.018 
 (0.066) (0.065) (0.060) (0.059) (0.066) (0.065) (0.061) (0.060) (0.068) (0.067) 
Regional learning 0.134*** 0.119*** 0.147*** 0.139*** 0.142*** 0.133*** 0.148*** 0.136*** 0.153*** 0.145*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (0.025) (0.023) (0.023) (0.026) (0.026) 
Output gap 0.030*** 0.239 0.044*** 0.284 0.020 0.378* 0.030** 0.391** 0.007 0.480** 
 (0.011) (0.198) (0.010) (0.181) (0.018) (0.193) (0.012) (0.181) (0.011) (0.196) 
Trade openness 0.356* 0.000* 0.404** 0.000** 0.435** 0.000 0.399** 0.000* 0.540*** 0.000* 
 (0.196) (0.000) (0.181) (0.000) (0.195) (0.000) (0.182) (0.000) (0.195) (0.000) 
IMF 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.025 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.023 
 (0.000) (0.023) (0.000) (0.021) (0.000) (0.022) (0.000) (0.022) (0.000) (0.022) 
FIRST 0.030 -0.069*** 0.019 -0.060*** 0.028 -0.072*** 0.017 -0.059*** 0.029 -0.063*** 
 (0.023) (0.022) (0.021) (0.020) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.020) (0.022) (0.023) 
LEFT -0.072*** 0.017 -0.063*** 0.025** -0.074*** 0.019 -0.062*** 0.021* -0.064*** 0.016 
 (0.022) (0.013) (0.020) (0.012) (0.022) (0.013) (0.020) (0.013) (0.024) (0.014) 
RIGHT 0.015 0.021 0.025** 0.026** 0.016 0.029** 0.019 0.024* 0.014 0.023* 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) 
Financial crisis 0.027** 0.107*** 0.029** 0.161*** 0.028** 0.101*** 0.026** 0.087*** 0.024* 0.081*** 
 (0.013) (0.023) (0.012) (0.023) (0.013) (0.029) (0.012) (0.022) (0.014) (0.029) 
           
Panel B: Dependent Variable:  
Financial crisis 
               
Credit gap  -0.000  0.006  -0.016  -0.015  -0.023* 
  (0.013)  (0.011)  (0.018)  (0.015)  (0.013) 
Output gap  -6.689***  -3.333*  -4.768  1.989  -3.490* 
  (2.227)  (1.949)  (3.048)  (2.298)  (2.110) 
Trade openness  -0.000  -0.003**  -0.001  -0.008***  -0.004** 
  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002) 
Inflation  4.441***  1.627***  2.950***  3.937***   
  (0.599)  (0.394)  (0.491)  (0.508)   
Foreign exchange reserve to external debt  -1.445***      -0.452   
  (0.509)      (0.452)   
Current account to GDP  0.002    0.016     
  (0.012)    (0.018)     
Private sector credit to GDP    0.002       
    (0.002)       
Public debt to GDP    0.007***  0.003    0.005*** 
    (0.002)  (0.003)    (0.002) 
External debt to GDP        0.470***   
        (0.127)   
Money supply growth          2.488*** 
          (0.465) 
           
Wald test   11.63***  16.70***  9.43***  8.96***  6.34** 
Observation 490 490 550 550 488 488 554 554 455 455 
Notes: (1) Columns in OLS and ETE show the results of the estimations of the OLS and endogenous treatment effects models, respectively. (2) *, **, and *** show the significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 2.20 Financial crisis and financial liberalization 
  Five-year interval data of Abiad et al. (2008) 
  Currency crisis Banking crisis Domestic debt crisis External debt crisis Inflation crisis 
Panel A: Dependent Variable:  
Financial liberalization 
OLS ETE OLS ETE OLS ETE OLS ETE OLS ETE 
Domestic learning 0.307*** 0.279*** 0.263*** 0.245*** 0.311*** 0.309*** 0.256*** 0.265*** 0.302*** 0.276*** 
 (0.091) (0.088) (0.085) (0.084) (0.091) (0.089) (0.084) (0.082) (0.098) (0.096) 
Regional learning 0.243*** 0.229*** 0.264*** 0.247*** 0.252*** 0.245*** 0.262*** 0.251*** 0.258*** 0.251*** 
 (0.035) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.035) (0.034) (0.032) (0.032) (0.037) (0.036) 
Output gap 0.226 0.206 0.265 0.233 0.204 0.198 0.293* 0.294* 0.178 0.128 
 (0.170) (0.170) (0.167) (0.166) (0.171) (0.168) (0.166) (0.163) (0.181) (0.179) 
Trade openness 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
IMF 0.040 0.008 0.035 0.020 0.046 0.039 0.022 0.005 0.031 0.021 
 (0.038) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.040) (0.039) 
FIRST -0.097** -0.089** -0.086** -0.069* -0.105** -0.103** -0.079* -0.076* -0.084 -0.079 
 (0.045) (0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.045) (0.044) (0.042) (0.041) (0.053) (0.051) 
LEFT 0.003 0.004 0.008 0.006 0.003 0.004 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.011 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.021) (0.020) 
RIGHT 0.036* 0.019 0.029 0.027 0.031 0.032* 0.033* 0.028 0.031 0.030 
 (0.020) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.021) (0.020) 
Financial crisis 0.029** 0.134*** 0.019 0.133*** 0.012 0.071* 0.038** 0.090*** 0.021 0.105*** 
 (0.015) (0.027) (0.014) (0.031) (0.023) (0.040) (0.016) (0.033) (0.016) (0.040) 
           
Panel B: Dependent Variable:  
Financial crisis 
         
 
  
 
  
Credit gap  0.018  0.028  0.003  -0.000  -0.019 
  (0.019)  (0.020)  (0.033)  (0.023)  (0.020) 
Output gap  -3.787**  -5.020***  -3.217  -1.363  -3.499* 
  (1.749)  (1.880)  (2.831)  (1.920)  (1.830) 
Trade openness  -0.001  -0.003  -0.000  -0.005  -0.005* 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003) 
Inflation  3.968***  1.979***  2.893***  4.204***   
  (0.767)  (0.562)  (0.634)  (0.785)   
Foreign exchange reserve to external debt  -1.933***      -1.545*   
  (0.688)      (0.889)   
Current account to GDP  0.012    -0.003     
  (0.019)    (0.031)     
Private sector credit to GDP    0.001       
    (0.002)       
Public debt to GDP    0.005**  0.001    0.008*** 
    (0.002)  (0.003)    (0.003) 
External debt to GDP        0.474**   
        (0.214)   
Money supply growth          2.527*** 
          (0.733) 
           
Wald test   10.02***  10.11***  2.85*  3.16*  3.65* 
Observation 248 248 281 281 248 248 281 281 234 234 
Notes: (1) Columns in OLS and ETE show the results of the estimations of the OLS and endogenous treatment effects models, respectively. (2) *, **, and *** show the significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 2.21 Financial crisis and financial liberalization 
  Five-year interval data of Gwartney et al. (2016) 
  Currency crisis Banking crisis Domestic debt crisis External debt crisis Inflation crisis 
Panel A: Dependent Variable:  
Financial liberalization 
OLS ETE OLS ETE OLS ETE OLS ETE OLS ETE 
Domestic learning 0.447*** 0.425*** 0.473*** 0.445*** 0.470*** 0.459*** 0.470*** 0.469*** 0.392*** 0.360*** 
 (0.111) (0.104) (0.100) (0.098) (0.107) (0.105) (0.101) (0.099) (0.120) (0.113) 
Output gap -0.448** -0.643*** -0.444** -0.515** -0.427** -0.428** -0.431** -0.460** -0.494** -0.629*** 
 (0.210) (0.226) (0.200) (0.206) (0.205) (0.202) (0.201) (0.201) (0.218) (0.205) 
Trade openness 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
IMF 0.089* 0.021 0.071 0.049 0.067 0.059 0.075* 0.043 0.088* 0.053 
 (0.047) (0.044) (0.044) (0.043) (0.046) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.049) (0.046) 
FIRST -0.072 -0.089* -0.049 -0.044 -0.066 -0.065 -0.047 -0.048 -0.089 -0.088 
 (0.054) (0.051) (0.050) (0.048) (0.053) (0.052) (0.050) (0.049) (0.064) (0.060) 
LEFT 0.028 0.022 0.040* 0.041* 0.029 0.031 0.038* 0.037* 0.034 0.028 
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.025) (0.024) 
RIGHT 0.045* 0.020 0.044* 0.039* 0.040* 0.041* 0.044* 0.037* 0.053** 0.046* 
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.026) (0.024) 
Financial crisis 0.022 0.191*** 0.025 0.168*** 0.094*** 0.160*** 0.011 0.102*** 0.023 0.194*** 
 (0.018) (0.029) (0.016) (0.033) (0.028) (0.040) (0.019) (0.034) (0.019) (0.039) 
           
Panel B: Dependent Variable:  
Financial crisis 
         
 
  
 
  
Credit gap  0.000  0.016  0.002  -0.008  -0.023 
  (0.017)  (0.019)  (0.033)  (0.022)  (0.018) 
Output gap  -4.050***  -4.276**  -3.273  -1.569  -3.274** 
  (1.552)  (1.844)  (2.880)  (1.888)  (1.561) 
Trade openness  -0.002  -0.002  0.000  -0.006  -0.006* 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003) 
Inflation  3.520***  2.229***  3.070***  4.083***   
  (0.683)  (0.571)  (0.645)  (0.726)   
Foreign exchange reserve to external debt  -1.064*      -1.325   
  (0.571)      (0.883)   
Current account to GDP  0.013    -0.020     
  (0.016)    (0.031)     
Private sector credit to GDP    0.001       
    (0.002)       
Public debt to GDP    0.004*  0.001    0.005** 
    (0.002)  (0.003)    (0.002) 
External debt to GDP        0.459**   
        (0.206)   
Money supply growth          2.406*** 
          (0.607) 
           
Wald test   16.76***  11.95***  4.33**  9.69***  14.07*** 
Observation 248 248 281 281 248 248 281 281 234 234 
Notes: (1) Columns in OLS and ETE show the results of the estimations of the OLS and endogenous treatment effects models, respectively. (2) *, **, and *** show the significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 2.22 Financial crisis and prudential regulation 
  Three-year interval data of Abiad et al. (2008) 
  Currency crisis Banking crisis Domestic debt crisis External debt crisis Inflation crisis 
Panel A: Dependent Variable:  
Prudential regulation 
OLS ETE OLS ETE OLS ETE OLS ETE OLS ETE 
Domestic learning -0.076 -0.066 -0.077 -0.077 -0.074 -0.080 -0.047 -0.043 -0.026 -0.019 
 (0.068) (0.068) (0.062) (0.062) (0.068) (0.068) (0.063) (0.063) (0.066) (0.066) 
Regional learning 0.114*** 0.112*** 0.104*** 0.102*** 0.114*** 0.116*** 0.126*** 0.125*** 0.164*** 0.161*** 
 (0.028) (0.027) (0.025) (0.025) (0.028) (0.028) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) 
Output gap -0.180 -0.213 -0.203 -0.294 -0.174 -0.142 -0.124 -0.122 0.073 0.031 
 (0.264) (0.265) (0.243) (0.244) (0.264) (0.265) (0.245) (0.243) (0.241) (0.242) 
Trade openness 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
IMF -0.006 -0.013 -0.025 -0.033 -0.008 -0.006 -0.012 -0.013 -0.003 -0.009 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.029) (0.028) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.028) (0.028) 
FIRST -0.053* -0.054* -0.038 -0.038 -0.053* -0.054* -0.042 -0.041 -0.037 -0.037 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.027) (0.027) (0.030) (0.030) (0.028) (0.028) (0.030) (0.029) 
LEFT 0.038** 0.039** 0.042** 0.043** 0.038** 0.037** 0.035** 0.035** 0.039** 0.040** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
RIGHT 0.046** 0.044** 0.044*** 0.042*** 0.045** 0.046** 0.043** 0.042** 0.037** 0.035** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Financial crisis -0.001 0.025 0.078*** 0.186*** 0.012 -0.034 0.009 0.024 -0.002 0.066 
 (0.014) (0.034) (0.014) (0.055) (0.025) (0.067) (0.016) (0.044) (0.014) (0.058) 
           
Panel B: Dependent Variable:  
Financial crisis 
   
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Credit gap  0.014  0.021*  -0.010  -0.007  -0.012 
  (0.014)  (0.012)  (0.019)  (0.015)  (0.014) 
Output gap  -7.168***  -4.044*  -4.136  2.541  -3.325 
  (2.338)  (2.098)  (3.199)  (2.391)  (2.168) 
Trade openness  -0.001  -0.003**  -0.001  -0.009***  -0.004** 
  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002) 
Inflation  4.542***  1.265***  2.822***  3.935***   
  (0.630)  (0.468)  (0.492)  (0.528)   
Foreign exchange reserve to external debt  -1.081**      -0.188   
  (0.492)      (0.444)   
Current account to GDP  0.006    0.013     
  (0.013)    (0.020)     
Private sector credit to GDP    0.001       
    (0.002)       
Public debt to GDP    0.006***  0.002    0.004** 
    (0.002)  (0.002)    (0.002) 
External debt to GDP        0.488***   
        (0.133)   
Money supply growth          2.665*** 
          (0.522) 
           
Wald test   0.77  2.45  0.42  0.15  1.63 
Observation 490 490 550 550 488 488 554 554 455 455 
Notes: (1) Columns in OLS and ETE show the results of the estimations of the OLS and endogenous treatment effects models, respectively. (2) *, **, and *** show the significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 2.23 Financial crisis and prudential regulation 
  Five-year interval data of Abiad et al. (2008) 
  Currency crisis Banking crisis Domestic debt crisis External debt crisis Inflation crisis 
Panel A: Dependent Variable:  
Prudential regulation 
OLS ETE OLS ETE OLS ETE OLS ETE OLS ETE 
Domestic learning 0.268*** 0.275*** 0.242*** 0.244*** 0.276*** 0.273*** 0.265*** 0.274*** 0.270*** 0.271*** 
 (0.092) (0.091) (0.087) (0.086) (0.092) (0.091) (0.087) (0.086) (0.095) (0.093) 
Regional learning 0.271*** 0.267*** 0.271*** 0.270*** 0.271*** 0.272*** 0.282*** 0.276*** 0.286*** 0.285*** 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.036) (0.036) (0.038) (0.038) (0.036) (0.037) (0.039) (0.038) 
Output gap -0.011 -0.014 -0.016 -0.017 0.004 0.002 -0.011 0.000 -0.017 -0.022 
 (0.219) (0.215) (0.213) (0.209) (0.219) (0.214) (0.215) (0.212) (0.216) (0.212) 
Trade openness -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
IMF -0.013 -0.021 -0.038 -0.040 -0.014 -0.012 -0.016 -0.030 -0.038 -0.040 
 (0.050) (0.051) (0.048) (0.048) (0.050) (0.050) (0.049) (0.053) (0.048) (0.049) 
FIRST -0.070 -0.069 -0.067 -0.066 -0.067 -0.067 -0.071 -0.068 -0.082 -0.082 
 (0.058) (0.056) (0.054) (0.053) (0.058) (0.057) (0.055) (0.054) (0.064) (0.062) 
LEFT 0.075*** 0.075*** 0.068*** 0.068*** 0.075*** 0.075*** 0.062** 0.062*** 0.081*** 0.081*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) 
RIGHT 0.085*** 0.083*** 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.090*** 0.090*** 0.072*** 0.068*** 0.084*** 0.084*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) 
Financial crisis -0.024 -0.001 0.036** 0.050 -0.021 -0.037 -0.008 0.033 0.012 0.026 
 (0.019) (0.045) (0.018) (0.066) (0.030) (0.072) (0.020) (0.067) (0.019) (0.061) 
           
Panel B: Dependent Variable:  
Financial crisis 
         
 
  
 
  
Credit gap  0.041*  0.051**  0.013  0.006  -0.012 
  (0.022)  (0.021)  (0.033)  (0.024)  (0.022) 
Output gap  -2.906  -3.409*  -2.341  -0.650  -2.355 
  (2.049)  (2.013)  (2.963)  (1.988)  (1.964) 
Trade openness  -0.001  -0.003  0.000  -0.006  -0.004* 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.003) 
Inflation  4.731***  1.768***  3.006***  4.530***   
  (0.940)  (0.665)  (0.650)  (0.825)   
Foreign exchange reserve to external debt  -1.105      -1.337   
  (0.731)      (0.954)   
Current account to GDP  0.003    -0.014     
  (0.022)    (0.032)     
Private sector credit to GDP    0.000       
    (0.003)       
Public debt to GDP    0.003  -0.000    0.006** 
    (0.002)  (0.003)    (0.003) 
External debt to GDP        0.490**   
        (0.224)   
Money supply growth          3.253*** 
          (0.724) 
           
Wald test   0.29  0.05  0.05  0.59  0.06 
Observation 248 248 281 281 248 248 281 281 234 234 
Notes: (1) Columns in OLS and ETE show the results of the estimations of the OLS and endogenous treatment effects models, respectively. (2) *, **, and *** show the significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
 80 
Table 2.24 Financial crisis and individual dimension of financial liberalization (Gwartney et al., 2016) 
  Freedom to own foreign currency bank accounts (3D) Black market exchange rates (4C) 
  
Currency  
crisis 
Banking  
crisis 
Domestic debt  
crisis 
External debt 
 crisis 
Inflation 
 crisis 
Currency  
crisis 
Banking  
crisis 
Domestic debt  
crisis 
External debt 
 crisis 
Inflation  
crisis 
Panel A: Dependent Variable:  
Financial liberalization 
          
Domestic learning 0.524** 0.439** 0.472** 0.436** 0.466** 0.186 0.304 0.284 0.246 0.031 
 (0.224) (0.205) (0.222) (0.203) (0.228) (0.234) (0.220) (0.230) (0.222) (0.249) 
Output gap -0.320 -0.279 -0.255 -0.299 -0.360 -1.132** -1.028*** -0.977** -0.967** -1.174*** 
 (0.485) (0.467) (0.485) (0.465) (0.479) (0.452) (0.393) (0.417) (0.388) (0.451) 
Trade openness -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
IMF 0.231** 0.175* 0.173 0.189* 0.218** -0.006 0.089 0.073 0.078 0.084 
 (0.116) (0.105) (0.110) (0.109) (0.108) (0.092) (0.087) (0.094) (0.088) (0.101) 
FIRST -0.059 0.007 -0.046 -0.004 -0.181 -0.227** -0.160* -0.172 -0.151 -0.167 
 (0.126) (0.117) (0.126) (0.116) (0.138) (0.106) (0.097) (0.108) (0.097) (0.130) 
LEFT 0.016 0.031 0.020 0.022 0.021 0.069 0.088** 0.086* 0.086** 0.079 
 (0.056) (0.053) (0.056) (0.052) (0.055) (0.047) (0.044) (0.048) (0.044) (0.052) 
RIGHT 0.064 0.058 0.067 0.039 0.091* 0.026 0.051 0.052 0.059 0.059 
 (0.057) (0.051) (0.056) (0.052) (0.055) (0.048) (0.043) (0.048) (0.043) (0.052) 
Financial crisis -0.096 -0.051 0.102 -0.001 0.107 0.379*** 0.184* 0.213** 0.118* 0.160 
 (0.125) (0.127) (0.131) (0.110) (0.143) (0.062) (0.096) (0.088) (0.062) (0.106) 
           
Panel B: Dependent Variable:  
 Financial crisis 
          
Credit gap 0.045* 0.058** 0.009 -0.003 -0.023 0.023 0.048** 0.015 0.005 -0.010 
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.033) (0.025) (0.022) (0.018) (0.021) (0.033) (0.024) (0.022) 
Output gap -2.665 -3.197 -2.356 -0.718 -2.581 -2.448 -3.522* -2.693 -0.466 -2.527 
 (2.168) (2.033) (2.906) (1.997) (1.902) (1.649) (1.991) (2.964) (2.017) (1.945) 
Trade openness -0.001 -0.003 0.000 -0.005 -0.004* -0.002 -0.003 0.000 -0.005 -0.004* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Inflation 4.762*** 1.774*** 2.980*** 4.522***  4.249*** 1.952*** 3.006*** 4.601***  
 (0.935) (0.626) (0.655) (0.791)  (0.765) (0.609) (0.652) (0.768)  
Foreign exchange reserve to external debt -1.166   -1.266  -1.269**   -1.371  
 (0.736)   (0.937)  (0.621)   (0.953)  
Current account to GDP 0.004  -0.015   0.006  -0.019   
 (0.022)  (0.031)   (0.018)  (0.032)   
Private sector credit to GDP  0.000     0.000    
  (0.002)     (0.002)    
Public debt to GDP  0.003 -0.000  0.005**  0.003 -0.000  0.006** 
  (0.002) (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002) (0.003)  (0.003) 
External debt to GDP    0.441**     0.455**  
    (0.219)     (0.224)  
Money supply growth     2.998***     3.240*** 
     (0.786)     (0.713) 
           
Wald test  0.17 0.38 0.30 0.65 1.89 12.09*** 2.70 0.26 0.84 1.00 
Observation 248 281 248 281 234 248 281 248 281 234 
    *Significant at 10%   
   
     
  **Significant at  5%           
***Significant at  1%           
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Table 2.25 Financial crisis and individual dimension of financial liberalization (Gwartney et al., 2016) 
  Controls of the movement of capital and people (4D) Credit market regulations (5A) 
  
Currency  
crisis 
Banking  
crisis 
Domestic debt  
crisis 
External debt 
 crisis 
Inflation 
 crisis 
Currency  
crisis 
Banking  
crisis 
Domestic debt  
crisis 
External debt 
 crisis 
Inflation  
crisis 
Panel A: Dependent Variable:  
Financial liberalization 
          
Domestic learning -0.068 -0.015 -0.064 0.073 -0.075 0.177* 0.291*** 0.309*** 0.284*** 0.189 
 (0.139) (0.130) (0.141) (0.124) (0.133) (0.107) (0.102) (0.111) (0.103) (0.116) 
Output gap -0.558* -0.627** -0.483 -0.651** -0.675** -0.215 -0.161 -0.111 -0.084 -0.291 
 (0.317) (0.302) (0.305) (0.301) (0.297) (0.209) (0.200) (0.197) (0.192) (0.195) 
Trade openness 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
IMF -0.002 0.014 0.033 -0.022 0.042 -0.023 0.001 0.015 -0.022 0.005 
 (0.067) (0.064) (0.066) (0.063) (0.064) (0.043) (0.041) (0.045) (0.042) (0.043) 
FIRST 0.036 0.030 0.026 0.031 0.059 -0.076 -0.046 -0.067 -0.051 -0.080 
 (0.077) (0.072) (0.078) (0.070) (0.086) (0.048) (0.046) (0.051) (0.046) (0.058) 
LEFT -0.000 0.015 0.004 0.010 0.032 0.010 0.014 0.006 0.020 0.021 
 (0.035) (0.033) (0.035) (0.031) (0.034) (0.022) (0.020) (0.023) (0.021) (0.023) 
RIGHT -0.009 -0.003 0.017 -0.010 0.010 -0.020 -0.005 -0.008 -0.006 -0.003 
 (0.035) (0.031) (0.034) (0.031) (0.034) (0.022) (0.021) (0.023) (0.021) (0.023) 
Financial crisis 0.247*** 0.251*** 0.284*** 0.250*** 0.281*** 0.204*** 0.192*** 0.180*** 0.164*** 0.237*** 
 (0.049) (0.049) (0.057) (0.043) (0.053) (0.025) (0.024) (0.035) (0.027) (0.029) 
           
Panel B: Dependent Variable:  
 Financial crisis 
          
Credit gap 0.010 0.021 -0.018 -0.016 -0.027 0.016 0.012 0.002 -0.000 -0.009 
 (0.019) (0.018) (0.030) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.032) (0.022) (0.018) 
Output gap -4.983*** -5.472*** -4.720* -3.518** -4.503*** -3.364** -3.992** -3.753 -1.818 -2.619* 
 (1.797) (1.763) (2.580) (1.615) (1.602) (1.640) (1.582) (2.777) (1.771) (1.495) 
Trade openness -0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.002 -0.005* -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) 
Inflation 3.798*** 2.018*** 2.963*** 3.590***  4.095*** 2.874*** 3.307*** 4.345***  
 (0.759) (0.524) (0.582) (0.585)  (0.581) (0.559) (0.621) (0.620)  
Foreign exchange reserve to external debt -1.065*   -1.190*  -0.567   -1.196  
 (0.589)   (0.717)  (0.587)   (0.895)  
Current account to GDP -0.010  -0.025   -0.003  0.017   
 (0.019)  (0.029)   (0.018)  (0.031)   
Private sector credit to GDP  -0.000     0.002    
  (0.002)     (0.002)    
Public debt to GDP  0.002 0.000  0.006**  0.003** 0.003  0.006*** 
  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001) (0.002)  (0.002) 
External debt to GDP    0.239     0.314*  
    (0.156)     (0.182)  
Money supply growth     2.635***     2.493*** 
     (0.556)     (0.513) 
           
Wald test  11.47*** 15.55*** 11.18*** 19.26*** 17.10*** 24.38*** 31.97*** 11.58*** 16.79*** 23.73*** 
Observation 248 281 248 281 234 248 281 248 281 234 
    *Significant at 10%   
   
     
  **Significant at  5%           
***Significant at  1%           
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Chapter 3: Extreme capital inflow waves: Macroprudential 
policy or capital flow management? 
 
 
Abstract: Following the IMF’s institutional view of capital flows, this paper investigates links 
between extreme capital inflow waves and the use of macroprudential policy measures (MPMs) and 
capital flow management measures (CFMs). The analysis suggests that (i) sharp decreases in capital 
inflows (sudden stops) encourage regulators to tighten MPMs; (ii) the tightening of MPMs following 
sudden stops tends to target financial institutions rather than borrowers; (iii) sharp increases in capital 
inflows (surges) lead to the tightening of CFMs; and (iv) large and volatile capital inflows tend to 
promote the upgrading of MPMs and CFMs as financial policy reforms, particularly after the global 
financial crisis (GFC). These findings confirm that since the GFC, countries’ practices are consistent 
with the recommendation of the IMF’s institutional view wherein the use of MPMs is relevant to 
limiting the systemic risks to the financial system of sudden stops and CFMs are appropriate during 
surges that could increase risks to financial stability in future. Our results are robust to the exclusion 
of the GFC period and the use of gross capital flows, as well as to controls for contagion effects and 
addressing possible endogeneity problems.  
 
Keywords: Extreme capital inflow waves; Macroprudential policy; Capital flow management.
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3.1  Introduction 
Prior to the 2008-2009 Global Financial Crisis (GFC), it was commonly acknowledged that financial 
integration could offer various benefits, including the more efficient allocation of capital across 
countries, better consumption smoothing through international risk sharing, enhanced macroeconomic 
and financial discipline, and higher investment and output growth. Supporters of financial 
globalization also argue that the cross-border movement of capital allows individual and institutional 
investors to diversify risks and foster technology transfer. 24  On the other hand, another body of 
literature criticizes financial globalization and notes the costs and risks associated with global financial 
integration, including the high probability of financial turmoil, contagion effects, and market 
segmentation between those who are able to participate in the global financial system and those who 
must rely on their domestic financial sector.25  
The recent GFC and its consequences have led to the reconsideration of the implications of 
financial globalization and the existing financial regulatory framework, since the weaknesses of the 
current regulatory framework have been highlighted. Some studies argue that the existing financial 
regulatory framework is not sufficient to protect the stability of the financial system as a whole (Borio, 
2003; Knight, 2006), since financial stability was mainly considered from a microprudential 
perspective that aimed to protect individual financial institutions. Thus, in the wake of the GFC, 
financial regulators have sought to determine the causes of crises as well as to identify policy tools to 
prevent future financial system crises. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) emphasizes both regulatory weaknesses at the international and national levels and 
                                                          
24 Many studies also show benefits of financial globalization. Kose et al. (2009) state that international financial integration 
improves risk diversification and capital allocation efficiency, thereby promoting productivity growth. Moreover, Fischer 
(1998) claims that openness to capital movements enables developing economies to transition from lower- to middle-
income status, and Chinn and Ito (2006) and Calderón and Kubota (2009) suggest that access to international capital 
markets enhances the depth and scope of domestic financial markets. 
25 Bordo et al. (2010) argue that a greater amount of foreign debt is associated with an increased risk of financial crises and 
leads to significant permanent output losses. In addition, Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013) show a negative relationship 
between capitals flows and economic growth. 
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corporate governance weaknesses as the causes of the GFC in the UNCTAD 2010 report on corporate 
governance in the wake of the financial crisis. 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) also states in its 2012 Institutional View (IV) that 
capital account liberalization is not always optimal and, under certain conditions, capital controls on 
inflows and outflows can be appropriate to prevent and mitigate financial instability. In addition, the 
IMF has proposed regulatory frameworks, highlighting two possible approaches: macroprudential 
policy measures (MPMs) and capital flow management (CFMs). Although these two types of policy 
measures are often perceived as similar, the IMF (2012) emphasizes that their primary objectives do 
not necessarily overlap: MPMs can help mitigate systemic financial risks and improve the capacity of 
financial systems to safely intermediate cross-border flows and increase countries’ resilience to 
aggregate shocks, including the risks associated with capital flows, whereas CFMs can help enhance 
financial stability in the face of extreme and volatile capital flows. The IMF’s IV report further 
emphasizes that although MPMs can be used to enhance risk management capabilities, a more 
comprehensive discussion is still required to evaluate the usefulness of CFMs in managing the various 
financial risks arising from international capital flows. 
In addition, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision developed a new Basel regulatory 
framework, known as Basel III, which focuses primarily on strengthening macroprudential regulation. 
The establishment of Basel III reflects one of the most significant responses to recent crises (Claessens 
& Kodres, 2014). With the support of the IMF and the establishment of Basel III, since the GFC, 
academic researchers and financial regulators have proposed uses of MPMs and CFMs for crisis 
resolution. Thus, the term ‘macroprudential’ has become popular since the recent GFC, although it 
was first introduced by the Bank of England in 1979 (Kahou & Lehar, 2017; Maes, 2009). 
Macroprudential policy frameworks are now a focus of discussions about financial reform issues in 
most countries. In addition to MPMs, financial regulators have paid more attention to the need for 
capital flow controls than they had in the past due to the argument that extreme capital flow waves 
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have unfavorable effects. A number of emerging market economies have recently employed CFMs to 
smooth capital inflows (Ahmed & Zlate, 2014).  
The purpose of this paper is to empirically test whether countries employ MPMs or CFMs 
following shocks related to volatile capital inflows. Two types of extreme capital inflow waves can 
occur: sharp declines in capital inflows (sudden stops) and sharp increases in capital inflows (surges). 
In this paper, we attempt to evaluate the following questions: (i) Do episodes of extreme capital inflows 
promote MPMs or CFMs? (ii) Are there any differences in the focuses of these policies in the pre- and 
post-GFC periods? Examining these questions could help determine whether countries have upgraded 
their macroprudential polices to address the systemic financial risks arising from large and volatile 
capital flows and whether they have increased controls on capital inflows in response to inflow surges 
to safeguard financial stability, as recommended in the IMF’s policy advice on capital controls and 
macroprudential policies based on its IV.  In addition, this examination enables us to consider 
differences in financial regulators’ behaviors toward such policies before and after the GFC. 
In empirically testing whether countries are likely to tighten MPMs or CFMs after experiencing 
episodes of extreme capital inflows, this study uses information on macroprudential policy measures 
constructed by Cerutti et al. (2017) and information on capital control measures from Fernández et al. 
(2016) for over 110 countries during the period from 2000 to 2013. First, we estimate a complementary 
logarithmic model as our base model, assuming that all types of capital inflow episodes are treated as 
exogenous economic shocks. The results indicate that sudden declines in net capital inflows (sudden 
stops) are likely to encourage financial regulators to tighten MPMs, whereas the association between 
sharp increases in capital inflows (surges) and the upgrading of MPMs is unclear. Given that sudden 
stops are considered a form of financial crisis, the positive relationship we identify between the 
occurrence of sudden stops and the tightening of MPMs would support the crises-beget-reforms 
arguments of Abiad and Mody (2005), Agnello et al. (2015), and Hlaing and Kakinaka (2018). 
Moreover, such sudden stops lead to tighter MPMs targeting financial institutions or lenders rather 
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than borrowers. In contrast, our results show that sharp increases in net capital inflows (surges) are 
likely to upgrade CFMs, although the association between episodes of capital inflows and CFMs is 
less significant. 
The significant positive correlations between the occurrence of stop episodes and the tightening 
of macroprudential policies suggest that an economy facing reversals of capital inflows tends to 
upgrade its macroprudential policies to strengthen the resilience of the financial system so that it can 
withstand adverse capital flows shocks. In contrast, the non-significant associations between the 
occurrence of surge episodes and the tightening of MPMs confirm that MPMs will not be upgraded in 
the face of sharp increases in capital inflows because MPMs are not generally designed to limit capital 
flows. Concerning CFMs, the positive correlations between the incidence of surge episodes and the 
upgrading of CFMs indicate that an economy facing sharp increases in capital inflows upgrades its 
capital control measures to manage the risks associated with such high volatility. Therefore, our 
findings have confirmed that countries’ current practices are consistent with the IMF’s 
recommendations in light of the institutional view, where MPMs are relevant to limiting systemic risks 
in the whole financial system and CFMs are appropriate under circumstances of capital inflow surges 
that will raise the risks of prospective financial instability.  
A group of studies has suggested that the existing micro-based financial regulatory framework 
is suspect and not strong enough to insure financial stability of the system as a whole because financial 
crises were infrequent before the GFC (Davis, 1999; Crockett, 2000; Borio, 2003; Knight, 2006). 
Nevertheless, financial regulators have mainly employed micro-based frameworks and have not 
emphasized reliable macro-based policy measures. However, the GFC reminded financial regulators 
worldwide of the need to emphasize macro-based frameworks, which have moved to the center given 
the reconsideration of financial policy reforms (Schoenmaker & Wierts, 2016; Kahou & Lehar, 2017; 
Fendoğlu, 2017). To empirically test and compare the importance of the GFC in relation to MPMs and 
CFMs, we divide the sample into pre- and post-GFC periods. Our analysis indicates that the upgrading 
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of MPMs and CFMs is more pronounced after the GFC period. MPMs and CFMs were not generally 
included in financial policy reforms following large and volatile capital inflows before the GFC, 
although the use of MPMs and CFMs has become much more common in the wake of the GFC. Our 
results confirm the arguments of Kahou and Lehar (2017) and Fendoğlu (2017) that financial stability 
was not considered from macroprudential perceptive prior to the GFC, and the GFC reminded financial 
regulators of the importance of the adoption of macroprudential policies with capital flow controls to 
achieve financial stability. 
To confirm the empirical validity of our baseline results, this study conducts several robustness 
checks. First, we use gross capital inflows instead of net capital flows, since the literature emphasizes 
the importance of gross capital flows (Forbes & Warnock, 2012). Second, we consider contagion or 
bandwagon effects because the probability of changing financial policies can be connected to 
international convergence among peer countries (Abiad & Mody, 2005; Masciandaro et al., 2008; 
Masciandaro & Romelli, 2018). We use two indicators to proxy for the role of peer pressure in the 
diffusion of tightening MPMs and CFMs. Third, we mitigate the concern that our results are driven by 
the influence of the GFC by excluding and dummying out the years of the GFC (2008 and 2009). 
Finally, we use matching methods to mimic randomization with regard to the assignment of the 
treatment because the baseline regression may suffer from endogeneity problems. For example, some 
studies state that the likelihood of capital flow episodes is driven by various macroeconomic factors 
(Forbes & Warnock, 2012; Calderón & Kubota, 2013; Passari & Rey, 2015), which would induce 
endogeneity problems. Selection bias can occur since countries which experience capital inflow 
episodes tend to have different characteristics from those which do not. For example, our estimated 
results for the first-stage probit regressions show that countries with higher credit growth rate are less 
likely to experience sudden stop episodes and more likely to experience surge episodes. To address 
this issue, we re-estimate our models using matching methods, such as propensity score matching 
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(PSM) and inverse probability weighted regression adjustment (IPWRA). The sensitivity analysis 
qualitatively confirms the robustness of our baseline results.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature related to 
international capital flows, macroprudential policy measures, and capital flow management. Section 3 
describes the methodology used to identify capital flow episodes, the data, and the empirical 
specification. Section 4 presents the estimated results and discusses the economic and policy 
implications of our findings. Section 5 presents some robustness checks. The final section concludes. 
 
3.2  Literature review 
After the 2008-2009 GFC, economists and policymakers have been more supportive of 
macroprudential policies and capital control measures to improve the capacity to safely intermediate 
international capital flows and address their related systematic risks to financial systems. International 
organizations, such as the IMF and the BIS, and a large number of empirical studies have explored the 
relationships among macroprudential policies, capital controls, financial stability, and international 
capital flows. As noted by the IMF (2011, 2012), MPMs are required to address the stability of the 
financial system as a whole, and CFMs can be useful for mitigating the risks of capital flows. Although 
these policy measures are often perceived as similar, their primary objectives do not necessarily 
overlap (IMF, 2012). MPMs are tools that are primarily designed to mitigate systematic financial risks, 
improve resilience to large and volatile capital flows, and maintain financial system stability. On the 
other hand, CFMs encompass administrative, tax, and prudential tools that are designed to influence 
capital flows and are generally grouped into residency-based and other CFMs (Ibrahim & Keller, 
2012).26 
 
                                                          
26 Residency-based CFMs include a variety of measures that discriminate on the basis of residency, often called capital 
controls, including taxes on flows from non-residents, while other CFMs are measures that do not discriminate on the basis 
of residency, including limits on foreign currency borrowing and currency specific reserve requirements (Ibrahim & Keller, 
2012). 
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3.2.1  Measures of macroprudential policy and capital flow management  
Information on the actual use of macroprudential policies is limited. Most countries did not generally 
adopt explicit macroprudential policy frameworks before the GFC, and some countries have started 
paying more attention to the use of such policies since the GFC. Lim et al. (2011) construct 10 
macroprudential instruments (caps on loan-to-value amounts, caps on debt-to-income ratios, caps on 
foreign currency lending, ceilings on credit or credit growth, limits on net open currency 
positions/currency mismatches, limits on maturity mismatches, reserve requirements, countercyclical 
capital requirements, time-varying/dynamic provisioning, and restrictions on profit distributions) for 
49 countries over the period from 2000 to 2010. Ostry et al. (2012) identify two capital control 
measures and four prudential measures for 51 emerging markets over the period from 1995 to 2008. 
In addition, Kuttner and Shim (2013) construct a macroprudential policy measure using three 
categories (changes in various forms of reserve requirements, targeted credit policy measures, and 
housing-related tax policy measures) for 57 advanced and emerging market economies over the period 
from 1980 Q1 to 2011 Q4. Crowe et al. (2013) use capital requirements, dynamic provisioning (the 
practice of increasing banks’ loan loss provisions during the upswing phase of the cycle), and loan-to-
value (LTV) and/or debt-to-income (DTI) ratios as three sets of macroprudential measures in their 
analysis covering 40 countries during the period from 2000 to 2009. 
From 2013-2014, the IMF’s Monetary and Capital Department carried out the Global 
Macroprudential Policy Instruments (GMPI) Survey of the participating countries’ financial 
authorities. They crossed-check the GMPI Survey with other surveys (Kuttner & Shim, 2013; Crowe 
et al., 2013). Most recent studies construct macroprudential measures employing information from the 
IMF’s GMPI Survey (Cerutti et al., 2016; Cizel et al., 2016; Fendoğlu, 2017; Cerutti et al., 2017). 
Cerutti et al. (2016) construct five types of prudential instruments (capital buffers, interbank exposure 
limits, concentration limits, loan-to-value ratio limits, and reserve requirements) for 64 countries over 
the period 2000Q1 through 2014Q4. Cizel et al. (2016) construct quantity-based (limits on interbank 
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and foreign currency exposure) and price-based (dynamic provisioning requirements and taxes on 
financial institutions) macroprudential policy measures for advanced economies and emerging markets 
over the period from 2000 to 2013. Fendoğlu (2017) categorizes borrower- and financial institution–
related measures for 18 major emerging market economies over the period from 2000Q1 to 2013Q2. 
Cerutti et al. (2017) group borrower-based and financial institution–based macroprudential policy 
indexes using 12 categories of macroprudential tools for 119 countries over the period from 2000 to 
2013. Among these studies, Cerutti et al. (2017) provide the most comprehensive database because it 
covers a wider sample of countries, a longer sample period, and many macroprudential policy tools. 
Most studies that create panel datasets of capital flow controls use de jure information, de facto 
indicators of capital account restrictions, or hybrid indicators combining the former two measures. For 
example, a stream of the literature constructs panel datasets of capital flow controls with a focus on de 
jure information from the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions (AREAER) (Grilli & Milesi-Ferretti, 1995; Quinn, 1997; Chinn & Ito, 2006). Grilli and 
Milesi-Ferretti (1995) construct a capital control index for 61 developed and developing countries over 
the period from 1960 to 1989, and Quinn (1997) creates a capital control index covering 64 countries 
over the period from 1958 to 1989. Chinn and Ito (2006) build capital control measures for 108 
countries over the period from 1980 to 2000, and they updated their index in 2015 to cover 182 
countries over the period from 1970 to 2015. Although these studies provide panel datasets covering 
long periods and/or broad country coverage, the informational content of these measures has many 
limitations because of the structure of the AREAER (Quinn et al., 2011). 
Another group of studies constructs de jure measures of capital control (Bekaert et al., 2005; 
Lane & Milesi-Ferretti, 2007). Bekaert et al. (2005) build simple capital control indexes for 95 
countries over the period from 1980 to 2006 by assigning a value of zero prior to the date of 
liberalization and one afterwards. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) construct a capital control database 
for 145 countries over the period from 1970 to 2004 by using external assets and liabilities. In addition, 
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several empirical works construct hybrid measures combining de jure information and de facto 
indicators of capital account restrictions (Schindler, 2009; Klein, 2012; Fernández et al., 2016). 
Schindler (2009) constructs a panel dataset for 91 countries over the period from 1995 to 2005, and 
Klein (2012) extends Schindler’s (2009) dataset by including the period from 2006 to 2010, but this 
change limits coverage to 44 countries. Fernández et al. (2016) describe a new dataset of capital control 
restrictions on both inflows and outflows of 10 categories of assets (equities, bonds, money market 
instruments, collective investments, derivatives, commercial credits, financial credits, guaranties and 
sureties, direct investments, and real estate) for 100 countries over the period from 1995 to 2013 by 
extending Schindler’s (2009) methodology. Fernández et al. (2016) provide the most comprehensive 
dataset covering a wide range of countries and a longer time period. 
 
3.2.2  Related literature 
With support from a series of IMF reports (2011, 2012) and Basel III, theoretical and empirical studies 
have been conducted on macroprudential policies and capital control management since the crucial 
event of the GFC. The main objectives of employing macroprudential policies are to mitigate business 
cycles, discipline large financial institutions, and control the risks arising from market failures and key 
externalities, such as externalities related to strategic complementarities, fire sales, and 
interconnectedness or contagion (Cerutti et al., 2017). 
A strand of the literature has studied the role of macroprudential policies in addressing volatile capital 
flows, mitigating financial risks, and promoting financial stability, while another group of studies 
considers the links between macroprudential policies and developments in credit and leverage.  
Lim et al. (2011) evaluate the effectiveness of macroprudential instruments and report that 
many macroprudential instruments could be effective in mitigating systemic risk. Dell’Ariccia et al. 
(2012) assess the effectiveness of macroeconomic and macroprudential policies in reducing the risk of 
a crisis or in limiting its consequences, and they conclude that macroprudential tools are effective in 
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alleviating the incidence of credit booms and decreasing the probability that booms end badly. 
Claessens et al. (2013) analyze the role of macroprudential policies in limiting the vulnerabilities of 
individual banks and thereby the overall banking system, and they conclude that countries are likely 
to benefit from greater use of macroprudential policies to mitigate risks in their banking systems. 
Crowe et al. (2013) explore the effects of macroprudential policies on real estate booms and busts and 
find that macroprudential policies, such as limits on loan-to-value ratios, appear to best control a boom. 
Moreover, Zhang and Zoli (2016) suggest that macroprudential instruments help control 
housing price growth, credit growth, and bank leverage in Asia. Cerutti et al. (2017) also conclude that 
macroprudential policies are generally associated with reductions in credit growth, but a weaker 
association is observed in more developed and financially open economies. After studying the role of 
macroprudential policies in the risk-taking behaviors of banks, Altunbas et al. (2018) conclude that 
macroprudential tools are effective in modifying such risk-taking, and these policies seem more 
effective during a tightening phase than during an easing phase. However, the effectiveness of 
macroprudential policy tools in achieving their specific objectives, such as increasing the resilience of 
the financial system or taming financial booms and busts, still need to be examined. Macroprudential 
measures have become popular since the GFC. However, due to a lack of clear evidence about their 
effectiveness, policymakers are still a long way from knowing how to use them reliably (Blanchard et 
al., 2013). 
Although capital inflow controls have been viewed as economic distortions and as sources of 
slow economic growth in the early 1990s, the recent GFC has favorably altered this view of capital 
inflow controls. One strand of the literature has examined the efficacy of capital flow controls. Farhi 
and Werning (2014) investigate the role of capital controls and suggest that optimal capital controls 
lean against the wind and help smooth out capital flows. Devereux and Yetman (2014) study the 
transmission of shocks that cause liquidity traps across countries and show that the existence of capital 
controls can help restore monetary policy effectiveness when the nominal interest rate reaches the zero 
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lower bound in a global liquidity trap context. Benigno et al. (2016) conclude that prudential capital 
controls, prudential regulations that take the form of capital controls, are beneficial for financial 
stability. Davis and Presno (2017) investigate the interaction between capital account management and 
optimal monetary policy in the context of a small open economy and conclude that capital controls 
allow monetary policy to focus less on the foreign interest rate and more on domestic variables such 
as inflation. In contrast, another strand of the literature has cast doubts on the effectiveness of capital 
controls. Magud et al. (2011) state that although capital controls make monetary policy more 
independent, change the composition of capital flows, and reduce real exchange rate pressures, the 
reliability of this evidence depends on the circumstances. Other papers, such as those by Forbes (2007), 
Kokenyne and Baba (2011), and Klein (2012), find limited effects of capital controls on monetary 
policy, capital flow volumes, and macroeconomic variables. Capital controls have long been employed 
to mitigate risks originating from volatile capital flows, and academicians and policymakers have 
discussed the roles of capital controls repeatedly. Nonetheless, the effects of capital controls are still 
controversial (Blanchard et al., 2013). 
In addition, a growing body of literature focuses on both macroprudential policies and capital 
controls. For example, Ostry et al. (2012) state that macroprudential polices and capital flow 
management policies should be considered simultaneously and in an integrated manner. In addition, 
they argue that both policies can help reduce the financial stability risks associated with large capital 
inflows and enhance economic resilience during busts. Forbes et al. (2015) assess the impacts of capital 
controls and macroprudential measures and suggest that macroprudential measures significantly 
reduce financial fragility but that capital controls are ineffective in accomplishing most of their stated 
goals, except for reducing financial vulnerability. Korinek and Sandri (2016) state that employing both 
macroprudential policies and capital controls is optimal to mitigate the contractionary effects of 
exchange rate devaluation, because macroprudential polices can reduce the amount and riskiness of 
financial liabilities and capital controls can decrease net capital inflows. In general, MPMs and CFMs 
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have become popular and widely used around the world, and many works have been devoted to 
exploring their effectiveness since the GFC. However, the discussion of which policies are most 
effective in promoting financial stability, strengthening the resilience of the financial system, and 
controlling capital flows is still controversial. Although many studies have evaluated the consequences 
of capital controls and/or macroprudential policies, to the best of our knowledge, no empirical studies 
have discussed the determinants of financial policy reforms related to two important policy dimensions 
(MPMs and CFMs), which is the focus of this study.  
With significant progress in financial globalization, cross-border banking and other capital 
flows have remarkably increased over time. Although normal capital flows may confer economic 
benefits, extreme capital flows can impose substantial economic costs and risks. Policy makers attempt 
to identify the causes and consequences of extreme capital flow waves (sudden stops and surges). For 
instance, studies find that surges in capital inflows have been associated with subsequent sudden stops 
or reversals in capital inflows (Calvo, 1998; Calvo & Reinhart,2000), and sudden stops are associated 
with currency depreciation, slower growth, and higher interest rates (Edwards, 2005; Freund & 
Warnock, 2007). At the same time, a group of studies states that push (external) factors are the main 
drivers of extreme capital flow waves (Forbes & Warnock, 2012; Calderón & Kubota, 2013; Passari 
& Rey, 2015). 
After examining the causes and consequences of extreme capital flow waves, policymakers attempt to 
identify the best policy responses to such flows. Following the GFC, volatile capital flows were present 
in emerging Asian countries, and central banks in this region have intervened in their currency markets 
to mitigate the unfavorable impacts of volatile capital flows (Caporale et al., 2017). Financial policy 
reform is also a core dimension of the policy response to volatile capital flows, since its general 
objectives are to achieve a more flexible economy with an efficient allocation of financial resources, 
to enhance the resilience of the financial system, and to prevent crises in the future. Depending on the 
observed economic and financial conditions, regulators adopt different financial policy measures. For 
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example, in the crisis-begets-reform argument, different types of financial crises may produce different 
outcomes and encourage financial authorities to react with different policy measures (Abiad & Mody, 
2005; Waelti, 2015; Hlaing & Kakinaka, 2018).27 Likewise, policymakers might react differently to 
the different conditions of extreme capital flow movements (sudden stops and surges). A careful 
examination of how extreme capital flow waves influence policy behaviors related to MPMs and 
CFMs can provide important policy assessments and guidance in a globalized economy. However, no 
empirical studies have discussed such crucial policy issues, particularly related to MPMs and CFMs. 
 
3.3  Empirical approach 
This section first defines two types of extreme capital flow waves based on marked decreases and 
increases in capital inflows. Then, we present the methodology and data used in this study. 
 
3.3.1  Defining capital inflow episodes 
The identification of extreme capital flow waves or events, called capital flow episodes, was initiated 
by Calvo (1998) who defines a sudden stop as a marked slowdown in net capital inflows. Following 
his work, many works define episodes of extreme capital flow movements using either net inflows 
(Calvo et al., 2004; Guidotti et al., 2004) or gross flows (Forbes & Warnock, 2012). This paper defines 
extreme capital flow waves following Guidotti et al. (2004). We use net capital inflows to identify two 
types of capital flow episodes (sudden stops and surges). We denote the net capital inflows of country 
i in period t (year) as nkifi,t = kifi,t − kofi,t, where kifi,tand kofi,t represent gross capital inflows and 
gross capital outflows, respectively, in country i in period t. Next, we calculate the year-over-year 
change in the capital inflows of country i  in period t  as ∆nkfi,t = nkfi,t − nkfi,t−1 , where nkfi,t 
                                                          
27 Abiad and Mody (2005) observe that balance-of-payment crises promote financial liberalization, whereas banking crises 
set liberalization back. Waelti (2015) provides the evidence that a sudden flight triggers the liberalization of capital account 
restrictions, and a sudden stop promotes prudential regulation. Hlaing and Kakinaka (2018) show that of the five types of 
financial crises (currency, banking, domestic debt, external debt, and inflation crises), only banking and inflation crises 
promote prudential regulation. 
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represents net capital inflows. Then, the year-over-year change in capital inflows is normalized by a 
country’s GDP as ∆NKFit = ∆nkfi,t/Yi,t. A capital inflow episode takes place whenever the following 
two conditions are met: (i) ∆NKFit < μ(∆NKFit) − σ(∆NKFit) or ∆NKFit > μ(∆NKFit) + σ(∆NKFit), 
where μ and σ represent the sample mean and standard deviation of ∆NKFit, respectively, and (ii) 
∆NKFit < −0.05. In other word, a potential sudden stop (surge) is identified as a period during which 
the annual change in capital inflows (∆NKFit) falls below (rises above) the mean minus (plus) one 
standard deviation of ∆NKFit. Among potential episodes, a change in capital inflows that is greater 
than 5% of GDP is defined as a capital inflow episode. By following this approach, we calculate two 
types of episodes: (i) sudden stops (sharp decreases in capital inflows) and (ii) surges (sharp increases 
in capital inflows). 
 
3.3.2  Methodology and data 
The objective of this paper is to assess whether the upgrading of MPMs or CFMs has been followed 
by a sharp decrease and increase of capital inflows (sudden stops and surges). Based on the previous 
literature, including work by Forbes and Warnock (2012) and Masciandaro and Romelli (2018), we 
estimate the following empirical equation for MPMs and CFMs considering the linkages between 
capital inflow episodes and macroeconomic variables: 
Prob(Pi,t = 1) = F(βEPSi,t−1 + γXi,t−1),       (1) 
where Pi,t is a dummy variable that takes the value one if country i tightens policy (MPMs or CFMs) 
in year t and zero otherwise;28 EPS is an episode dummy variable that takes the value one if country i 
experiences an episode (sudden stop or surges); and X is a vector of variables that are likely to be 
related to the probability of upgrading policy (MPMs or CFMs). We lag all independent variables so 
that any changes in MPMs or CFMs occur after the variable is measured. 
                                                          
28 We focus only on the tightening of MPMs and CFMs because the cases that countries reduce MPMs and CFMs measures 
are rare in our dataset.  
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Since observations of tightening MPMs and CFMs are rare in our analysis (90 percent of the 
sample is zeros), an appropriate methodology with which to estimate equation (1) is the 
complementary logarithmic, or cloglog, framework, which is based on cumulative distribution 
function F(⋅) of the extreme value distribution: 
F(z) = 1 − exp [− exp(z)].         (2) 
This function is asymmetric, unlike logit and probit models, and approaches zero slowly and one 
quickly. We cluster the standard errors by country in each of the empirical models to allow for the 
relaxation of the assumption of independence between observations in the data. We also include year 
dummies to control for time-specific effects. 
Concerning MPMs, we use data from Cerutti et al. (2017). Using the IMF’s GMPI Survey data, 
they construct two main measures: borrower-based and financial institution–based measures. 
Specifically, borrower-based measure includes two instruments: (i) caps on the loan-to-value ratio and 
(ii) the debt-to-income ratio. Financial institution–based measures includes ten instruments: (i) time-
varying/dynamic loan loss provisioning, (ii) general countercyclical capital buffers/requirements, (iii) 
leverage ratio, (iv) capital surcharges on SIFIs, (v) limits on interbank exposure, (vi) concentration 
limits, (vii) limits on foreign currency loans, (viii) reserve requirement ratios and/or countercyclical 
reserve requirements, (ix) limits on domestic currency loans, and (x) levies/taxes on financial 
institutions. They also construct an aggregate macroprudential policy index (MPI) by summing the 12 
policy instruments to capture the overall degree of macroprudential policy in a country. For our 
analysis, we first use an aggregate index of macroprudential policies to evaluate the relationship 
between capital inflow episodes and the tightening of overall macroprudential tools. We then use 
borrower-based and financial institution–based policies to verify which sector financial regulators 
target, because the aggregate index represents a rough approximation and different measures may 
differ in nature. We use annual changes in the aggregate index of macroprudential policies and its two 
dimensions by setting the index to one if policies are tightened and zero otherwise. 
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Concerning CFMs, we use information on capital control indicators from Fernández et al. 
(2016). They construct a measure of CFMs using both de jure information and de facto indicators of 
capital account restrictions. For de jure information, they draw on the IMF’s AREAER. For de facto 
indicators, they account for the properties of capital controls on inflows and outflows based on 10 
asset/direction categories: (i) equities, (ii) bonds (debt instruments with maturities greater than 1 year), 
(iii) money market instruments (debt instruments with maturities of 1 year or less), (iv) collective 
investments, (v) derivatives, (vi) commercial credits, (vii) financial credits, (viii) guaranties and 
sureties, (ix) direct investment, and (x) real estate. Then, they construct the overall level of capital 
control by using the average of capital inflow and outflow control measures. For our analysis, we use 
controls on capital inflows as CFMs since we focus on the analysis of extreme capital inflow waves. 
We use annual changes in the capital inflow control index by setting the value to one if the control is 
upgraded and zero otherwise.  
To examine the relationship between extreme capital inflow waves and the probability of 
tightening MPMs or CFMs, this study considers two types of capital inflow episodes, (i) sharp declines 
in capital inflows (sudden stops) and (ii) sharp increases in capital inflows (surges), as explained in 
the previous subsection. To identify capital inflow episodes, yearly net capital inflow data are collected 
from the International Financial Statistics of the International Monetary Fund (IFS-IMF). In addition, 
we include a vector of control variables that are likely to be related to the tightening of MPMs and 
CFMs. First, we include U.S. stock volatility and globalization indexes, which are captured by the 
VXO volatility index of the Chicago Board Options Exchange and the overall KOF globalization index 
of Dreher (2006), respectively, in the model to control for common changes in global uncertainty and 
the overall level of a country’s integration into the global economy. Second, we account for the level 
of central bank independence and proxy for distributional conflict by including the measure of central 
bank independence developed by Garriga (2016) and the fractionalization index from the World 
Bank’s Database of Political Institutions, respectively. Third, the model controls for different 
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intervention strategies by incorporating the percent change in foreign exchange reserves to GDP. 
Fourth, we include three measures of macroeconomic conditions (the inflation rate, the percent change 
in private credit relative to GDP, and the real GDP growth rate) to account for inflation risk, credit 
growth, and output growth. The data on the percent change in foreign exchange reserves to GDP and 
the measures of macroeconomic conditions are obtained from the World Development Indicators 
(WDI). Finally, we include the level of MPMs or CFMs in the previous period in the model to account 
for the possibility that financial regulators’ decisions to upgrade MPMs and CFMs depend on the 
present level of these policies. We use one-period lagged values for all independent variables in an 
effort to minimize the potential problem of reverse causality. Table 1 presents brief definitions and 
data sources for the variables used in our empirical analysis, and Table 2 shows the incidence of MPM 
and CFM tightening. 
 
3.4  Empirical results 
This section presents the results of estimating equation (1) to examine whether extreme capital inflow 
waves lead to the tightening of MPMs and CFMs and to discuss possible policy implications related 
to the crisis-begets-reform argument of Abiad and Mody (2013) and the IMF’s recent macroprudential 
policy suggestions. Tables 3-5 presents the results of the MPM equations for each episode of sudden 
stops and surges, where Table 3 corresponds to aggregate MPMs, and Tables 4 and 5 correspond to 
financial institution–based MPMs and borrower-based MPMs, respectively. Table 6 presents the 
results of the CFM equations for each episode of sudden stops and surges. Columns (1) and (2) in each 
table present the baseline regression, which includes only capital inflow episodes (sudden stops or 
surges). Columns (3) and (4) include macroeconomic variables as controls, and column (5) includes 
both types of capital inflow episodes and macroeconomic variables. In addition, we divide the entire 
period into two sub-samples: the pre-GFC period ranging from 2000 to 2008 and the post-GFC period 
ranging from 2009 to 2013. The estimated results are described in columns 6-11 of each table.  
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3.4.1  Macroprudential policy measures 
The estimation results for overall macroprudential policy shown in Table 3 show that the coefficients 
on sudden stop episodes are significant and positive, indicating that incidences of sudden decreases in 
capital inflows are likely to tighten overall macroprudential polices. Regarding financial institution–
based and borrower-based macroprudential policies, the estimation results in Tables 4 and 5 show that 
the coefficients on episodes of sudden stops are significant and positive for financial intuition–targeted 
instruments, whereas the results are less clear for borrower-targeted instruments. Our results for policy 
responses are consistent with the arguments in some previous studies. Neagu and Racaru (2013) 
suggest that capital inflow stops put systemic pressure on the financial system, and Fendoğlu (2017) 
states that a stringent macroprudential policy stance is effective in reducing the impacts of capital 
inflows on credit cycles. Aysan et al. (2015) also emphasize the role of financial institution–based 
macroprudential policy in helping to reduce the impact of capital flows on domestic credit. Given these 
arguments, financial regulators facing sudden stops in capital inflows tend to upgrade macroprudential 
policy, particularly financial institution–based macroprudential policy. In addition, since sudden stops 
can be regarded as one type of financial crisis, the finding of a positive relationship between sudden 
stop episodes and the tightening of macroprudential policies supports the crisis-begets-reform 
argument in the crisis-reform literature (Abiad & Mody, 2005; Agnello et al., 2015; Hlaing & Kakinaka, 
2018). 
To evaluate whether the 2008-2009 GFC induces significant changes in policy responses to 
extreme capital inflow waves, we divide the full sample into pre- and post-GFC periods. The results 
related to overall MPMs and financial institution–based MPMs in Tables 3 and 4 indicate that the 
coefficients on sudden stops are non-significant during the pre-GFC period but significant and positive 
during the post-GFC period. The results for borrower-based MPMs in Table 5 reveal that the 
coefficients on sudden stops are non-significant during both pre- and post-GFC periods. 
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Macroprudential policy was insensitive to sudden stops in capital inflows before the GFC, but the 
incidence of sudden stops has encouraged financial regulators to upgrade macroprudential policy, 
particularly financial institution–targeted instruments rather than borrower-targeted ones, in a more 
pronounced manner since the GFC. On the other hand, the results in Tables 3-5 show that the 
coefficients on surges are non-significant in all models, irrespective of the subsample period, so surges 
in capital inflows do not promote the upgrading of macroprudential policy during either pre- or post-
GFC periods. 
With respect to other control variables in the models of overall MPMs and financial institution– 
and borrower-targeted MPMs, the analysis reveals that the GFC represents an important turning point 
in policy reforms such that macroprudential policy during the post-GFC period generally became more 
sensitive to macroeconomic environments and institutional conditions compared to that during the pre-
GFC period. As shown in Tables 3-5, during the post-GFC period, the upgrading of financial 
institution–targeted MPMs is positively associated with central bank independence and the ratio of 
credit to GDP, and it is negatively correlated with global uncertainty. In addition, the upgrading of 
borrower-targeted MPMs is positively associated with globalization and the growth rate during the 
post-GFC period. On the other hand, the upgrading of financial institution–targeted MPMs and the 
ratio of foreign exchange reserves to GDP are positively correlated during the pre-GFC period while 
the correlation appears to diminish during the post-GFC period. 
 
3.4.2  Capital flow management 
The estimations for the link between capital inflow episodes and upgrading of CFMs in Table 6 show 
that the coefficients of surge episodes are significant and positive, although at the 10 percent level. 
The results indicate that financial regulators are likely to strengthen controls on capital inflows after 
experiencing capital inflow surges. Several studies reveal that surge episodes can raise macroeconomic 
challenges and financial stability concerns. For example, Calvo (1998) and Calvo and Reinhart (2000) 
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state that sudden stops or reversals in capital inflows often follow surges in capital inflows. Powell and 
Tavella (2012) also reveal that capital inflow surges are associated with subsequent banking crises or 
recessions. However, Ostry et al. (2012) and Fernández et al. (2013) suggest that capital controls 
promote financial stability and improve macroeconomic adjustment in economies. The IMF has also 
released an official statement endorsing the use of capital controls to manage the risks associated with 
inflow surges or disruptive outflows. Thus, our positive association between surges and upgrading 
CFMs coincides with the argument that policy makers may use capital controls in a precautionary 
capacity to mitigate the risks of financial and macroeconomic instability in the future.  
Similar to the MPM case, to evaluate whether the 2008-2009 GFC causes significant changes 
in policy responses of CFMs to extreme capital inflow waves, we divide the full sample into pre- and 
post-GFC periods. The results in Table 6 indicate that the coefficients on surges are non-significant 
during the pre-GFC period but significant and positive during the post-GFC period. Although capital 
control policy was insensitive to surges in capital inflows before the GFC, the incidence of surge 
episodes has encouraged financial regulators to tighten controls over capital inflows in the aftermath 
of the GFC. On the other hand, Table 6 indicates that the coefficients on sudden stops are non-
significant in all models irrespective of the subsample periods, so sudden stops of capital inflows do 
not promote the tightening of capital controls during either pre- or post-GFC periods. Regarding the 
other control variables, the analysis reveals that the inflation rate is positively linked with upgrading 
CFMs, which is consistent with the findings of Forbes et al. (2015). Although there is no association 
between CFM upgrading and global uncertainty during the pre-GFC period, the coefficient on global 
uncertainty becomes significant and negative during the post-GFC period. Moreover, the upgrading of 
CFMs is negatively associated with globalization during the pre-GFC period, although there is no 
association between them during the post-GFC period. 
 
3.4.3  Macroprudential policy measures and capital flow management 
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The previous subsections indicate that the incidence of sudden stop episodes is positively associated 
with the tightening of macroprudential policies, whereas occurrences of surge episodes are positively 
related with the upgrading of controls on capital inflows. Financial regulators use macroprudential 
polices after experiencing sudden decreases in capital inflows, and they use capital control polices in 
the face of sudden increases in capital inflows. These findings have several important implications for 
the international finance literature. First, the IMF (2013) notes that macroprudential polices do not 
seek to affect the strength of capital flows; rather, their main objectives are to create buffers and reduce 
the systemic risks associated with capital flow reversals. Our results are consistent with the IMF’s 
policy advice that financial regulators employ macroprudential polices to address capital flow reversals, 
which can put systemic pressure on the financial system (Neagu & Racaru, 2013). However, 
macroprudential polices are not employed to slow down capital inflows during capital flow bonanzas. 
 Second, given the crisis-begets-reform argument, our results confirm that financial crisis 
promotes macroprudential policy reform since sudden stops are regarded as a type of financial crisis. 
In the aftermath of a financial crisis, governments implement financial regulatory reforms, which 
mainly include the tightening of macroprudential policies, to increase the resilience of their financial 
systems. Third, the IMF’s institutional view of capital flows states that macroeconomic policies 
including monetary, fiscal, and exchange rate policies should be employed in order to address the risks 
arising from capital inflow surges since such episodes can fuel macroeconomic and financial instability. 
When room for macroeconomic policy adjustment is limited, CFMs might be useful for supporting 
macroeconomic policy adjustment and safeguarding financial system stability (IMF, 2017). Our results 
state that financial regulators’ current practices are consistent with the IMF’s recommendation that 
capital control policies should be employed to address capital flow bonanzas, which could contribute 
to systemic risks in the financial sector (Calvo, 1998; Calvo & Reinhart, 2000; Powell & Tavella, 
2012). The findings on the relationship between MPMs and sudden stops as well as on the nexus 
between CFMs and surges are consistent with IMF policy recommendations for countries experiencing 
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large and volatile capital flows based in the institutional view. Moreover, our study has confirmed that 
awareness of the need to use macroprudential and capital control policies has been highlighted, 
particularly since the critical event of the GFC.  
 
3.5  Robustness checks 
In this subsection, we perform a series of robustness checks by (i) dummying out and excluding the 
GFC period, (ii) using gross capital inflows instead of net capital flows, (iii) incorporating contagion 
effects, and (iv) employing matching methods to address possible endogeneity problems. 
 
3.5.1  Dummying out and excluding the GFC period 
Given the crisis-begets-reform hypothesis, the GFC could provide an environment favorable to 
financial policy reforms, since financial regulators have to repair the cracks exposed by the crisis or 
prevent future crises. It has been widely acknowledged that compared with other cases of extreme 
capital flow waves, the effects of the GFC were more substantial and prevailed across many countries. 
Thus, our results could be driven by the GFC period. To mitigate this concern, we exclude observations 
during GFC (2008 and 2009) from our sample. Alternatively, we dummy out the years of the GFC 
(2008 and 2009) by including a dummy variable that equals one for years of the GFC and zero 
otherwise. Table 7 presents the results. Even after losing some observations during the GFC period or 
controlling for the GFC periods with the dummy variables, the analysis shows that sudden stops 
promote the upgrading of MPMs and surges promote the upgrading of CFMs, although these results 
are less significant. These results are qualitatively similar to those of our main results and confirm that 
they are not seriously driven by the GFC period.  
 
3.5.2  Using gross capital inflows 
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Although capital flow episodes have traditionally been identified using the net capital inflows in the 
literature, recent papers have shifted to using gross capital flows (Milesi-Ferretti et al., 2011; Forbes 
& Warnock, 2012). Several studies state that shocks to capital flows are driven by the decisions of 
domestic or foreign investors who may have different features of foreign investment. Although our 
primary objective is not to capture distinctions in the behaviors of domestic and foreign investors, it is 
worth using gross capital inflows instead of net capital flows as a robustness check. The results in 
Table 8 show the non-significant coefficients on sudden stops and surges during the pre-GFC period. 
However, the estimation reveals a positive link between stop episodes and tightening MPMs during 
the post-GFC period. In addition, the robustness check shows a positive link between surge episodes 
and upgrading CFMs during the post-GFC period, although the estimated coefficient is less significant. 
These results generally coincide with our previous results, so our findings are robust to replacing net 
capital inflows with gross capital inflows. 
 
3.5.3  Incorporating contagion effects 
The probability of changing financial policies is connected to international convergence among peer 
countries that learn from and follow the policy changes implemented by their peers. Some empirical 
studies also stress the importance of international convergence in institutional design (Abiad & Mody, 
2005; Persson & Tabellini, 2009; Masciandaro et al., 2008; Masciandaro & Romelli, 2018). Abiad and 
Mody (2005) build a measure of regional learning or diffusion that focuses on the idea that countries 
within a region will attempt to catch up to the highest (or regional leader’s) level of financial policy 
reform within the region. Persson and Tabellini (2009) also propose a measure of a country’s closeness 
to democracy with respect to its neighboring countries. Recently, Masciandaro and Romelli (2018) use 
the weighted average of the supervisory architecture among neighbors to explain institutional 
similarities among countries. Thus, we consider peer, contagion, or bandwagon effects in this 
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robustness check. This study uses two indicators to proxy for the role played by peer pressure in the 
diffusion of tightened macroprudential policies and controls on capital inflows. 
The first measure of peer effects is based on spatial spillover effects among countries. 
Following the work of Masciandaro and Romelli (2018), we construct a measure of geographical 
contagion based on spatial spillover (peer) effects among countries. Specifically, the measure of the 
geographical contagion is calculated as the absolute value of the difference in the policy index (MPMs 
or CFMs) between a country and its peers: 
Peers(ρ)i,t = |∑ (Policyiti≠j − Policyjt)ϖ(ρ)t
j,i
|, 
where Policyit and Policyjt are the levels of MPMs or CFMs, respectively, in base country i and its 
peer country j at year t, and ϖ(ρ)t
j,i is a declining function of the standardized distance between i and 
j. The weights ϖ(ρ)t
j,i are obtained from the inverse distance matrix between paired countries and are 
zero for countries outside the assumed radius ρ. Closer countries are assigned higher weights based on 
the inverse distance matrix. We follow the works of Elhorst et al. (2013) and Masciandaro and Romelli 
(2018) and assume a 3000-km radius ρ for the distance. We obtain the geographical distance data from 
the CEPII database. As the second measure of peer effects, we build a measure of continental contagion 
for country i at year t, which is computed as the share of countries that upgrade MPMs or CFMs in 
year t and are located on the same continent as country i. 
Table 9 presents the results of the models with contagion effects (geographical and continent 
contagion). The results related to the links between sudden stops and surges and the upgrading of 
MPMs (CFMs) are robust to the inclusion of contagion measures. Sudden stop episodes promote the 
upgrading of MPMs, particularly after the GFC, while surge episodes promote the upgrading of CFMs, 
particularly after the GFC. This implies that our baseline findings are robust after accounting for these 
contagion effects. In addition, the analysis suggests that countries face international pressure to tighten 
their MPMs and CFMs, which provides clear evidence of contagion effects. The results reveal that 
MPMs are sensitive to geographical contagion, while CFMs are sensitive to continental contagion. 
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These findings of the existence of contagion across countries are in line with previous studies, such as 
those by Masciandaro et al. (2008) and Masciandaro and Romelli (2018), that show the contagion 
effects of central bank and financial supervision reforms. Shorter distances between a country and its 
geographical peers and higher shares of countries upgrading their policies on the same continent 
encourage countries to tighten their MPMs and CFMs.  
 
3.5.4  Addressing possible endogeneity problems  
The fourth and final robustness check considers alternative econometric approaches to our baseline 
regression. Our baseline analysis focused on the probability of tightening policies without considering 
endogeneity issues. However, there is some concern that capital inflow episodes are not random 
because macroeconomic conditions can also affect the likelihood of experiencing capital inflow 
episodes, which could induce endogeneity problems. For example, a body of literature argues that 
extreme fluctuation in capital flows is mainly driven by global and domestic factors (Forbes & 
Warnock, 2012; Calderón & Kubota, 2013; Passari & Rey, 2015). Therefore, the characteristics of 
individual countries may affect treatments and outcomes such that selection bias could exist in our 
analysis. Countries that experience capital inflow episodes can be different from those that do not, 
which could induce selection bias or ‘non-random assignment.’29 For example, credit growth may 
significantly be related to the occurrence of capital inflow episodes, and countries with intensified 
globalization may experience capital inflow episodes. To overcome these econometric challenges, we 
employ propensity-score matching (PSM) and inverse-probability-weighted regression adjustment 
(IPWRA) or doubly robust estimations. We assume capital inflow episodes (sudden stops and surges) 
as the treatment, where countries experiencing episodes are included in the treatment group, whereas 
countries that are not experiencing episodes are included in the control group.  
                                                          
29  Persson (2001) provides evidence of how the PSM method can overturn standard cross-country regression results of the 
effect of currency union on trade when countries which adopt a common currency are systemically different from those 
which do not. 
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To test for significant effects of capital inflow episodes on the likelihood of upgrading MPMs 
and CFMs, we calculate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) for each episode instead of 
calculating the average treatment effect (ATE) because the ATT works better than the ATE when the 
treatment assignment mechanism is not random. Following Imbens and Wooldridge (2009), the ATT 
is calculated by comparing the average value of the outcome variable for treated observations with that 
for the respective control observations: 
ATT = E[Y1|D = 1] − E[Y0|D = 1], 
where D is a dummy for capital inflow episodes (sudden stops or surges); Y1  and Y0  are potential 
outcomes (upgrading MPMs or CFMs) for countries that experience episodes and do not experience 
the episodes, respectively (two counterfactual situations); Y0|D = 1 is the value of the outcome of 
interest that would have been observed if the country had not experienced the episode (counterfactual 
outcome); and Y1|D = 1 is the value of the outcome that is actually observed in the same country. A 
crucial problem concerns the difficulty of estimating the ATT because the counterfactual outcome is 
the unobservable value of E[Y0|D = 1]. When the occurrence of capital inflow episodes is random, the 
average outcome of units not exposed to treatment, E[Y0|D = 1], is a proper substitute, so the ATT 
can be estimated from differences in the sample means of the outcome variables of the treatment and 
control groups. However, the incidence of capital inflow episodes, i.e., selection into treatment, can be 
endogenous. 
In non-experimental analyses, treatment assignment is not random (De Janvry et al., 2010; 
Heckman & Vytlacil, 2007). In the absence of random assignment, observed and unobserved 
characteristics of individual countries may affect treatments and outcomes such that selection bias 
persists. The idea behind matching methods is to mimic randomization with regard to the assignment 
of the treatment. The unobserved counterfactual outcome is imputed by matching treated units with 
untreated units that are as similar as possible with regard to all pretreatment characteristics that are 
associated with selection into treatment and affect the outcome of interest. Realizations of the outcome 
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measure for these matches are used as an empirical proxy for the unobserved counterfactual. The 
estimate of the ATT based on matching is defined as: 
ATT(x) = E[Y1|D = 1, X = x] − E[Y0|D = 0, X = x], 
where x is a vector of relevant pretreatment characteristics or covariates that are expected to be related 
to capital flow episodes, E[Y1|D = 1, X = x] is the expected outcome for units that received treatment, 
and E[Y0|D = 0, X = x] is the expected outcome for the treated units’ best matches.  
In this robustness check, the covariates include the same control variables used in the baseline 
models in the previous section, namely, one-period lagged values of the VXO volatility index, overall 
KOF globalization index values, central bank independence, fractionalization index, percent change 
in foreign exchange reserves to GDP, inflation rate, percent change in private credit relative to GDP, 
real GDP growth rate, and MPM or CFM levels. We first estimate the ATT by applying the propensity 
score matching (PSM) method, which could reduce selection bias by creating comparable 
counterfactual outcomes for treated units. Once the treated units are matched, PSM assumes no 
systematic differences in unobservable characteristics between treated and untreated units. Given the 
estimated propensity scores P(x ) under the main assumptions, i.e., conditional independence, 
independent and identically distributed observations, and common support assumptions, the ATT can 
be computed as:30 
ATT = E[Y1|D = 1, P(x)] − E[Y0|D = 0, P(x)].  
                                                          
30 The first assumption is the conditional independence assumption (CIA) or confoundedness; i.e., after controlling for 
observed covariates, the potential outcomes are independent of the treatment assignment. This assumption states that no 
unobservable variable affects both the likelihood of treatment and the outcome of interest, after conditioning on covariates. 
CIA is a strong assumption, and it does not consider any unobservable differences. The second assumption is independent 
and identically distributed observations, which requires that the potential outcomes and treatment status of each individual 
are independent of the potential outcomes and treatment status of all other individuals in the sample. The third assumption 
is the common support or overlap condition, which suggests that every observation comes with a positive probability of 
being treated and control. There are several statistical tests that can be employed to assess the accuracy of the matching, 
i.e., the mean value of covariates between treatment and control groups should be similar after matching or whether the 
algorithm removes any significant differences between the treated and control groups. This balancing property aims to 
ensure that treatment is independent of unit characteristics after conditioning on the observed covariates (Heinrich et al., 
2010). We employ two balancing property tests to evaluate the common support condition and independence assumption. 
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This study first applies PSM using the nearest neighbor and calculates the ATT for capital inflow 
episodes. 
However, the ATT estimated from PSM can still suffer from bias in the presence of 
misspecification of the propensity score model (Robins et al., 2007; Wooldridge, 2007, 2010). One 
potential remedy for such a problem is to apply IPWRA estimation methods (Imbens & Wooldridge, 
2009). IPWRA estimators use weighted regression coefficients to compute the averages of treatment-
level predicted outcomes, where the weights are the estimated inverse probabilities of treatment.31 
Unlike PSM, IPWRA has a doubly robust property that ensures consistent results, as it allows the 
outcome and the treatment model to account for misspecification. PSM will provide inconsistent 
estimates if the treatment model is misspecified. On the other hand, with IPWRA, if the treatment 
model is misspecified, the estimates of the treatment effect can still be consistent as long as the 
outcome model is not misspecified. In addition, if the treatment model is not misspecified, IPWRA 
can provide consistent estimates even when the outcome model is misspecified. That is, IPWRA 
estimates are consistent in the presence of misspecification of the treatment or outcome model but not 
both (Imbens & Wooldridge, 2009; Wooldridge, 2010). 
In addition to the misspecification issue, IPWRA improves on PSM in two ways. First, the 
outcome model includes controls for the observation’s baseline characteristics. Both IPWRA and PSM 
need to meet the conditional independence assumption, which states that no unobservable variable 
affects both the likelihood of treatment and the outcome of interest, after conditioning on the covariates. 
Since IPWRA includes more covariates in the outcome model than PSM, which includes only the 
covariates in the treatment model, this assumption is more likely to hold with IPWRA than with PSM. 
Second, unlike PSM, which compares each treatment observation to control observations that have 
similar likelihoods of being treated in a restrictive way, IPWRA implicitly compares every unit to 
                                                          
31 As with any method of estimating treatment effects, IPWRA requires several assumptions, such as the conditional 
independence, independent and identically distributed observations, and overlap assumptions. 
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every other while placing higher weights on observations that have a similar likelihood of being treated 
and lower weights on observations that are dissimilar. To estimate the treatment effects with IPWRA, 
we first estimate the parameters of the treatment model and derive inverse-probability weights. By 
using the estimated inverse-probability weights, we fit weighted regression outcome models for each 
treatment level and obtain treatment-specific predicted outcomes for each subject. Finally, we compute 
the means of the treatment-specific predicted outcomes so that the contrasts of these outcomes provide 
the estimates of the ATT.  
This robustness check estimates the ATTs on the basis of four different specifications on 
sudden stop or surge episodes of net capital inflows (treatment) or on the upgrading of MPMs or CFMs 
(outcomes) for the full sample and the two subsamples of the pre- and post-GFC periods. The first 
specification (model 1) is the same as in the previous section, and the outcome variable is a dummy 
that equals one if the country upgrades MPMs (CFMs) in current period and zero otherwise. The 
treatment variable is a dummy that equals one if the country experiences a capital flow episode in the 
previous period and zero otherwise. This specification examines relatively short-term policy reactions 
to capital inflow episodes. For the second specification (model 2), we use the same treatment variable 
used in model 1 but modify the outcome variable by assigning the value one if the country upgrades 
MPMs (CFMs) in the two years following the current period. By doing so, we evaluate longer-term 
policy reactions to capital inflow episodes compared with model 1. Moreover, following the work of 
Forbes et al. (2015), we consider a third specification (model 3) with the same outcome variable used 
in model 1 by accounting for an exclusion window for 1 year before and 1 year after an episode of 
capital inflow (treatment) during which a country is not used as a control observation even if it does 
not experience an episode during these years. The fourth specification (model 4) considers the same 
specification as model 3 but extends the exclusion window to 2 years before and 2 years after an 
episode. Forbes et al. (2015) suggest that such an exclusion window prevents countries that recently 
experienced or are about to experience an episode from being used as a control observation and 
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prevents matching treated observations for one country with control observations for the same country 
at slightly different points in time. 
Table 10 reports the results of PSM and IPWRA for the four specifications (models 1-4).32 The 
results indicate that the coefficients on sudden stops and surges are generally insignificant for both 
MPMs and CFMs for the pre-GFC subsample. However, for the post-GFC subsample, the coefficients 
on sudden stops are significant and positive for MPMs, and those on surges are significant and positive 
for CFMs. These results are consistent with our baseline findings that sudden stop episodes promote 
the upgrading of MPMs, whereas surge episodes promote the tightening of CFMs, particularly after 
the GFC. Thus, our findings hold after considering possible endogeneity issues. 
 
3.6  Conclusion 
An extensive body of literature has examined the relationship between extreme capital flow waves and 
capital controls. In addition to capital control policies, the role of macroprudential policies in response 
to extreme capital flow waves has attracted considerable attention among financial regulators and 
researchers, particularly since the 2008-2009 GFC. It is generally accepted that the primary objective 
of macroprudential policies is to limit systemic financial risks, and the primary purpose of capital 
controls is to limit large fluctuations in capital flows. However, no previous studies have investigated 
the crucial relationships among volatile capital inflows, macroprudential policies, and capital control 
policies. In this paper, we have assessed policy responses to extreme capital inflow waves in 
                                                          
32We first estimate a probit regression for the probability of having capital inflow episodes to obtain a distribution of 
propensity scores in order to match treated and control observations. Tables A1 and A2 in the appendix present the 
estimated results of the first-stage probit regressions for model 1. We perform two formal tests to assess if propensity score 
matching is valid. First, the common support condition (also known as the overlap test) is performed. The test result 
confirms that for each set of observable characteristics in Xi, we have a positive probability that a country observation is 
treated and untreated (i.e., 0 < p(Xi) < 1), which indicates that all treated observations are on-support for upgrading 
MPMs and CMFs over the full sample as well as the pre- and post-GFC subsamples. Second, we perform the balancing 
tests. Tables A3-A5 report the test results of model 1 for the full sample and the two subsamples of the pre-GFC and post-
GFC periods, respectively. The results indicate that there are significant differences between the treated and unmatched 
control groups, which would highlight the importance of selection bias. However, there are no longer significant differences 
between the treated and matched control groups, so that the PSM method would remove the selection bias. 
113 
macroprudential policy measure and capital flow management contexts, which are closely related to 
the IMF’s institutional view, using panel data for 110 countries over the period 2000-2013. 
The paper has presented four important results. First, countries are likely to tighten overall 
MPMs after experiencing sudden cessations in net capital inflows (sudden stops). Second, concerning 
financial regulators’ targeting decisions, the incidence of such sudden stops encourages policymakers 
to target financial institutions rather than borrowers. Third, financial regulators are likely to upgrade 
CFMs only in the face of surges in net capital inflows. Fourth, our results have confirmed that MPMs 
and CFMs were not included in financial policy reforms following large and volatile capital inflows 
before the GFC but have become much more common in the wake of the GFC. Therefore, our findings 
are consistent with the argument that after the GFC, countries’ practices are consistent with the IMF’s 
recommendations on institutional view in which the use of MPMs can help limit systemic risks to the 
whole financial system after a period of sudden stops and CFMs can be appropriate in the face of 
surges that could lead to risks to financial stability in future. 
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Tables 
Table 3.1. Definitions and sources of variables 
Variable Definition and construction Source 
Sudden stops A sharp decrease in capital inflows Author's calculations with data from 
International Financial Statistics of the 
International Monetary Fund (IFS-IMF) 
Surges A sharp increase in capital inflows 
Macroprudential policy 
measures (MPMs) 
Sum of the measures of the 12 instruments of 
macroprudential policy index (MPI) 
Cerutti et al. (2017) 
Capital flow management 
(CFMs) 
Sum of the measures of the 10 asset categories of controls 
on capital inflows 
Fernández et al. (2016) 
Global uncertainty Chicago Board Options Exchange, VXO volatility index Federal Reserve Economic Data 
Globalization Overall KOF globalization index Dreher (2006) 
Central bank independence The measure for central bank independence  Garriga (2016) 
Fractionalization Total fractionalization index World Bank’s Database of Political 
Institutions (DPI2012) 
Private sector credit to GDP 
(% change) 
Ratio of private sector credit to GDP World Development Indicators 
Foreign exchange reserve to 
GDP (% change) 
Ratio of total reserves minus gold to GDP World Development Indicators 
Real GDP growth Annual growth rate of real GDP (constant 2010 US$) World Development Indicators 
Inflation rate Consumer prices (annual %) World Development Indicators 
 
 
Table 3.2. Macroprudential policy and capital control measures 
country MPMs 
(+) 
CFMs 
(+) 
 
country MPMs 
(+) 
CFMs 
(+) 
 
country MPMs 
(+) 
CFMs 
(+) 
Albania 1 0 
 
Finland 1 2 
 
Nepal 2 0 
Algeria 2 3 
 
France 1 0 
 
Netherlands 2 0 
Angola 2 2 
 
Georgia 2 1 
 
New Zealand 1 0 
Argentina 2 8 
 
Germany 1 1 
 
Norway 2 2 
Armenia 0 0 
 
Ghana 1 2 
 
Pakistan 3 4 
Australia 0 1 
 
Haiti 2 0 
 
Paraguay 0 2 
Austria 2 1 
 
Honduras 2 0 
 
Peru 2 1 
Azerbaijan 3 0 
 
Hong Kong 0 1 
 
Philippines 1 3 
Bahamas 2 0 
 
Hungary 2 1 
 
Poland 1 1 
Bahrain 0 3 
 
Iceland 1 2 
 
Portugal 2 4 
Bangladesh 1 2 
 
India 1 1 
 
Romania 3 2 
Belarus 0 0 
 
Indonesia 2 3 
 
Russian Federation 0 3 
Belgium 0 0 
 
Ireland 0 0 
 
Saudi Arabia 1 2 
Belize 0 0 
 
Israel 4 2 
 
Singapore 2 0 
Bhutan 0 0 
 
Italy 0 0 
 
Slovakia 1 0 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 0 0 
 
Jamaica 2 4 
 
Slovenia 0 2 
Botswana 0 0 
 
Japan 0 0 
 
Solomon Islands 1 0 
Brazil 0 4 
 
Jordan 2 0 
 
South Africa 1 2 
Brunei 2 0 
 
Kazakhstan 1 4 
 
South Korea 4 2 
Bulgaria 3 0 
 
Kenya 0 0 
 
Spain 0 1 
Burundi 0 0 
 
Kuwait 1 1 
 
Sri Lanka 0 0 
Cambodia 0 0 
 
Kyrgyz Republic 3 5 
 
St. Kitts and Nevis 1 0 
Canada 1 0 
 
Lao PDR 0 0 
 
Sudan 1 0 
Cape Verde 0 0 
 
Latvia 2 0 
 
Sweden 1 1 
Chile 0 2 
 
Lebanon 2 3 
 
Switzerland 3 0 
China 5 0 
 
Lesotho 1 0 
 
Tajikistan 1 0 
Colombia 1 4 
 
Lithuania 1 0 
 
Thailand 2 3 
Costa Rica 1 2 
 
Macedonia 0 0 
 
The Gambia 1 0 
Croatia 1 0 
 
Malawi 0 0 
 
Tonga 0 0 
Cyprus 1 3 
 
Malaysia 0 3 
 
Trinidad and Tobago 1 0 
Czech Republic 0 1 
 
Malta 0 0 
 
Tunisia 0 0 
Dominican Republic 2 3 
 
Mauritius 0 1 
 
Turkey 4 4 
Ecuador 3 1 
 
Mexico 1 2 
 
Uganda 2 0 
El Salvador 0 1 
 
Moldova 1 4 
 
Ukraine 4 1 
Estonia 0 0 
 
Mongolia 2 0 
 
United Kingdom 0 1 
Ethiopia 0 4 
 
Morocco 0 0 
 
United States 1 0 
Fiji 0 0   Mozambique 1 0         
Notes: “+” denotes the addition or tightening of measures. 
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Table 3.3. Tightening of MPMs and extreme capital inflow waves  
Full sample Before GFC After GFC 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Sudden stop in net flows 0.814*** 
 
0.838*** 
 
0.868*** 0.764* 
 
0.770* 0.789*** 
 
0.854***  
(0.217) 
 
(0.257) 
 
(0.265) (0.441) 
 
(0.454) (0.265) 
 
(0.264) 
Surge in net flows 
 
-0.009 
 
0.007 0.150 
 
-0.088 0.032 
 
0.209 0.354   
(0.259) 
 
(0.284) (0.289) 
 
(0.393) (0.404) 
 
(0.395) (0.403) 
Macroprudential regulation 
  
0.004 0.003 0.007 0.099 0.091 0.100 -0.098 -0.095 -0.092    
(0.067) (0.071) (0.068) (0.095) (0.097) (0.097) (0.109) (0.109) (0.110) 
Global uncertainty 
  
-0.033 -0.019 -0.031 -0.020 -0.014 -0.020 -0.082** -0.076** -0.083**    
(0.045) (0.044) (0.045) (0.053) (0.050) (0.052) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
Globalization 
  
0.009 0.011 0.009 -0.003 -0.000 -0.003 0.035*** 0.037*** 0.035***    
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Central bank independence 
  
1.230* 1.052 1.226* 0.511 0.237 0.511 2.390* 2.589* 2.381*    
(0.691) (0.690) (0.692) (0.906) (0.849) (0.905) (1.371) (1.372) (1.336) 
Fractionalization 
  
-0.383 -0.443 -0.365 -0.409 -0.531 -0.403 -0.001 -0.012 0.024    
(0.630) (0.685) (0.642) (0.732) (0.820) (0.758) (1.125) (1.121) (1.125) 
Private credit to GDP (% change) 
  
1.455** 1.179 1.394* 1.081 0.859 1.066 3.325*** 2.984** 3.135**    
(0.722) (0.719) (0.717) (0.976) (0.969) (0.937) (1.209) (1.255) (1.238) 
Foreign exchange reserve to GDP (% change) 
  
0.735*** 0.725*** 0.724*** 0.732*** 0.715*** 0.730** 0.026 -0.041 -0.007    
(0.230) (0.222) (0.233) (0.280) (0.271) (0.285) (0.396) (0.385) (0.390) 
Real GDP growth 
  
0.044 0.040 0.044 0.013 0.014 0.013 0.111** 0.112** 0.109**    
(0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.045) (0.047) (0.045) (0.050) (0.047) (0.049) 
Inflation 
  
1.998 1.982 1.989 1.779 1.935 1.780 3.822 3.644 3.735    
(1.316) (1.326) (1.322) (1.783) (1.810) (1.789) (2.445) (2.407) (2.409) 
Observations 1406 1406 1139 1139 1139 666 666 666 473 473 473 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
     *Significant at 10% 
  **Significant at    5% 
 ***Significant at   1% 
 
 
  
122 
Table 3.4. Tightening of MPMs (financial institutions-base) and extreme capital inflow waves  
Full sample Before GFC After GFC 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Sudden stop in net flows 0.739*** 
 
0.836*** 
 
0.879*** 0.630 
 
0.638 0.881*** 
 
0.967***  
(0.238) 
 
(0.262) 
 
(0.271) (0.511) 
 
(0.517) (0.317) 
 
(0.325) 
Surge in net flows 
 
0.131 
 
0.065 0.208 
 
-0.041 0.041 
 
0.233 0.417   
(0.281) 
 
(0.310) (0.318) 
 
(0.420) (0.425) 
 
(0.418) (0.428) 
Macroprudential regulation 
  
-0.080 -0.083 -0.075 0.039 0.030 0.041 -0.187 -0.195 -0.180    
(0.101) (0.101) (0.103) (0.117) (0.119) (0.121) (0.158) (0.154) (0.161) 
Global uncertainty 
  
-0.044 -0.032 -0.041 -0.056 -0.052 -0.056 -0.073* -0.066* -0.074*    
(0.050) (0.049) (0.050) (0.055) (0.054) (0.055) (0.039) (0.040) (0.040) 
Globalization 
  
0.001 0.002 0.000 -0.012 -0.010 -0.013 0.025* 0.027* 0.024*    
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) 
Central bank independence 
  
2.195*** 2.007*** 2.179*** 1.689 1.440 1.689 2.911** 3.115*** 2.837**    
(0.726) (0.701) (0.730) (1.135) (0.996) (1.134) (1.145) (1.137) (1.133) 
Fractionalization 
  
-0.957 -0.983 -0.935 -0.940 -0.975 -0.933 -0.715 -0.702 -0.676    
(0.671) (0.711) (0.687) (0.883) (0.947) (0.897) (0.992) (0.997) (1.008) 
Private credit to GDP (% change) 
  
1.868** 1.566* 1.778** 1.410 1.219 1.391 3.445*** 3.043** 3.199***    
(0.804) (0.833) (0.816) (1.134) (1.176) (1.102) (1.134) (1.202) (1.224) 
Foreign exchange reserve to GDP (% change) 
  
0.595*** 0.585*** 0.577*** 0.681*** 0.672*** 0.677*** -0.229 -0.310 -0.253    
(0.192) (0.182) (0.186) (0.245) (0.238) (0.244) (0.470) (0.438) (0.451) 
Real GDP growth 
  
0.026 0.022 0.026 -0.030 -0.029 -0.030 0.093 0.095 0.091    
(0.036) (0.038) (0.037) (0.050) (0.054) (0.050) (0.062) (0.059) (0.061) 
Inflation 
  
1.869 1.911 1.845 1.063 1.307 1.063 4.085* 3.855 3.942    
(1.505) (1.460) (1.510) (1.767) (1.755) (1.767) (2.431) (2.369) (2.423) 
Observations 1297 1297 1040 1040 1040 567 567 567 473 473 473 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
     *Significant at 10% 
  **Significant at    5% 
 ***Significant at   1% 
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Table 3.5. Tightening of MPMs (borrowers-base) and extreme capital inflow waves 
 Full sample Before GFC After GFC 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Sudden stop in net flows 0.789*  0.664  0.661 0.989  1.027 -0.239  -0.307 
 (0.479)  (0.633)  (0.649) (0.746)  (0.779) (1.129)  (1.121) 
Surge in net flows  -0.158  -0.122 -0.018  0.007 0.203  -0.350 -0.382 
  (0.472)  (0.489) (0.496)  (0.693) (0.720)  (0.827) (0.830) 
Macroprudential regulation   -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.003 -0.001 -0.005 -0.021 -0.024 -0.020 
   (0.253) (0.253) (0.253) (0.450) (0.418) (0.452) (0.410) (0.408) (0.408) 
Global uncertainty   -0.081 -0.069 -0.081 0.018 0.031 0.020 -0.273 -0.291 -0.288 
   (0.087) (0.082) (0.087) (0.112) (0.104) (0.111) (0.199) (0.200) (0.203) 
Globalization   0.031** 0.032** 0.031** 0.008 0.010 0.007 0.104*** 0.106*** 0.106*** 
   (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.035) (0.036) (0.035) 
Central bank independence   -0.658 -0.774 -0.659 -0.907 -1.200 -0.903 0.738 0.600 0.661 
   (1.126) (1.154) (1.137) (1.233) (1.197) (1.236) (3.014) (3.220) (3.239) 
Fractionalization   0.550 0.469 0.548 0.673 0.474 0.719 0.781 0.785 0.795 
   (0.813) (0.820) (0.810) (0.995) (1.004) (1.054) (2.004) (2.000) (1.991) 
Private credit to GDP (% change)   0.753 0.624 0.760 0.529 0.234 0.429 5.234 5.533 5.494 
   (1.419) (1.353) (1.354) (1.564) (1.528) (1.549) (4.764) (4.555) (4.610) 
Foreign exchange reserve to GDP (% change)   1.099*** 1.087*** 1.100*** 0.909* 0.859* 0.898 0.964 1.023* 1.023* 
   (0.339) (0.325) (0.342) (0.538) (0.503) (0.558) (0.588) (0.604) (0.599) 
Real GDP growth   0.091* 0.087* 0.091* 0.073 0.069 0.074 0.207** 0.210** 0.209** 
   (0.050) (0.051) (0.050) (0.057) (0.058) (0.057) (0.104) (0.104) (0.104) 
Inflation   2.820 2.744 2.821 2.162 2.047 2.159 8.064 8.206 8.160 
   (2.266) (2.303) (2.252) (3.164) (3.306) (3.210) (5.092) (5.036) (5.050) 
Observations 1297 1297 1043 1043 1043 666 666 666 377 377 377 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
     *Significant at 10% 
  **Significant at    5% 
 ***Significant at   1% 
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Table 3.6. Tightening of CFMs and extreme capital inflow waves  
Full sample Before GFC After GFC 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Sudden stop in net flows -0.460 
 
-0.326 
 
-0.239 -0.387 
 
-0.367 -0.321 
 
-0.109  
(0.333) 
 
(0.427) 
 
(0.430) (0.431) 
 
(0.442) (0.702) 
 
(0.694) 
Surge in net flows 
 
0.262 
 
0.470* 0.442* 
 
0.177 0.136 
 
0.809** 0.796**   
(0.222) 
 
(0.256) (0.258) 
 
(0.405) (0.414) 
 
(0.384) (0.372) 
Macroprudential regulation 
  
-0.286 -0.301 -0.294 -0.480 -0.488 -0.479 0.023 -0.043 -0.038    
(0.478) (0.474) (0.480) (0.601) (0.594) (0.601) (0.576) (0.602) (0.605) 
Global uncertainty 
  
-0.070* -0.070* -0.067 -0.028 -0.029 -0.026 -0.078* -0.083* -0.082*    
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.048) (0.047) (0.048) (0.041) (0.044) (0.043) 
Globalization 
  
-0.016 -0.019* -0.019 -0.028** -0.030** -0.029** 0.013 0.006 0.007    
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) 
Central bank independence 
  
-0.309 -0.288 -0.304 -0.570 -0.526 -0.573 0.192 0.212 0.221    
(0.721) (0.721) (0.719) (0.915) (0.918) (0.917) (0.876) (0.882) (0.883) 
Fractionalization 
  
0.990 1.042* 1.016 1.150 1.204 1.164 0.906 0.850 0.843    
(0.646) (0.631) (0.647) (0.764) (0.757) (0.775) (1.061) (1.118) (1.117) 
Private credit to GDP (% change) 
  
0.474 0.265 0.244 0.220 0.171 0.157 2.210 1.621 1.607    
(1.139) (1.155) (1.161) (1.219) (1.198) (1.228) (1.987) (1.980) (1.970) 
Foreign exchange reserve to GDP (% change) 
  
0.214 0.211 0.213 0.172 0.175 0.167 -0.137 -0.146 -0.145    
(0.359) (0.359) (0.357) (0.405) (0.399) (0.407) (0.711) (0.717) (0.712) 
Real GDP growth 
  
0.019 0.020 0.017 0.009 0.013 0.009 0.051 0.043 0.043    
(0.038) (0.037) (0.039) (0.045) (0.043) (0.045) (0.056) (0.060) (0.060) 
Inflation 
  
4.077*** 3.963*** 3.991*** 4.062*** 3.950*** 4.049*** 6.266** 6.045** 6.022**    
(1.429) (1.412) (1.424) (1.521) (1.528) (1.520) (2.826) (2.781) (2.773) 
Observations 983 983 819 819 819 480 480 480 339 339 339 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
     *Significant at 10% 
  **Significant at    5% 
 ***Significant at   1% 
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Table 3.7. Tightening of MPMs and CFMs and capital inflow (GFC dummy and excluding GFC periods) 
  With GFC dummy  Excluding GFC periods 
 MPMs CFMs  MPMs CFMs 
Sudden stop in net flows 0.787*** -0.279  0.703** -0.656 
 (0.269) (0.422)  (0.318) (0.489) 
Surge in net flows 0.178 0.466*  0.080 0.361 
 (0.286) (0.258)  (0.345) (0.297) 
Macroprudential policy / Capital control 0.033 -0.268  0.013 -0.252 
 (0.064) (0.472)  (0.068) (0.466) 
VXO 0.015 -0.030**  0.037** -0.031** 
 (0.017) (0.013)  (0.017) (0.015) 
Globalization 0.008 -0.018  0.015** -0.011 
 (0.007) (0.012)  (0.007) (0.012) 
Central bank independence 1.280* -0.249  1.430* -0.203 
 (0.677) (0.710)  (0.743) (0.654) 
Fractionalization -0.306 1.017  -0.435 0.931 
 (0.610) (0.659)  (0.618) (0.710) 
Private credit to GDP (% change) 0.891 -0.412  1.213 0.336 
 (0.690) (1.089)  (0.752) (1.141) 
Foreign exchange reserve to GDP (% change) 0.693*** 0.138  0.682*** -0.109 
 (0.194) (0.327)  (0.222) (0.353) 
Real GDP growth 0.042 0.026  0.069*** 0.016 
 (0.028) (0.036)  (0.026) (0.037) 
Inflation 1.565 3.862***  2.016 4.655*** 
 (1.285) (1.384)  (1.289) (1.656) 
GFC Dummy -0.325 -0.133    
 (0.329) (0.305)    
Observations 1139 819  947 681 
Year FE YES YES  YES YES 
     *Significant at 10% 
  **Significant at    5% 
 ***Significant at   1% 
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Table 3.8. Tightening of MPMs and CFMs, and extreme capital inflow waves (gross flows) 
  MPMs  
  
CFMs 
 
 
 Full sample Before GFC After GFC  Full sample Before GFC After GFC 
Sudden stop in gross flows 0.825** 0.627 0.766**  0.431 0.238 0.494  
(0.342) (0.579) (0.375)  (0.434) (0.558) (0.574) 
Surge in gross flows -0.158 -0.214 0.035  -0.089 -0.218 0.247  
(0.312) (0.385) (0.394)  (0.280) (0.373) (0.464) 
Macroprudential policy / Capital control 0.003 0.086 -0.101  -0.298 -0.483 -0.009  
(0.071) (0.100) (0.110)  (0.476) (0.602) (0.575) 
VXO -0.035 -0.031 -0.087**  -0.086** -0.045 -0.089**  
(0.045) (0.054) (0.037)  (0.043) (0.050) (0.043) 
Globalization 0.011 0.002 0.034***  -0.016 -0.025* 0.009  
(0.008) (0.010) (0.012)  (0.012) (0.014) (0.015) 
Central bank independence 1.127 0.346 2.517*  -0.290 -0.520 0.154  
(0.690) (0.866) (1.352)  (0.710) (0.899) (0.858) 
Fractionalization -0.471 -0.532 -0.059  1.045 1.208 0.973  
(0.688) (0.817) (1.131)  (0.637) (0.759) (1.082) 
Private credit to GDP (% change) 1.262* 0.913 3.018**  0.556 0.314 2.302  
(0.711) (0.960) (1.193)  (1.048) (1.106) (1.981) 
Foreign exchange reserve to GDP (% change) 0.759*** 0.786*** -0.031  0.218 0.255 -0.181  
(0.227) (0.280) (0.412)  (0.371) (0.432) (0.743) 
Real GDP growth 0.047 0.015 0.112**  0.031 0.018 0.049  
(0.029) (0.045) (0.048)  (0.037) (0.044) (0.060) 
Inflation 1.963 1.695 3.795  4.014*** 3.907** 6.722**  
(1.318) (1.839) (2.440)  (1.469) (1.580) (2.853) 
Observations 1139 666 473 
 
819 480 339 
Year FE YES YES YES 
 
YES YES YES 
     *Significant at 10% 
  **Significant at    5% 
 ***Significant at   1% 
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Table 3.9. Tightening of MPMs and CFMs and extreme capital inflow waves (contagion effects) 
 MPMs       CFMs      
 Full sample  Before  
GFC 
 After  
GFC 
  Full sample  Before 
GFC 
 After  
GFC 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Sudden stop in net flows 0.843*** 0.868*** 0.656 0.770* 0.815*** 0.854***  -0.220 -0.069 -0.437 -0.226 -0.048 0.117  
(0.269) (0.265) (0.500) (0.454) (0.273) (0.264)  (0.429) (0.423) (0.431) (0.437) (0.702) (0.707) 
Surge in net flows 0.071 0.150 -0.094 0.032 0.264 0.354  0.449* 0.473* 0.129 0.288 0.781** 0.702*  
(0.274) (0.289) (0.345) (0.404) (0.401) (0.403)  (0.260) (0.264) (0.423) (0.434) (0.373) (0.365) 
Geographical contagion 0.439***  0.664***  0.330*   0.297  0.933  -0.650   
(0.147)  (0.240)  (0.192)   (0.782)  (1.103)  (1.067)  
Continent contagion  0.101  0.145  0.139   0.045***  0.046***  0.047***  
 (0.117)  (0.204)  (0.107)   (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.009) 
Macroprudential policy / Capital control -0.105 0.007 -0.113 0.100 -0.147* -0.092  -0.346 -0.032 -0.645 -0.107 0.046 0.093  
(0.065) (0.068) (0.099) (0.097) (0.089) (0.110)  (0.488) (0.434) (0.600) (0.558) (0.667) (0.518) 
Global uncertainty -0.022 -0.006 -0.008 0.017 -0.083** -0.047  -0.067 -0.019 -0.021 -0.017 -0.085* -0.067  
(0.045) (0.046) (0.052) (0.036) (0.036) (0.046)  (0.042) (0.041) (0.049) (0.050) (0.045) (0.042) 
Globalization 0.011 0.009 0.001 -0.003 0.036*** 0.035***  -0.017 -0.010 -0.025* -0.021 0.006 0.021  
(0.008) (0.007) (0.012) (0.010) (0.013) (0.012)  (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016) 
Central bank independence 1.394* 1.226* 0.761 0.511 2.433* 2.381*  -0.342 -0.214 -0.672 -0.750 0.260 0.619  
(0.720) (0.692) (0.938) (0.905) (1.247) (1.336)  (0.703) (0.581) (0.904) (0.818) (0.869) (0.706) 
Fractionalization -0.550 -0.365 -1.047 -0.403 0.075 0.024  1.119 0.649 1.379* 0.760 0.691 0.571  
(0.586) (0.642) (0.782) (0.758) (0.998) (1.125)  (0.683) (0.593) (0.815) (0.739) (1.129) (1.076) 
Private credit to GDP (% change) 1.662** 1.394* 1.242 1.066 3.434*** 3.135**  0.254 0.296 0.220 0.474 1.847 0.717  
(0.733) (0.717) (0.947) (0.937) (1.301) (1.238)  (1.138) (1.310) (1.162) (1.425) (2.175) (2.107) 
Foreign exchange reserve to GDP (% change) 0.754*** 0.724*** 0.732*** 0.730** 0.013 -0.007  0.230 0.150 0.165 -0.020 -0.143 -0.083  
(0.233) (0.233) (0.281) (0.285) (0.380) (0.390)  (0.365) (0.336) (0.447) (0.406) (0.725) (0.734) 
Real GDP growth 0.047 0.044 0.021 0.013 0.114** 0.109**  0.023 0.031 0.018 0.032 0.046 0.040  
(0.033) (0.030) (0.053) (0.045) (0.052) (0.049)  (0.038) (0.040) (0.043) (0.049) (0.059) (0.059) 
Inflation 2.179* 1.989 2.376 1.780 3.633 3.735  4.167*** 4.522*** 4.761*** 4.521*** 6.211** 9.112***  
(1.312) (1.322) (1.760) (1.789) (2.261) (2.409)  (1.461) (1.376) (1.749) (1.529) (2.845) (3.066) 
Observations 1139 1139 666 666 473 473  810 819 476 480 334 339 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
     *Significant at 10% 
  **Significant at    5% 
 ***Significant at   1% 
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Table 3.10. ATTs of extreme capital inflow waves on MPMs and CFMs 
 MPMs         CFMs        
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  
 PSM IPWRA PSM IPWRA PSM IPWRA PSM IPWRA  PSM IPWRA PSM IPWRA PSM IPWRA PSM IPWRA 
Full sample                  
Sudden stop in net flows 0.098*** 0.069** 0.086* 0.093** 0.083** 0.078** 0.113*** 0.095***  -0.092* -0.031 -0.063 0.004 0.031 -0.035 -0.083** -0.051  
(0.032) (0.032) (0.048) (0.041) (0.038) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035)  (0.048) (0.030) (0.053) (0.045) (0.036) (0.032) (0.042) (0.037) 
Surge in net flows 0.005 0.004 -0.053 -0.019 -0.032 0.000 0.032 0.003  0.031 0.058 0.009 0.023 0.015 0.048 0.092** 0.058  
(0.030) (0.024) (0.045) (0.032) (0.038) (0.026) (0.031) (0.026)  (0.042) (0.036) (0.050) (0.044) (0.046) (0.037) (0.040) (0.036) 
Observations 1139 1139 1049 1049 946 946 807 807  818 818 752 752 673 673 570 570 
Pre-GFC period 
  
               
Sudden stop in net flows 0.068* 0.041 0.081 0.067 0.108*** 0.057 0.056 0.054  0.017 -0.038 0.017 -0.014 -0.086 -0.038 -0.109 -0.037  
(0.039) (0.042) (0.058) (0.051) (0.036) (0.044) (0.052) (0.048)  (0.054) (0.040) (0.073) (0.058) (0.072) (0.041) (0.100) (0.044) 
Surge in net flows 0.018 0.009 0.009 0.011 0.045 0.013 0.027 0.026  0.079* 0.016 0.013 -0.010 0.013 -0.001 0.026 0.011  
(0.035) (0.029) (0.051) (0.036) (0.029) (0.030) (0.033) (0.029)  (0.043) (0.041) (0.067) (0.050) (0.050) (0.044) (0.053) (0.043) 
Observations 666 666 666 666 553 553 467 467  480 480 480 480 393 393 328 328 
Post-GFC period                  
Sudden stop in net flows 0.119** 0.102** 0.222*** 0.125** 0.136** 0.109** 0.102** 0.137***  -0.025 -0.020 -0.108 0.041 -0.024 -0.020 0.053 -0.038  
(0.051) (0.049) (0.063) (0.062) (0.062) (0.052) (0.051) (0.049)  (0.066) (0.045) (0.085) (0.068) (0.052) (0.046) (0.058) (0.055) 
Surge in net flows 0.025 0.020 -0.131 -0.030 0.075* 0.005 -0.025 0.010  0.170*** 0.138** 0.179** 0.132 0.096 0.132** 0.077 0.130**  
(0.047) (0.040) (0.100) (0.055) (0.041) (0.042) (0.054) (0.042)  (0.058) (0.063) (0.084) (0.085) (0.068) (0.065) (0.082) (0.065) 
Observations 473 473 383 383 393 393 338 338  338 338 272 272 281 281 239 239 
     *Significant at 10% 
  **Significant at    5% 
 ***Significant at   1% 
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Table 3.11. First-stage probit regression results used to calculate propensity scores (MPMs) 
  Sudden stops   Surge 
  Full sample Pre-GFC Post-GFC   Full sample Pre-GFC Post-GFC 
Macroprudential regulation -0.038 -0.070 -0.017  -0.066** -0.035 -0.105** 
 (0.036) (0.054) (0.049)  (0.033) (0.047) (0.048) 
VXO 0.054** 0.030 0.067***  -0.060*** -0.063*** 0.001 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.017)  (0.022) (0.024) (0.013) 
Globalization 0.006 0.011** -0.003  0.013*** 0.017*** 0.007 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)  (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) 
Central bank independence -0.876*** -1.412*** 0.018  -0.006 0.168 -0.146 
 (0.295) (0.377) (0.517)  (0.273) (0.357) (0.447) 
Fractionalization -0.220 -0.482 0.073  -0.408* -0.634** -0.116 
 (0.229) (0.297) (0.382)  (0.217) (0.291) (0.340) 
Private credit to GDP (% change) -2.054*** -1.772*** -3.089***  1.949*** 2.140*** 2.074*** 
 (0.469) (0.578) (0.898)  (0.399) (0.518) (0.675) 
Foreign exchange reserve to GDP (% change) 0.184 0.192 0.002  -0.020 -0.177 0.544** 
 (0.159) (0.192) (0.286)  (0.146) (0.192) (0.261) 
Real GDP growth -0.025 -0.009 -0.044*  0.003 -0.024 0.031 
 (0.016) (0.021) (0.025)  (0.014) (0.021) (0.022) 
Inflation -0.374 0.917 -2.125  0.862 -0.224 1.629 
 (0.907) (1.121) (1.757)  (0.874) (1.295) (1.253) 
Observations 1139 666 473  1139 666 473 
Year FE YES YES YES   YES YES YES 
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Table 3.12. First-stage probit regression results used to calculate propensity scores (CFMs) 
  Sudden stops   Surge 
  Full sample Pre-GFC Post-GFC   Full sample Pre-GFC Post-GFC 
Capital control 0.271 0.321 0.101  0.092 0.215 -0.038 
 (0.256) (0.328) (0.433)  (0.250) (0.337) (0.383) 
VXO 0.084*** 0.043 0.077***  -0.058** -0.071** -0.015 
 (0.030) (0.028) (0.021)  (0.027) (0.029) (0.017) 
Globalization 0.015** 0.014* 0.014  0.027*** 0.025*** 0.032*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.012)  (0.006) (0.008) (0.011) 
Central bank independence -0.898*** -1.384*** -0.150  -0.062 0.470 -0.566 
 (0.343) (0.434) (0.602)  (0.328) (0.436) (0.529) 
Fractionalization -0.567** -0.689* -0.504  -0.318 -0.353 -0.139 
 (0.281) (0.359) (0.474)  (0.290) (0.390) (0.454) 
Private credit to GDP (% change) -1.754*** -1.458** -2.575**  2.315*** 2.464*** 2.673*** 
 (0.608) (0.720) (1.248)  (0.555) (0.700) (1.030) 
Foreign exchange reserve to GDP (% change) 0.135 0.001 -0.015  -0.276 -0.161 -0.024 
 (0.214) (0.277) (0.391)  (0.231) (0.310) (0.385) 
Real GDP growth -0.032 -0.023 -0.031  -0.004 -0.048 0.029 
 (0.022) (0.030) (0.034)  (0.021) (0.032) (0.030) 
Inflation -0.485 0.839 -3.402  2.349** 0.497 5.304** 
 (1.197) (1.352) (3.048)  (1.194) (1.608) (2.186) 
Observations 819 480 339  819 480 339 
Year FE YES YES YES   YES YES YES 
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Table 3.13. Balancing property (Full sample) 
  MPMs   CFMs 
 Sudden stops  Surge  Sudden stops  Surge 
 Mean   Bias  
Reduction 
P-
value  
 Mean   Bias  
Reduction 
P-
value  
 Mean   Bias  
Reduction 
P-
value  
 Mean   Bias  
Reduction 
P-
value    Treated Control   Treated Control   Treated Control   Treated Control 
Before matching                    
Macroprudential regulation/ Capital control 1.63 1.85  0.135  1.55 1.88  0.009  0.33 0.32  0.950  0.26 0.34  0.006 
VXO 23.48 22.15  0.049  23.01 22.17  0.148  23.91 22.05  0.018  22.93 22.15  0.260 
Globalization 65.91 62.78  0.043  66.91 62.39  0.001  71.83 68.04  0.013  74.20 67.42  0.000 
Central bank independence 0.56 0.61  0.006  0.62 0.60  0.166  0.57 0.62  0.008  0.64 0.61  0.048 
Fractionalization 0.59 0.62  0.176  0.60 0.61  0.470  0.59 0.65  0.013  0.63 0.64  0.721 
Private credit to GDP (% change) 0.01 0.06  0.000  0.10 0.04  0.000  0.02 0.05  0.017  0.08 0.03  0.000 
Foreign exchange reserve to GDP (% change) 0.09 0.06  0.314  0.05 0.06  0.689  0.07 0.05  0.462  0.02 0.06  0.184 
Real GDP growth 3.36 4.30  0.014  4.11 4.20  0.766  2.99 3.82  0.036  3.24 3.81  0.106 
Inflation 0.55 0.06  0.534  0.06 0.06  0.967  0.05 0.05  0.231  0.05 0.52  0.858 
                    
After matching                    
Macroprudential regulation/ Capital control 1.63 1.33 -37.8 0.081  1.55 1.52 90.3 0.829  0.32 0.34 -640.2 0.732  0.26 0.20 29.7 0.071 
VXO 23.48 22.71 41.6 0.432  23.01 22.57 48.2 0.579  23.80 24.06 86.0 0.821  22.93 22.45 38.3 0.615 
Globalization 65.91 67.40 52.3 0.477  66.91 67.91 77.9 0.561  71.77 71.42 91.0 0.868  74.20 75.28 84.1 0.495 
Central bank independence 0.56 0.59 32.7 0.170  0.62 0.63 43.2 0.533  0.57 0.55 76.8 0.655  0.64 0.64 84.7 0.811 
Fractionalization 0.59 0.60 58.6 0.681  0.60 0.60 71.7 0.876  0.60 0.59 83.3 0.805  0.63 0.64 -32.2 0.680 
Private credit to GDP (% change) 0.01 0.01 92.1 0.811  0.10 0.11 91.9 0.745  0.02 0.02 98.2 0.971  0.08 0.08 89.8 0.719 
Foreign exchange reserve to GDP (% change) 0.09 0.10 57.0 0.740  0.05 0.04 8.6 0.790  0.08 0.11 -33.4 0.556  0.02 0.04 38.2 0.523 
Real GDP growth 3.36 3.00 60.8 0.423  4.11 4.22 -17.3 0.769  2.99 2.62 55.6 0.485  3.24 3.12 79.3 0.797 
Inflation 0.55 0.06 99.9 1.000   0.06 0.05 -1701.2 0.517   0.05 0.05 54.9 0.706   0.05 0.05 86.6 0.986 
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Table 3.14. Balancing property (Pre-GFC) 
  MPMs   CFMs 
 Sudden stops  Surge  Sudden stops  Surge 
 Mean   Bias  
Reduction 
P-
value  
 Mean   Bias  
Reduction 
P-
value  
 Mean   Bias  
Reduction 
P-
value  
 Mean   Bias  
Reduction 
P-
value    Treated Control   Treated Control   Treated Control   Treated Control 
Before matching                    
Macroprudential regulation/ Capital control 1.34 1.60  0.142  1.34 1.62  0.074  0.36 0.31  0.252  0.23 0.33  0.009 
VXO 19.83 19.89  0.941  20.05 19.85  0.787  20.49 19.77  0.465  19.80 19.88  0.926 
Globalization 64.36 61.93  0.252  68.83 60.89  0.000  69.39 67.36  0.330  75.26 66.14  0.000 
Central bank independence 0.51 0.60  0.000  0.63 0.58  0.030  0.52 0.61  0.001  0.66 0.59  0.008 
Fractionalization 0.56 0.62  0.037  0.60 0.61  0.625  0.58 0.65  0.009  0.64 0.64  0.972 
Private credit to GDP (% change) 0.01 0.06  0.003  0.10 0.05  0.000  0.01 0.05  0.018  0.09 0.04  0.002 
Foreign exchange reserve to GDP (% change) 0.10 0.06  0.316  0.03 0.07  0.223  0.07 0.05  0.527  0.00 0.06  0.117 
Real GDP growth 4.50 5.16  0.153  4.74 5.16  0.290  4.02 4.62  0.165  4.03 4.64  0.117 
Inflation 0.05 0.05  0.852  0.05 0.06  0.103  0.05 0.05  0.553  0.05 0.05  0.243 
                    
After matching                    
Macroprudential regulation/ Capital control 1.34 1.01 -23.1 0.092  1.34 1.28 76.6 0.700  0.36 0.36 88.5 0.928  0.23 0.22 85.0 0.721 
VXO 19.83 20.90 -1579.7 0.386  20.05 19.94 43.2 0.902  20.49 20.91 42.2 0.771  19.79 19.75 40.0 0.964 
Globalization 64.36 65.29 61.3 0.740  68.83 68.32 93.4 0.822  69.39 71.06 17.6 0.544  75.26 75.94 92.6 0.730 
Central bank independence 0.51 0.52 86.5 0.689  0.63 0.63 85.2 0.797  0.52 0.54 73.1 0.494  0.66 0.65 89.5 0.817 
Fractionalization 0.56 0.56 89.0 0.882  0.60 0.57 -185.1 0.293  0.58 0.58 91.4 0.897  0.64 0.63 -1269.4 0.699 
Private credit to GDP (% change) 0.01 0.00 73.9 0.509  0.10 0.10 95.9 0.900  0.01 0.00 67.3 0.567  0.09 0.08 86.0 0.702 
Foreign exchange reserve to GDP (% change) 0.10 0.08 60.0 0.771  0.03 0.05 60.1 0.728  0.07 0.12 -55.8 0.599  0.00 0.02 78.0 0.732 
Real GDP growth 4.50 4.05 31.4 0.486  4.74 4.73 97.1 0.977  4.02 3.90 79.8 0.851  4.04 3.86 71.9 0.711 
Inflation 0.05 0.05 34.4 0.937  0.05 0.05 94.2 0.924  0.05 0.06 -142.6 0.438  0.05 0.03 -24.7 0.067 
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Table 3.15. Balancing property (Post-GFC) 
  MPMs   CFMs 
 Sudden stops  Surge  Sudden stops  Surge 
 Mean   Bias  
Reduction 
P-
value  
 Mean   Bias  
Reduction 
P-
value  
 Mean   Bias  
Reduction 
P-
value  
 Mean   Bias  
Reduction 
P-
value    Treated Control   Treated Control   Treated Control   Treated Control 
Before matching                    
Macroprudential regulation/ Capital control 2.00 2.20  0.381  1.84 2.25  0.046  0.28 0.34  0.203  0.29 0.34  0.254 
VXO 28.07 25.38  0.002  27.08 25.44  0.036  28.74 25.26  0.001  27.35 25.36  0.036 
Globalization 67.85 63.98  0.084  64.268 64.51  0.904  75.28 69.01  0.005  72.71 69.21  0.077 
Central bank independence 0.62 0.61  0.738  0.61 0.62  0.577  0.63 0.63  0.906  0.62 0.63  0.803 
Fractionalization 0.62 0.61  0.751  0.60 0.62  0.587  0.61 0.64  0.432  0.62 0.64  0.610 
Private credit to GDP (% change) 0.01 0.05  0.029  0.94 0.04  0.000  0.02 0.03  0.43  0.08 0.02  0.000 
Foreign exchange reserve to GDP (% change) 0.06 0.05  0.694  0.08 0.04  0.362  0.07 0.05  0.697  0.04 0.05  0.848 
Real GDP growth 1.93 3.05  0.059  3.22 2.85  0.479  1.54 2.68  0.096  2.12 2.63  0.405 
Inflation 0.05 0.06  0.452  0.07 0.06  0.055  0.04 0.05  0.211  0.06 0.05  0.042 
                    
After matching                    
Macroprudential regulation/ Capital control 2.00 2.02 91.7 0.958  1.84 1.73 72.7 0.632  0.26 0.33 -3.1 0.331  0.28 0.31 46.3 0.622 
VXO 28.07 27.84 91.5 0.840  27.08 26.99 94.3 0.935  28.59 28.15 87.4 0.754  27.21 27.16 97.3 0.971 
Globalization 67.85 68.04 95.1 0.952  64.268 64.76 -108.4 0.859  75.23 76.05 86.8 0.766  72.83 72.54 91.8 0.910 
Central bank independence 0.62 0.63 1.70 0.807  0.61 0.60 30.9 0.776  0.64 0.67 -858.6 0.409  0.62 0.60 -222.2 0.569 
Fractionalization 0.62 0.63 -20.60 0.748  0.60 0.61 17.2 0.733  0.62 0.60 38.3 0.738  0.62 0.64 80.3 0.933 
Private credit to GDP (% change) 0.01 0.01 98.00 0.968  0.94 0.11 70.5 0.441  0.02 0.01 28.4 0.628  0.07 0.08 91.5 0.835 
Foreign exchange reserve to GDP (% change) 0.06 0.05 43.60 0.876  0.08 0.03 -27.6 0.418  0.075 0.170 -401.2 0.242  0.05 0.02 -206.9 0.679 
Real GDP growth 1.92 1.60 71.10 0.650  3.22 2.81 -10.2 0.552  1.50 0.63 23.8 0.290  2.11 1.88 54.3 0.768 
Inflation 0.05 0.05 48.60 0.716  0.07 0.07 86.0 0.853  0.04 0.04 88.4 0.892  0.06 0.06 79.4 0.799 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
134 
Chapter 4: Global uncertainty and capital flows: any 
difference between foreign direct investment and portfolio 
investment? 
4.1 Introduction 
Many countries have been liberalized and integrated into international financial markets with the wave 
of capital flows since the 1990s. Recently, international capital flows have fluctuated tremendously 
due to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008 and China’s stock market crash in 2015. Since volatile 
capital flows could cause macroeconomic and financial instabilities, policy makers always concern the 
stability of capital flows. A lot of literature has documented the causes and consequences of such 
extreme capital flow episodes. Forbes and Warnock (2012) describe that extreme fluctuation in capital 
flows is mainly driven by global uncertainty, rather than domestic factors. Extending their work, 
Calderón and Kubota (2013) and Comelli (2015) also explain the justification for the significant role 
of global uncertainty in driving extreme capital flows. Passari and Rey (2015) further state that gross 
capital flows and risky asset prices around the world are largely driven by fluctuations in global 
uncertainty.  
However, given the fact that total capital flows consist of foreign direct investment (FDI), 
portfolio investment (FPI), and other investment (OTH) including notable bank flows, only few studies 
have employed the subcomponents of capital flows in explaining the link between large fluctuations 
in capital flows and global uncertainty (Schmidt & Zwick, 2015; Choi & Furceri, 2018). Practitioners 
have highlighted that different types of capital flows display different behaviors and nature. The 
perceived wisdom is that FDI is the least volatile form of capital flows, OTH is the most volatile, and 
FPI ranks between FDI and OTH (Sole Pagliari & Ahmed, 2017). Some studies also show that FDI is 
the most resilient flows (Kose et al., 2006). On the other hand, a highly uncertain environment with 
the presence of fixed costs increases the real-option effect by hindering investment, which is in line 
with the ‘wait-and-see' mechanism of Bernanke (1983) and Bloom (2009). In this case, FDI is not 
necessarily less vulnerable to uncertainty shocks, so that theoretical prediction is indeterminate. Thus, 
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this paper examines it empirically by dividing capital flows into FDI, FPI, and OTH. More importantly, 
this paper addresses potential differences in awareness of global uncertainty between advanced and 
developing economies, since few studies have existed on this issue. 
By using quarterly data on gross capital inflows and outflows over 57 countries covering the 
period from 2000 to 2015, we first identify four types of episodes (‘stop’ and ‘surge’ for sudden 
contraction and boom in capital inflows, and ‘retrenchment’ and ‘flight’ for sudden contraction and 
boom in capital outflows) for each type of capital flows and then evaluate how global uncertainty 
relates to each of the four types of episodes. Our analysis provides clear evidences showing the 
similarity and difference in the responses to global uncertainty between different types of capital flows 
as well as between advanced and developing economies. Intensified global uncertainty generally 
increases the likelihood of sudden contraction of most types of capital inflows and outflows. On the 
other hand, intensified global uncertainty decreases the likelihood of sudden expansion of all types of 
capital outflows, but the link between global uncertainty and sudden expansion of all types of capital 
inflows is less clear. More importantly, concerning differences between advanced and developing 
economies, global uncertainty increases the likelihood of sudden contraction of portfolio investment 
in both advanced and developing economies, while it increases that of foreign direct investment in 
only advanced economies. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 explains the methodology to classify the 
capital flow episodes and our empirical approach to identify the relationship between global 
uncertainty and four types of capital flow episodes. Section 3 presents empirical results. Section 4 
concludes. 
 
4.2 Methodology 
4.2.1 Classifying extreme capital flows 
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To classify extreme capital flows into four types of episodes (stop, surge, flight, and retrenchment), 
this study follows the work of Forbes and Warnock (2012). We first construct four-quarter moving 
sum of gross flows, KFj,t = ∑ CapitalFlowsj,t−i
3
i=0 , where CapitalFlowsj,t−i denotes gross flows of 
country j in quarter t − i. We define the four quarter (year-over-year) change in gross flows of country 
j in quarter t  by ∆KFj,t = KFj,t −  KFj,t−4 , and then we calculate the rolling mean and standard 
deviation of ∆KFj,t over the last five years.  
A stop (retrenchment) episode is defined when a change in four-quarter gross inflow (outflow), ∆KFj,t , 
falls below one-standard deviation from its rolling mean and subsequently there is at least one-quarter 
when  ∆KFj,t declines below its two-standard deviation from its rolling mean. The stop (retrenchment) 
episode ends when the change in gross inflow (outflow) exceeds the one-standard deviation from its 
rolling mean. Similarly, a surge (flight) episode is denoted when a change in four-quarter gross inflow 
(outflow) rises more than one-standard deviation above its rolling mean and subsequently there must 
be at least one-quarter  ∆KFj,t  that exceeds above its two-standard deviation from its rolling mean. 
The period of the surge (flight) episode ends when a change in gross inflow (outflow) falls below one-
standard deviation above its rolling mean. The four types of episodes (stop, retrenchment, surge, and 
flight) are identified for total (gross) capital flows and the three subcomponents (FDI, FPI, and OTH 
flows) (see Table 4.6). 
 
4.2.2 Empirical specification 
To discuss the role of global uncertainty in relating to extreme capital flows, we mainly follow Forbes 
and Warnock (2012) and estimate the following model with regard to each of the four types of episodes 
for total (gross) capital flows, FDI, FPI, and OTH flows: 
Prob(EPSj,t = 1) = F(βGLBt−1 + γCONt−1 + δDOMt−1) 
where EPSj,t is an episode dummy that takes the value of 1 if country j experiences an episode in 
quarter t and 0 otherwise, and GLBt−1, CONt−1, and DOMt−1 denote the vectors of global, contagion, 
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and domestic factors, respectively. Forbes and Warnock (2012) consider global and contagion factors 
as push elements and domestic factors as pull elements (see also Calvo et al., 1996; Fratzscher, 2012; 
Sarno et al., 2016). 
This study includes four global macroeconomic indicators: uncertainty, liquidity, interest rates, 
and growth. In addition, we include two contagion measures: regional and trade linkages. The regional 
linkage is a binary variable by taking one if at least one economy in the same region experiences an 
episode, and zero otherwise. We measure the trade linkage by: 
TLj,t =
∑ (EXPj,i,t×EPSi,t
n
i=1 )
∑ EXPj,i,t
n
i=1
×
EXPj,t
Yj,t
, 
We calculate TLj,t for each type of episodes (stop, surge, flight, and retrenchment) for total (gross) 
capital flows, FDI, FPI, and OTH flows. To account for domestic factors, we include six variables: 
financial development, financial openness, public debt, growth shock, income level, and inflation 
index (see Table 1).33 Since capital flow episodes occur irregularly (at least 70% of the sample is zero 
for all episodes), we estimate the empirical model by employing the complementary log-log model 
with the assumption that F(∙)  follows the extreme value distribution function F(Z) = 1 −
exp[−exp(Z)]. Our model applies country clustered standard errors. 
 
4.3 Estimation results 
Tables 2-5 present our estimation results related to extreme movements of total (gross) capital flow 
and each of the three subcomponents (FDI, FPI, and OTH flows). The first panel shows results for the 
full sample countries, and the second and third panels show results for advanced and developing 
economies, respectively. First, our results related to total (gross) capital flows generally confirm the 
findings of Forbes and Warnock (2012) indicating that intense global uncertainty is positively 
correlated with stops and retrenchments and negatively correlated with flights, although its effect on 
                                                          
33 Following Dell’Erba and Reinhardt (2015), we construct the inflation index to adjust the cases of hyper-inflation. 
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surges is insignificant. These findings show similar behaviors of foreign and domestic investors during 
a period of a sharp contraction of capital flows (stops and retrenchments), whereas they have different 
behaviors during a boom period for capital flows (surges and flights). Second, concerning the different 
types of capital flows, the analysis presents that higher global uncertainty increases the probability of 
a sudden decline in FDI and FPI inflows and in all types of capital outflows. At the same time, higher 
global uncertainty decreases the probability of a sharp rise in all types of capital outflows, but its effects 
on the probability of a sharp rise in all types of capital inflows are insignificant. These results present 
that the responses to global uncertainty are not heterogeneous among different types of capital flows. 
The conventional wisdom suggests that FDI is more resilient during the crisis period. However, in the 
presence of uncertainty, a significant wait-and-see effect appears on investment with large fixed costs 
(Bloom, 2009), so that such investment, like FDI, can also be vulnerable to uncertainty shocks.34 
More importantly, once the sample countries are divided into two groups of advanced and 
developing economies, we find a clear difference between them. The analysis indicates that global 
uncertainty increases the likelihood of sudden contraction of FPI flows in both advanced and 
developing economies, while it tends to increase the likelihood of sudden contraction of FDI and OTH 
flows only in advanced economies but not in developing economies. As often suggested in 
conventional wisdom on capital flow volatility, FDI is most resilient in developing economies during 
times of high global uncertainty. However, the analysis reveals that FDI is vulnerable to uncertainty 
shock in advanced economies, which confirms presence of “wait-and-see” mechanism in these 
economies.  
 
4.4 Conclusion 
                                                          
34 We conduct two robustness checks. The first robustness check is to drop the periods of the Global Financial Crisis 
(2007Q4 through 2009Q4) from our sample, and the second is to incorporate dummies of these periods into the models. 
The results are generally similar to our original ones, which are shown in the online appendix (Tables 4.7-4.10). 
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This empirical study has confirmed the argument of the existing literature, including Forbes and 
Warnock (2012), Calderón and Kubota (2013), and Passari and Rey (2015), that global uncertainty is 
a crucial source of extreme capital flow waves. More importantly, we have found clear differences in 
the role of global uncertainty between advanced and developing economies. In developing economies, 
FDI is more resilient, compared to FPI, during times of high global uncertainty, as suggested in 
conventional wisdom. In contrast, FDI is as vulnerable as FPI to uncertainty shock in advanced 
economies. Thus, the “wait-and-see” mechanism matters on FDI only in advanced economies.  
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Tables 
 
Table 4.1. Definitions and sources of data  
Variable Definition and construction Source 
Capital flows Quarterly data on gross capital inflows and outflows International Financial Statistics (IFS) 
Global uncertainty Chicago Board Options Exchange, VXO volatility index Federal Reserve Economic Data 
Global liquidity Quarterly growth rate of sum of M2 in the US, Japan, and core 
Euro-Zone, and M4 in the UK 
International Financial Statistics (IFS) 
Global interest rate Average interest rate on long-term government bonds of the 
US, Japan, the UK, and Euro area 
International Financial Statistics (IFS) 
Global growth Quarterly average growth rate of the US, Japan, the UK, and 
the Euro 
International Financial Statistics (IFS) 
Trade flows Exports Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) and 
International Financial Statistics (IFS) 
Financial development Ratio of domestic credit to private sector to GDP  World Development Indicators (WDI) 
Capital controls Ratio of foreign assets plus liabilities to GDP International Financial Statistics (IFS) 
Public debt Ratio of public debt to GDP  Abbas et al. (2010) and IMF Historical 
Public Debt 
Growth shock Difference between the log of actual real GDP and its trend 
components 
World Economic Outlook (WEO) 
Income Log of real GDP per capita World Economic Outlook (WEO) 
Inflation index An index based on inflation data from WEO, which assigns a 
value between 0 and 12 to different inflation intervals (0 for 
inflation rates below 2% and 12 above 120%), following 
Dell'Erba and Reinhardt (2015). 
International Financial Statistics (IFS) 
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Table 4.2 Estimation results for stops 
  All sample countries       Advanced countries       Developing countries     
  Total FDI FPI OTH   Total FDI FPI OTH   Total FDI FPI OTH 
Global Factors               
Uncertainty 0.078*** 0.067*** 0.043*** 0.014  0.099*** 0.103*** 0.039*** 0.042**  0.043 0.032 0.062*** -0.078 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.008) (0.019)  (0.020) (0.018) (0.009) (0.017)  (0.035) (0.024) (0.019) (0.051) 
Liquidity -9.477*** -6.390** -4.358 -5.142*  -9.069** -7.989** -6.865 -3.806  -11.946* -7.444 5.077 -2.854 
 (3.010) (3.242) (4.329) (2.703)  (4.183) (4.014) (5.058) (4.259)  (6.354) (5.729) (5.990) (3.326) 
Interest rates -0.432* -0.427** 0.173 -0.328*  -0.173 -0.165 0.314 -0.147  -1.014*** -0.864*** -0.239 -0.499 
 (0.245) (0.197) (0.201) (0.173)  (0.271) (0.241) (0.212) (0.350)  (0.295) (0.253) (0.398) (0.333) 
Growth 0.169** 0.181** -0.055 0.030  0.162 0.345*** -0.089 0.019  -0.072 -0.087 0.041 0.308 
 (0.077) (0.091) (0.077) (0.187)  (0.114) (0.106) (0.103) (0.236)  (0.248) (0.151) (0.141) (0.445) 
Contagion               
Trade 29.787*** 19.394*** 20.684*** 17.962**  29.562*** 20.973*** 19.953** 18.979*  26.063*** 20.841** 25.735* 36.385* 
 (5.761) (6.086) (6.665) (7.635)  (6.413) (7.085) (8.341) (9.957)  (7.985) (10.405) (14.883) (21.800) 
Regional 2.207*** 2.591*** 1.766*** 0.145***  2.744*** 3.396*** 1.707*** 0.154*  2.336*** 2.675*** 1.884*** 0.144** 
 (0.261) (0.285) (0.209) (0.041)  (0.314) (0.450) (0.224) (0.082)  (0.589) (0.494) (0.568) (0.063) 
Domestic Factors               
Financial System 0.005 0.003 0.003 -0.000  0.004 0.002 0.004 0.003  0.001 0.004 -0.001 -0.016* 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.004)  (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) 
Capital Controls -0.006*** -0.011 -0.007** -0.000  -0.009** -0.101 -0.007** -0.001  0.010 0.047*** 0.004 0.022** 
 (0.002) (0.007) (0.003) (0.002)  (0.004) (0.076) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.009) (0.012) (0.022) (0.011) 
Debt to GDP 0.005 -0.000 0.010*** 0.008*  0.004 0.005 0.011*** 0.012**  0.023* -0.010 0.016 0.016 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004)  (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005)  (0.014) (0.010) (0.017) (0.011) 
Real GDP Growth -0.053 -0.045 -0.117*** 0.008  -0.054 -0.074 -0.141** 0.024  -0.055 0.026 -0.104 -0.027 
 (0.040) (0.036) (0.044) (0.031)  (0.063) (0.046) (0.067) (0.061)  (0.072) (0.051) (0.074) (0.049) 
Real GDP per capita 0.060 0.078 0.288 -0.435  0.350 0.860 0.450 0.006  0.359 0.188 0.448 -0.198 
 (0.345) (0.434) (0.311) (0.291)  (0.666) (0.978) (0.438) (0.678)  (0.500) (0.401) (0.582) (0.414) 
Inflation -0.063 -0.067 -0.084 -0.054  -0.162 -0.230 -0.104 -0.086  0.148 0.075 -0.093 -0.117 
 (0.086) (0.074) (0.086) (0.080)  (0.104) (0.168) (0.113) (0.097)  (0.137) (0.125) (0.155) (0.126) 
Observations 1667 1667 1667 1667   992 992 992 992   675 675 675 675 
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Table 4.3 Estimation results for retrenchments 
  All sample countries       Advanced countries       Developing countries     
  Total FDI FPI OTH   Total FDI FPI OTH   Total FDI FPI OTH 
Global Factors               
Uncertainty 0.065*** 0.049*** 0.031*** 0.029**  0.074*** 0.056*** 0.033*** 0.032**  0.038* 0.040 0.026** 0.022 
 (0.010) (0.015) (0.007) (0.012)  (0.013) (0.019) (0.009) (0.016)  (0.020) (0.034) (0.011) (0.016) 
Liquidity -7.416** -11.525*** -5.217 -6.812**  -5.693* -15.716*** -2.938 -7.319*  -6.008 -9.867 -10.138** -9.049 
 (3.054) (3.268) (3.436) (3.429)  (3.442) (3.884) (5.426) (4.416)  (5.770) (6.862) (4.075) (5.650) 
Interest rates -0.413* -0.299 0.207 -0.497***  -0.095 -0.148 0.330 0.033  -0.596 0.088 0.199 -1.069*** 
 (0.229) (0.276) (0.208) (0.191)  (0.310) (0.425) (0.271) (0.285)  (0.387) (0.344) (0.391) (0.299) 
Growth 0.085 0.087 -0.044 0.071  -0.034 0.033 -0.343*** 0.181  0.240 0.251 0.318* -0.094 
 (0.080) (0.135) (0.097) (0.147)  (0.120) (0.193) (0.122) (0.212)  (0.146) (0.209) (0.193) (0.164) 
Contagion               
Trade 31.718*** 27.055*** 10.744 0.391  37.785*** 32.332*** 20.465* -10.768  22.332*** 33.646*** -10.229 0.678 
 (5.444) (6.106) (8.280) (7.431)  (9.460) (7.618) (11.636) (8.061)  (6.195) (11.884) (13.552) (17.677) 
Regional 1.960*** 2.437*** 2.290*** 0.146***  2.126*** 2.369*** 2.140*** 0.169***  2.174*** 2.884*** 2.750*** 0.190*** 
 (0.286) (0.323) (0.284) (0.034)  (0.322) (0.346) (0.310) (0.048)  (0.573) (0.660) (0.522) (0.055) 
Domestic Factors               
Financial System 0.014*** 0.010* 0.008*** 0.006*  0.010*** 0.010 0.013*** 0.001  0.017** 0.017 0.004 0.022*** 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004)  (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.004)  (0.008) (0.012) (0.007) (0.008) 
Capital Controls -0.005 -0.024 -0.010 -0.003  -0.079*** -0.084 -0.062* -0.002  0.050*** -0.048 0.057*** -0.024 
 (0.005) (0.034) (0.010) (0.003)  (0.030) (0.052) (0.036) (0.002)  (0.019) (0.080) (0.012) (0.035) 
Debt to GDP 0.001 0.014*** 0.003 0.008  0.006** 0.020*** 0.011*** 0.014***  -0.015 0.011 -0.021* -0.035*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005)  (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) 
Real GDP Growth -0.060* -0.039 -0.134*** -0.104***  -0.068 -0.083 -0.206*** -0.167***  -0.086* -0.009 -0.130*** -0.104** 
 (0.036) (0.042) (0.034) (0.035)  (0.050) (0.070) (0.064) (0.059)  (0.052) (0.064) (0.041) (0.044) 
Real GDP per capita -0.574* -0.757** -0.108 -0.734**  1.091** 1.556 0.622 -0.501  -0.661* -1.068** 0.063 -0.686** 
 (0.300) (0.357) (0.237) (0.326)  (0.538) (1.183) (0.729) (0.470)  (0.400) (0.445) (0.342) (0.336) 
Inflation -0.066 -0.216** -0.049 -0.145*  -0.080 -0.206 -0.089 -0.035  -0.042 -0.357** -0.083 -0.188 
 (0.060) (0.102) (0.061) (0.075)  (0.087) (0.138) (0.112) (0.110)  (0.141) (0.159) (0.087) (0.115) 
Observations 1711 1711 1711 1711   978 978 978 978   733 733 733 733 
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Table 4.4 Estimation results for surges 
  All sample countries       Advanced countries       Developing countries     
  Total FDI FPI OTH   Total FDI FPI OTH   Total FDI FPI OTH 
Global Factors               
Uncertainty -0.003 -0.011 -0.013 -0.005  0.004 -0.017 -0.030 -0.006  -0.004 -0.005 -0.003 0.004 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.008)  (0.020) (0.018) (0.019) (0.010)  (0.014) (0.016) (0.012) (0.014) 
Liquidity 11.285*** 2.842 6.670*** 6.024**  13.521*** 3.517 4.930 6.150**  9.604*** 5.322* 8.808*** 5.944 
 (2.196) (2.362) (2.213) (2.434)  (3.743) (3.856) (3.413) (2.795)  (3.314) (3.174) (2.450) (4.803) 
Interest rates 1.181*** 0.796*** 0.314* 0.732***  1.664*** 1.203*** 0.505* 0.846***  0.967*** 0.411 0.223 0.666** 
 (0.263) (0.246) (0.179) (0.169)  (0.391) (0.268) (0.281) (0.231)  (0.350) (0.329) (0.273) (0.306) 
Growth 0.224 0.109 0.285 0.093  0.736*** 0.351** 0.421* 0.184  0.007 -0.047 0.259 0.053 
 (0.156) (0.114) (0.179) (0.132)  (0.186) (0.155) (0.250) (0.144)  (0.166) (0.146) (0.238) (0.240) 
Contagion               
Trade 13.695*** 17.761*** -4.930 2.067  27.885*** 11.205 -11.060 6.218  1.612 25.064** -1.479 -3.559 
 (5.307) (6.093) (8.731) (3.289)  (8.135) (9.201) (8.864) (4.183)  (5.215) (12.268) (14.845) (5.976) 
Regional 3.224*** 2.109*** 2.598*** 0.123***  3.034*** 2.160*** 2.752*** 0.098***  3.396*** 2.045*** 2.206*** 0.156*** 
 (0.319) (0.326) (0.287) (0.021)  (0.427) (0.200) (0.430) (0.023)  (0.855) (0.739) (0.458) (0.047) 
Domestic Factors               
Financial System 0.007** 0.004 0.009*** 0.004  0.010** 0.003 0.009** 0.003  0.025** 0.017 0.021** 0.024 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.015) 
Capital Controls -0.086** 0.007*** -0.179*** -0.073*  -0.038 0.009*** -0.161** -0.029  -1.095** -0.252 -0.141 -1.315*** 
 (0.035) (0.002) (0.064) (0.040)  (0.037) (0.003) (0.066) (0.041)  (0.430) (0.582) (0.139) (0.416) 
Debt to GDP -0.002 -0.007 -0.009* -0.006  0.002 -0.003 -0.006 -0.007  -0.017 -0.021 -0.022 -0.006 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)  (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.016) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014) 
Real GDP Growth 0.030 0.016 0.036 0.000  0.049 -0.006 0.005 0.003  0.016 0.017 0.057 -0.005 
 (0.023) (0.018) (0.034) (0.033)  (0.052) (0.032) (0.032) (0.041)  (0.028) (0.026) (0.054) (0.060) 
Real GDP per capita -0.528* -0.604*** -0.630*** -0.271  -1.633** -0.679 -1.279** -0.300  -0.391 -0.488* -0.595* -0.195 
 (0.278) (0.228) (0.197) (0.285)  (0.692) (0.564) (0.557) (0.547)  (0.307) (0.275) (0.315) (0.390) 
Inflation 0.081 0.035 -0.047 -0.049  0.165 0.038 -0.003 -0.061  0.125 0.061 -0.032 -0.003 
 (0.083) (0.072) (0.066) (0.071)  (0.146) (0.126) (0.147) (0.069)  (0.103) (0.097) (0.080) (0.098) 
Observations 1665 1665 1665 1665   992 992 992 992   673 673 673 673 
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Table 4.5 Estimation results for flights 
  All sample countries       Advanced countries       Developing countries     
  Total FDI FPI OTH   Total FDI FPI OTH   Total FDI FPI OTH 
Global Factors               
Uncertainty -0.028*** -0.015* -0.041*** -0.019*  -0.028* -0.020* -0.052** -0.017  -0.028*** -0.006 -0.032* -0.031*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.015) (0.011)  (0.016) (0.011) (0.024) (0.019)  (0.009) (0.015) (0.018) (0.009) 
Liquidity 11.667*** 4.822*** 5.346* 8.175***  18.392*** 7.288*** 9.866** 10.171***  4.113 4.972 1.326 4.699 
 (2.539) (1.719) (2.775) (2.702)  (2.745) (1.905) (4.429) (3.427)  (3.865) (3.063) (4.087) (4.931) 
Interest rates 1.060*** 0.853*** 0.892*** 0.683***  1.138*** 1.646*** 1.293*** 0.862***  1.122*** 0.356 0.734*** 0.484** 
 (0.160) (0.176) (0.168) (0.147)  (0.215) (0.298) (0.243) (0.219)  (0.264) (0.230) (0.270) (0.207) 
Growth 0.233 -0.063 0.564** 0.369**  0.716*** -0.171 1.047*** 0.614**  0.051 -0.076 0.204 0.069 
 (0.191) (0.122) (0.226) (0.185)  (0.201) (0.177) (0.269) (0.248)  (0.229) (0.163) (0.271) (0.313) 
Contagion               
Trade 14.509*** 9.472* 11.517* 6.310*  28.849*** 8.096 16.082* 10.872*  1.940 9.760 6.970 0.185 
 (5.469) (5.361) (6.690) (3.578)  (6.983) (9.227) (9.654) (5.574)  (6.662) (7.460) (8.719) (4.495) 
Regional 2.848*** 2.572*** 2.346*** 0.107***  2.915*** 2.340*** 2.613*** 0.085**  2.788*** 2.980*** 2.184*** 0.161*** 
 (0.241) (0.371) (0.291) (0.026)  (0.335) (0.548) (0.309) (0.034)  (0.466) (0.550) (0.391) (0.039) 
Domestic Factors               
Financial System 0.007*** -0.000 0.004 0.006  0.009** 0.003 0.002 0.004  0.011 -0.002 0.011 -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.010) (0.012) (0.009) (0.014) 
Capital Controls -0.097*** 0.002 -0.098* -0.089*  -0.110*** 0.009** -0.045 -0.080  -0.440 -0.165 -0.361 -0.333 
 (0.038) (0.002) (0.052) (0.054)  (0.037) (0.004) (0.060) (0.051)  (0.367) (0.321) (0.249) (0.596) 
Debt to GDP -0.003 -0.013** -0.008 -0.005  -0.002 -0.008 -0.009 -0.008*  -0.013 -0.015 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004)  (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.004)  (0.012) (0.009) (0.015) (0.010) 
Real GDP Growth 0.014 -0.015 -0.039 0.002  -0.093* 0.017 -0.060* -0.062**  0.035 -0.049** -0.041 0.050 
 (0.030) (0.021) (0.032) (0.029)  (0.048) (0.037) (0.034) (0.030)  (0.033) (0.023) (0.042) (0.033) 
Real GDP per capita -0.377 -0.122 -0.017 -0.324  -0.201 -0.809 -0.375 0.399  -0.386 0.119 0.130 -0.647** 
 (0.237) (0.306) (0.294) (0.206)  (0.411) (0.705) (0.638) (0.525)  (0.319) (0.272) (0.316) (0.286) 
Inflation -0.022 0.034 -0.052 -0.043  0.021 0.033 0.066 0.031  -0.044 0.050 -0.052 -0.135* 
 (0.062) (0.085) (0.074) (0.061)  (0.132) (0.188) (0.121) (0.118)  (0.085) (0.068) (0.090) (0.072) 
Observations 1719 1719 1719 1719   986 986 986 986   733 733 33 733 
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Table 4.6 Occurrence of capital flow episodes 
Quarter Stops 
  
    Retrenchments   Surges 
  
    Flights 
    
  Gross FDI FPI OTH Gross FDI FPI OTH Gross FDI FPI OTH Gross FDI FPI OTH 
2000Q1 0 0 3 1 1 0 0 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 4 0 
2000Q2 0 0 3 1 1 0 0 2 3 2 3 3 4 3 4 0 
2000Q3 0 0 4 1 1 0 0 2 3 2 4 2 4 3 4 0 
2000Q4 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 3 1 3 3 5 0 
2001Q1 0 0 2 0 0 1 1 0 2 1 2 1 2 3 4 0 
2001Q2 1 0 0 0 1 2 1 0 0 1 0 2 2 1 3 0 
2001Q3 3 1 0 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 
2001Q4 5 2 0 0 3 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
2002Q1 5 2 0 0 4 2 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 
2002Q2 4 2 0 0 3 1 2 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 
2002Q3 2 1 1 0 3 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 2 0 1 
2002Q4 2 1 3 0 1 0 0 1 3 3 3 1 1 2 1 2 
2003Q1 0 1 5 0 0 0 0 1 6 5 5 3 5 3 3 4 
2003Q2 0 1 5 0 0 0 0 1 6 6 5 5 6 3 4 8 
2003Q3 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 7 5 6 5 9 4 5 9 
2003Q4 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 8 5 7 6 9 5 6 11 
2004Q1 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 8 6 7 5 10 6 8 12 
2004Q2 0 0 10 1 0 0 0 0 9 7 10 6 12 8 9 11 
2004Q3 0 0 10 1 0 0 0 0 9 7 10 6 12 8 9 10 
2004Q4 0 0 10 1 0 0 0 0 9 7 10 6 12 9 9 12 
2005Q1 0 0 11 0 0 0 0 0 10 8 11 7 15 9 10 15 
2005Q2 0 0 9 0 0 0 0 0 10 9 9 8 15 9 9 14 
2005Q3 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 10 9 7 8 14 9 9 15 
2005Q4 0 0 6 2 0 0 0 0 10 10 6 9 14 10 12 13 
2006Q1 0 2 6 2 0 0 0 1 9 10 6 7 12 8 12 10 
2006Q2 0 2 5 2 0 0 0 1 9 12 5 7 13 10 15 8 
2006Q3 0 2 7 2 0 0 0 1 11 13 7 10 15 12 14 11 
2006Q4 0 1 9 1 0 0 1 0 16 13 9 13 21 18 15 13 
2007Q1 0 0 13 1 0 0 0 0 19 17 13 18 23 19 18 18 
2007Q2 0 0 12 0 0 0 0 0 23 21 12 22 27 21 20 20 
2007Q3 0 0 16 0 0 0 0 0 24 21 16 23 29 20 21 22 
2007Q4 0 0 16 0 0 0 0 0 25 23 16 27 29 20 21 24 
2008Q1 0 0 13 0 0 0 0 0 27 25 13 28 30 22 19 27 
2008Q2 0 2 14 0 0 0 0 0 27 24 14 28 29 23 16 27 
2008Q3 0 2 7 0 0 0 3 0 25 23 7 26 27 22 8 23 
2008Q4 1 2 5 0 1 1 13 0 17 16 5 26 16 17 4 20 
2009Q1 11 8 3 1 9 4 18 0 8 11 3 20 5 9 2 7 
2009Q2 20 17 1 5 19 9 23 10 5 7 1 8 1 7 2 2 
2009Q3 23 19 1 9 22 12 25 15 4 5 1 4 1 5 0 1 
2009Q4 24 19 1 11 24 12 27 17 3 2 1 4 1 3 0 2 
2010Q1 17 12 2 12 17 7 19 17 3 0 2 4 4 4 1 3 
2010Q2 6 7 6 10 6 4 7 8 5 1 6 3 4 5 1 4 
2010Q3 5 2 6 11 3 2 5 5 7 2 6 2 4 7 1 3 
2010Q4 4 2 7 8 2 1 4 4 8 2 7 3 2 6 2 1 
2011Q1 3 2 7 7 2 1 5 4 5 2 7 3 2 8 4 1 
2011Q2 2 2 7 4 3 2 4 3 5 3 7 4 2 6 4 2 
2011Q3 0 2 9 2 3 1 3 1 5 5 9 5 2 6 3 2 
2011Q4 0 1 8 2 3 1 4 2 7 8 8 5 2 8 4 4 
2012Q1 0 1 8 2 4 2 4 3 6 9 8 5 1 7 3 3 
2012Q2 1 1 8 2 3 3 5 5 5 8 8 3 2 7 2 3 
2012Q3 3 4 5 6 7 4 5 7 3 9 5 2 2 6 2 3 
2012Q4 5 5 7 7 6 4 6 7 3 8 7 2 2 6 3 4 
2013Q1 6 4 9 7 6 3 7 6 6 9 9 1 3 6 4 4 
2013Q2 6 6 10 8 6 4 4 7 6 10 10 1 3 7 5 4 
2013Q3 5 6 10 9 6 6 3 7 6 9 10 1 3 6 6 5 
2013Q4 5 6 12 8 4 6 1 6 6 9 12 1 3 6 4 5 
2014Q1 4 5 12 8 4 6 1 5 3 9 12 2 3 9 6 4 
2014Q2 2 4 13 7 2 6 1 5 4 10 13 2 6 9 9 6 
2014Q3 1 5 13 7 0 5 1 6 4 9 13 5 5 9 8 4 
2014Q4 2 5 12 7 3 4 1 5 4 7 12 6 5 8 9 3 
2015Q1 6 11 10 9 5 10 2 8 2 5 10 9 9 6 8 4 
2015Q2 22 23 7 14 19 20 5 16 1 2 7 7 4 2 6 3 
2015Q3 32 28 5 16 30 22 11 17 1 4 5 3 3 2 7 3 
2015Q4 32 30 3 18 31 23 15 18 1 4 3 2 2 3 5 3 
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Table 4.7 Estimation results for stops and retrenchments (excluding GFC periods) 
  Stops         Retrenchments     
  Total FDI FPI OTH   Total FDI FPI OTH 
Global Factors          
Uncertainty 0.107*** 0.081** 0.068*** -0.001  0.052*** 0.031 0.054*** 0.041** 
 (0.021) (0.035) (0.018) (0.028)  (0.018) (0.027) (0.019) (0.020) 
Liquidity -18.368*** -10.937* -6.626 -4.032  -8.447* -12.481** -11.189** -9.846** 
 (4.634) (6.111) (6.519) (2.768)  (4.667) (6.292) (4.623) (3.865) 
Interest rates -0.513* -0.526* 0.004 -0.313*  -0.413 -0.307 -0.035 -0.446** 
 (0.270) (0.275) (0.250) (0.184)  (0.275) (0.354) (0.262) (0.212) 
Growth -0.708* -0.161 -0.766* 0.171  -0.033 0.029 -0.683* -0.201 
 (0.410) (0.546) (0.427) (0.308)  (0.429) (0.509) (0.361) (0.350) 
Contagion          
Trade 34.286*** 19.625*** 27.873*** 18.634**  33.623*** 26.173*** 12.626 -2.500 
 (5.660) (6.283) (5.628) (8.293)  (4.883) (6.353) (9.156) (7.671) 
Regional 2.622*** 2.897*** 1.689*** 0.147***  1.846*** 2.544*** 2.352*** 0.144*** 
 (0.335) (0.346) (0.299) (0.042)  (0.374) (0.423) (0.375) (0.036) 
Domestic Factors          
Financial System 0.002 -0.001 0.005 -0.004  0.011*** 0.007 0.008** 0.003 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) 
Capital Controls -0.004* -0.008 -0.003 0.001  -0.003 -0.020 -0.004 -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.004) (0.035) (0.006) (0.003) 
Debt to GDP 0.006 0.001 0.013*** 0.009**  0.002 0.015*** 0.002 0.008 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004)  (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) 
Real GDP Growth -0.116** -0.066 -0.146* 0.025  -0.096** -0.083 -0.216*** -0.114** 
 (0.058) (0.062) (0.077) (0.047)  (0.044) (0.064) (0.045) (0.046) 
Real GDP per capita -0.331 -0.161 -0.336 -0.480  -0.668** -0.751* -0.577* -0.673** 
 (0.333) (0.482) (0.344) (0.297)  (0.285) (0.407) (0.298) (0.313) 
Inflation -0.096 -0.120 -0.158 -0.059  -0.076 -0.266** -0.054 -0.132 
 (0.094) (0.114) (0.113) (0.084)  (0.074) (0.112) (0.120) (0.089) 
Observations 1410 1410 1410 1410   1442 1442 1442 1442 
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Table 4.8 Estimation results for surges and flights (excluding GFC periods) 
  Surges         Flights       
  Total FDI FPI OTH   Total FDI FPI OTH 
Global Factors          
Uncertainty -0.011 -0.035 -0.012 -0.020  -0.071*** -0.037* -0.062** -0.035 
 (0.023) (0.026) (0.019) (0.025)  (0.025) (0.020) (0.027) (0.028) 
Liquidity 5.574** -1.280 4.872** 2.074  7.645*** 3.207 3.332 8.142*** 
 (2.790) (2.789) (1.988) (3.403)  (2.849) (2.129) (2.868) (2.840) 
Interest rates 1.161*** 0.709*** 0.326* 0.600***  1.061*** 0.890*** 0.961*** 0.582*** 
 (0.249) (0.250) (0.172) (0.212)  (0.167) (0.170) (0.187) (0.166) 
Growth 0.200 0.379* 0.148 0.402  0.732** 0.216 0.637*** 0.669** 
 (0.270) (0.196) (0.174) (0.328)  (0.287) (0.194) (0.220) (0.271) 
Contagion          
Trade 13.954 13.229 -5.260 2.292  8.485 -3.336 0.866 13.115*** 
 (10.018) (9.516) (10.437) (4.854)  (9.850) (9.948) (10.059) (4.742) 
Regional 3.311*** 2.155*** 2.540*** 0.156***  2.470*** 2.417*** 2.356*** 0.090*** 
 (0.356) (0.322) (0.307) (0.037)  (0.292) (0.412) (0.275) (0.035) 
Domestic Factors          
Financial System 0.008** 0.005 0.010** 0.004  0.008** 0.000 0.005 0.007* 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Capital Controls -0.194*** 0.007*** -0.225*** -0.139*  -0.176*** 0.003 -0.146** -0.123* 
 (0.065) (0.002) (0.075) (0.071)  (0.057) (0.002) (0.070) (0.071) 
Debt to GDP -0.003 -0.009 -0.010** -0.008  -0.004 -0.014** -0.009 -0.006 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)  (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.004) 
Real GDP Growth -0.015 -0.013 0.014 -0.058  -0.022 -0.023 -0.097** -0.046 
 (0.029) (0.027) (0.037) (0.036)  (0.047) (0.025) (0.045) (0.046) 
Real GDP per capita -0.356 -0.735*** -0.467** -0.094  -0.438* -0.273 -0.053 -0.315 
 (0.328) (0.260) (0.223) (0.350)  (0.243) (0.341) (0.279) (0.234) 
Inflation 0.076 -0.046 -0.041 -0.039  -0.074 0.027 -0.067 -0.025 
 (0.096) (0.083) (0.075) (0.100)  (0.077) (0.103) (0.083) (0.072) 
Observations 1409 1409 1409 1409   1450 1450 1450 1450 
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Table 4.9 Estimation results for stops and retrenchments (adding GFC dummy) 
  Stops         Retrenchments     
  Total FDI FPI OTH   Total FDI FPI OTH 
Global Factors          
Uncertainty 0.073*** 0.055*** 0.035*** 0.010  0.056*** 0.039*** 0.020*** 0.026** 
 (0.012) (0.016) (0.008) (0.018)  (0.009) (0.015) (0.007) (0.012) 
Liquidity -9.078*** -5.640 -2.505 -4.881*  -6.623** -10.752*** -3.511 -6.556* 
 (3.144) (3.554) (4.487) (2.655)  (3.245) (3.632) (3.931) (3.422) 
Interest rates -0.454* -0.530** 0.062 -0.376**  -0.492* -0.395 0.037 -0.527** 
 (0.268) (0.261) (0.234) (0.183)  (0.265) (0.335) (0.237) (0.207) 
Growth 0.197** 0.248*** 0.069 0.117  0.158* 0.174 0.108 0.117 
 (0.081) (0.073) (0.066) (0.201)  (0.082) (0.129) (0.082) (0.141) 
Contagion          
Trade 29.254*** 18.697*** 17.888*** 18.410**  30.553*** 26.359*** 5.893 0.320 
 (5.669) (6.127) (6.424) (7.621)  (5.349) (6.138) (8.069) (7.423) 
Regional 2.214*** 2.579*** 1.893*** 0.145***  2.018*** 2.461*** 2.425*** 0.146*** 
 (0.264) (0.284) (0.219) (0.042)  (0.290) (0.329) (0.275) (0.035) 
Domestic Factors          
Financial System 0.005 0.003 0.003 -0.000  0.014*** 0.010* 0.008*** 0.006* 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004) 
Capital Controls -0.006*** -0.011 -0.007** -0.000  -0.005 -0.025 -0.010 -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.007) (0.003) (0.002)  (0.005) (0.035) (0.011) (0.003) 
Debt to GDP 0.005 0.000 0.010*** 0.008*  0.002 0.014*** 0.004 0.008 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004)  (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) 
Real GDP Growth -0.039 -0.009 -0.090* 0.022  -0.029 -0.000 -0.103*** -0.096** 
 (0.044) (0.051) (0.048) (0.031)  (0.035) (0.050) (0.036) (0.040) 
Real GDP per capita 0.065 0.067 0.335 -0.440  -0.571* -0.749** -0.080 -0.739** 
 (0.347) (0.434) (0.314) (0.291)  (0.296) (0.352) (0.230) (0.328) 
Inflation -0.065 -0.066 -0.090 -0.056  -0.069 -0.212** -0.053 -0.147* 
 (0.087) (0.075) (0.088) (0.080)  (0.063) (0.102) (0.061) (0.077) 
Dummy global financial crisis 0.309 0.827 0.883** 0.472  0.711** 0.863 1.136*** 0.273 
 (0.395) (0.662) (0.392) (0.420)  (0.355) (0.573) (0.392) (0.340) 
          
Observations 1667 1667 1667 1667   1711 1711 1711 1711 
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Table 4.10 Estimation results for surges and flights (adding GFC dummy)  
  Surge         Flight     
  Total FDI FPI OTH   Total FDI FPI OTH 
Global Factors          
Uncertainty -0.008 -0.018 -0.013 -0.017  -0.047*** -0.019* -0.045** -0.023 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.010)  (0.014) (0.011) (0.022) (0.014) 
Liquidity 10.693*** 2.324 6.675*** 4.500*  9.456*** 4.466** 4.923* 7.632*** 
 (2.194) (2.295) (2.162) (2.412)  (2.557) (1.814) (2.920) (2.600) 
Interest rates 1.152*** 0.761*** 0.314* 0.726***  1.027*** 0.839*** 0.887*** 0.682*** 
 (0.266) (0.249) (0.183) (0.175)  (0.164) (0.183) (0.168) (0.148) 
Growth 0.302** 0.162 0.284* 0.194*  0.454*** -0.035 0.598*** 0.419** 
 (0.143) (0.106) (0.159) (0.116)  (0.172) (0.110) (0.223) (0.166) 
Contagion          
Trade 11.690* 15.042** -4.910 -0.088  9.189 8.211 10.721 5.847 
 (6.181) (6.123) (8.976) (3.395)  (6.019) (5.065) (6.766) (3.621) 
Regional 3.170*** 2.064*** 2.598*** 0.109***  2.763*** 2.556*** 2.330*** 0.104*** 
 (0.329) (0.320) (0.290) (0.022)  (0.251) (0.367) (0.278) (0.027) 
Domestic Factors          
Financial System 0.007** 0.004 0.009*** 0.004  0.007** -0.000 0.004 0.006 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)  (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Capital Controls -0.087** 0.007*** -0.179*** -0.075*  -0.100*** 0.002 -0.098* -0.089 
 (0.036) (0.002) (0.064) (0.044)  (0.038) (0.002) (0.053) (0.055) 
Debt to GDP -0.002 -0.007 -0.009* -0.006  -0.004 -0.013** -0.008 -0.005 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) 
Real GDP Growth 0.037 0.023 0.036 0.030  0.018 -0.012 -0.038 0.006 
 (0.028) (0.018) (0.034) (0.039)  (0.033) (0.022) (0.031) (0.031) 
Real GDP per capita -0.543* -0.608*** -0.630*** -0.311  -0.357 -0.118 -0.019 -0.324 
 (0.280) (0.231) (0.198) (0.294)  (0.248) (0.306) (0.295) (0.207) 
Inflation 0.075 0.028 -0.047 -0.070  -0.043 0.031 -0.054 -0.048 
 (0.085) (0.072) (0.069) (0.075)  (0.062) (0.086) (0.075) (0.063) 
Dummy global financial crisis 0.350 0.349 -0.003 0.970***  0.884*** 0.193 0.128 0.230 
 (0.342) (0.238) (0.292) (0.280)  (0.309) (0.288) (0.289) (0.302) 
          
Observations 1665 1665 1665 1665   1719 1719 1719 1719 
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Chapter 5: Overall conclusion 
 
This thesis deals with the broad issues of the roles and drivers of financial turmoil, which are 
often captured by extreme capital flow waves and financial crises and how these in turn affect 
the policy responses of policy makers. In all chapters and throughout the dissertation, I have 
attempted to make a significant contribution to the existing literature by providing empirical 
supports.  
 A number of research efforts have conducted on 'crisis begets reform' hypothesis and 
confirmed it. However, the existing studies is not sufficient to draw a definite conclusion since 
financial policy reform generally includes both liberalization of the financial system and the 
strengthening of prudential regulation. To address this issue, Chapter 2 clearly describe 
whether both financial liberalization and prudential regulation are included during the process 
of financial policy reform or not. In addition, it explains the nexus between the origins of 
financial crises and the policy dimensions of financial policy reform by using five types of 
financial crises. The results confirm the crisis-begets-reform argument in the context of 
financial liberalization by showing that all types of financial crises promote financial 
liberalization. However, financial policy reform following financial crises does not generally 
include the strengthening of prudential regulation.  
 The chapter postulates that financial crises tend to promote ‘incomplete’ financial 
policy reform since financial liberalization should be accompanied by prudential regulation. 
As suggested in the works of Mishkin (2001), Rosenbluth and Schaap (2003), and Walter 
(2003), financial liberalization without sound prudential regulation fails to reduce vulnerability 
to subsequent financial crises. Furthermore, it clearly states that financial regulators’ choice of 
policy dimensions in response to financial crises varies depending on the crisis origin. This 
chapter suggests that financial regulators should evaluate the short- and long-term benefits and 
costs of each policy dimension of financial policy reform (both financial liberalization and 
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prudential regulation) and should choose the optimal combination of policy dimensions to 
maintain financial stability and to mitigate the adverse effects of possible financial disturbances 
when a country faces a specific type of financial crisis. 
 Subsequently, the recent Global Financial Crisis (GFC) has led to the literature to the 
focus on the macroprudential policies and capital controls. An extensive literature has explored 
the relationships among macroprudential policies, capital controls, and financial stability. Yet, 
study on the link between volatile capital inflows and upgrading of such policies still need to 
be explored. Chapter 3 has filled this gap by empirically testing whether countries employ 
MPMs or CFMs following shocks related to volatile capital inflows. In addition, it states the 
significant differences in the focus of these policies between the pre- and post-GFC periods.  
The results reconfirm the crisis-beget-reform argument in the crisis-reform literature by 
showing that financial regulators facing sudden stops of capital inflows (which can be regarded 
as one type of financial crises) tend to upgrade macroprudential policy, particularly financial 
institutions-based macroprudential policy. Furthermore, it indicates that an economy facing 
sharp increases of capital inflows upgrades its capital control measure to manage the risk 
associated with such large volatility. Such results are more pronounced in the post-GFC periods. 
This chapter suggest that macroprudential policies and capital controls are upgraded in the face 
of volatile capital inflows and the use of such policies have become much more common in the 
wake of the GFC. 
The final chapter revisits the old debate of how global uncertainty how global 
uncertainty relates to extreme waves of capital flows. The chapter attempts to focus on foreign 
direct investment, portfolio investment, and other investment besides gross capital flows. In 
addition, it explores the differences in the role of global uncertainty between advanced and 
developing economies since the role of global uncertainty could be different across countries. 
This empirical study has confirmed the argument of the existing literature, including Forbes 
and Warnock (2012), Calderón and Kubota (2013), and Passari and Rey (2015), that global 
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uncertainty is a crucial source of extreme capital flow waves. More importantly, A significant 
contribution of the study is that it has shown clear differences in the role of global uncertainty 
between advanced and developing economies. In developing economies, FDI is more resilient, 
compared to FPI, during times of high global uncertainty, as suggested in conventional wisdom. 
In contrast, FDI is as vulnerable as FPI to uncertainty shock in advanced economies. Thus, the 
“wait-and-see” mechanism matters on FDI only in advanced economies.   
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